

Byron Shafer and Richard Spady
Chapter Three
Social Cleavages and Political Opinions

Four great social cleavages have traditionally been used to describe political divisions in major countries: social class, race and ethnicity, religious background, sex and gender. Not all cleavages have been relevant to politics in all nations. Just as individual nations mix the number and sequence of relevant cleavages in idiosyncratic ways. The historical pattern that results does not prove that any given cleavage—sex rather than class, for example—was inconsequential for the nation in question, only that it was not mobilized into politics at a given point in time. Sometimes, this historical pattern has direct and obvious extrapolations to current political conflict. Other times, modern politics features new cleavages plus a fresh remix of the old. Regardless, any analysis that seeks to begin with the social bases of political opinion would need to address these ‘big four’ divisions.

Modern American politics certainly partakes of arguments about all four. Social class and the class-differentiated distribution of economic well-being were staples of American politics when the New Deal (and survey research!) arrived on the scene in the 1930s and 1940s. They have seldom been far from political conflict since then. Indeed, much research indicates that class is actually on the rise as a cleavage relevant to American politics. (Carty 2007, Bartels 2008) While there may be nearly as many indicators of social class as there are students of class phenomena, two indicators that would be accepted as an essential part of almost all definitions are income and education. Because they are related but not nearly identical, because both are available in all the Pew surveys, and, to jump ahead of the story, because they work in distinguishable ways, we utilize both in the analysis that follows.

Race and ethnicity have been central to American politics from at least the moments, respectively, when slavery arrived in what would become the United States and when it became clear that this new nation would be populated, to an impressive degree, by way of immigration. (Lipset 1964) The debate over race policy would be reinvigorated with a veritable civil rights ‘revolution’ in the 1960s and 1970s. (Sitkoff 1982, Graham 1990) Debate over immigration policy—and with it, over the ‘Americanization’ of immigrants—would rise and fall across time, largely in conjunction with immigrant waves, like the one currently roiling American society. (Portes 1987, King 2005) For our time, in any case, the inescapable categories are clear enough. Race must take account of Black Americans if it is to have any meaning. Ethnicity must mean Hispanic Americans, most especially. The Pew surveys offer both, and we attend explicitly to them.¹

¹ Other racial or ethnic categories that might be intriguing, as with Asian Americans or Native Americans, Ukrainian Americans or Lebanese Americans, are just too small in even the best of national samples to come into the analysis.

Religious background can be thought of in the same fashion: present from the creation, rising or falling in its political relevance across the years, getting a refreshed and partially new incarnation in modern times. Some (not all) of the American colonies began as explicitly religious experiments, attempts to create a new world according to theological precepts. (Howe 1979) Religious movements were integral to the great political conflicts of American history that followed, especially the Revolution and the Civil War. They went on to dominate American politics in the late nineteenth century, only to recede and then re-emerge in the late twentieth. (Leege et al. 2001, Layman 2002) The Pew surveys permit carrying the four great denominational families of American society in all years—Evangelical Protestants, Mainstream Protestants, Catholics, and various non-Christians—along with a more generic religiosity (in the form of church attendance) in most.

Lastly, sex and gender cleavages, conceived in the broadest sense, have attracted some attention in all eras, and insistent attention in the most recent years. As organizing principles for social life, they have been omnipresent. Still, the array of possible aspects of sex roles and gendered institutions that have made their way into opinion surveys in modern times remains impressive. (Kohut et al. 2001) Among these, the Pew surveys allow us to carry the basic sex difference, differentiating men from women. And they allow us to carry gendered institutions, most especially family structures, here distinguishing between parents and non-parents, that is, households with and without children. Both social cleavages are large enough to promise stable relationships and distinctive enough, from other grand cleavages and from each other, that such relationships can potentially add explanatory power. The Pew surveys also permit us to look for age-related differences, and we have added them to the section on sex and gender.

Methodologically, it is possible to treat these grand social cleavages, to varying but largely parallel degrees, as ‘instruments’ for the measurement analysis here, that is, as phenomena associated with our central concern, political values, which are nevertheless not shaped reciprocally by them. This is easiest to see—most indisputable—in the case of race or sex. We might get an individual survey respondent to change his or her answers on questions tapping cultural or economic issues, but it is only in rare cases or on the far shores of behavior that we would be changing their race or sex (or indeed, ethnicity) as a result. Social class allows a bit more reciprocity in the abstract: a change in cultural or economic values, asserted for a long enough time, just might affect social mobility and thus class position. Yet this could hardly work from one survey to the next, and the overall direction of effect (from social background to political values) would remain clear and overwhelming. As a result, the greatest fluidity in this relationship would probably involve religious background: a change in cultural or economic values just might lead to a switch in denomination. That said, the vast bulk of religious affiliations are inherited, full stop, and the aggregate shift in the size and composition of the great religious families moves only glacially from survey to survey.

Substantively, the story is more interesting. Some social cleavages are related to one but not the other of our two opinion dimensions. Some are related to both. Some, of course, relate to neither. For some social cleavages, an evident relationship to cultural or

economic values is neatly ordinal. For others, it makes more sense to talk about social *categories*, not a social *variable*, since nothing gives these categories a simple and inherent order. For still others, when the focus is a relationship to political values, the order is clear, with the dramatic exception of a particular category. Lastly, some elements of social background drive cultural and economic values in a parallel fashion, while other elements drive them in opposite directions. The result of all of the above is a straightforward but not uncomplicated picture of the links between social cleavages and political opinions in the United States, a kind of ideological landscape for political strategy and political conflict.

Social Class: Income

Social class, the placement of an individual within an economic system and the array of life chances and life styles that go with that placement, is one of the great social ‘locaters’ for all individuals, though its relevance to politics can vary enormously. A personal history, a particular period in time, or an idiosyncratic mix with other background characteristics can cause any given individual to make class more or less important when addressing politics. The mobilizing effect of political intermediaries, most especially political parties and organized interests, can give different priorities to class attachments, quite apart from individual choice. And the programmatic substance of the particular policies that are at the center of political conflict at a given point in time can cause the impact of social class to vary enormously.

With that as prologue, Table 1 presents all of the coefficients for our first measure of social class, namely income, in their relationship to public values on the culture and economics scales. As in Chapter 2, coefficients are for these specific relationships with all of the other major demographic variables (race and ethnicity, religious background, sex and gender) simultaneously in the model. These coefficients thus show the degree of movement away from the reference category, standardized at .00. In the case of income, that category is the approximate middle third of the American income distribution, effectively our ‘middle class’. To understand the table, note that being in the upper-middle income category for the survey of 2002, for example, would make an individual +.23 more liberal than the reference category on culture and -.12 more conservative on economics.

Because these coefficients represent links to major aspects of social background, it is desirable that the results in Table 1 remain roughly stable across time. In other words, a recurring tendency in the cultural and economic values for each income category is a major substantive reassurance about these coefficients. On the other hand, there ought to be some room for simple change, as previously non-political values get mobilized into politics or as changing policy implications cause social groups to shift their political preferences. Beyond that, events of the day or the substance of a political campaign may prime even enduring preferences in at least a modestly different fashion. And alas, there is always room for any given survey to offer a relationship that is a comparative outlier on simple sampling grounds, especially in the case of social characteristics that are less widespread.

Table 1

All that said, Table 1 tells a strongly patterned and impressively stable story. Family income is here divided roughly into thirds—terciles—along with a small top category aimed at capturing some distinction (if any) between the wealthy and the rest of the distribution. Hence the table features the bottom 30%, designated as lower income; the middle 30%, or middle income; the next 30%, as upper-middle; and the top 10%, or upper income. Table 1.A provides coefficients for the relationships between income and cultural or economic values for each year that the Pew Trust has done a national survey since 1987. It also offers the average and median scores for all surveys together, for reference. Table 1.B then aggregates these same surveys by the presidential election to which they refer. Thus the 1987 and 1988 surveys ask about presidential vote in 1984, so that they are combined to create figures for that year, and so on.²

Middle-income Americans are the reference category here, so they are assigned the standardized score of .00 on both cultural and economic values. On culture, lower-income Americans then sit in effectively the same position, with an average score across all surveys of +.01 and a median of +.02. This makes them indistinguishable from lower-income Americans, after all other social background variables are considered, a similarity that is most definitely not the result of standardization. Said differently, during this period in modern American history there was a vast general consensus on cultural values by income within American society, with both the bottom third and the middle third in essential agreement.

Upper-middle income Americans are then reliably more liberal on cultural matters, with an average score of +.25 across surveys and a median score of +.21. And upper-income Americans are more liberal yet, with an average score of +.41 and a median score of +.38. Overall, then cultural liberalism increases with family income, and cultural conservatism vice versa, but the relationship is not neatly linear. Instead, it is better described by saying that, on cultural matters, there is a clear division between lower-income and middle-income Americans on one side, and upper-middle and upper-income Americans on the other, with an additional increment of cultural liberalism among the very wealthiest.

Family income and economic values tell a very different story. Here, lower-income Americans are reliably more liberal than the reference category, preferring more governmental intervention as protection against the harshness of the economic marketplace, with an average score of +.19 across surveys and a median of +.18 as well. Middle-income Americans remain the reference category, at .00, and this time they are not in any simple consensus with lower-income counterparts. By contrast, upper-middle respondents are more conservative, with an average score of -.14 and a median of -.13.

² For the record, 1990 + 1992 = 1988; 1993 + 1994 = 1992; 1997 + 1999 = 1996; and 2002 is the only survey tapping 2000. In search of an underlying pattern and as protection against pure sampling variance, Table 1.B also dispenses with the single outlying score in each column, that is, the single result that is farthest from the column average.

And upper-income Americans are modestly but additionally conservative, at -.19 for an average score and -.15 for the median.

Overall, then, it is economic conservatism that increases with income, and economic liberalism vice versa. Income thus primes these two great dimensions of political values, culture and economics, in opposite directions. That said, both dimensions share an ordinal relationship to income though this relationship is more simply and neatly linear in the case of economic values. Lower-income Americans stand to the left of middle-income counterparts, while upper-middle and upper-income Americans stand to the right. Beyond that, lower-income and upper-income respondents are almost perfectly equidistant from middle-income respondents, to the left and the right respectively, though there is not really much difference between the upper-middle and upper-income segments.

Because this income analysis serves as a template for the rest of the chapter, it is probably worth returning to each of these comparisons. At bottom, family income drives cultural and economic values in opposite directions. Wealthier Americans are more liberal on cultural values, more conservative on economic values. Just as poorer Americans are more conservative on the former, more liberal on the latter. Though not all social characteristics, as we shall see, share this tendency to prime preferences on the two grand domains in opposite ways. Yet this observation should not lose track of the fact that the two distributions have additional, noticeable differences, even when the focus is just family income:

- Economic preferences cut American society into three distinct pieces: lower-income versus middle-income versus upper-middle plus upper-income.
- Because we have defined income by income shares—30/30/30/10—these three pieces also represent rough thirds of society.
- Moreover, this economic distribution is roughly symmetric, with the poor at +.19, the middle at .00, the rich at -.19, and the upper-middle only slightly less conservative at -.15.
- By contrast, culture divides income categories—our social classes—into two great pieces, the more and the less advantaged, with an extra increment for the most well-off.
- Moreover, this cultural distribution is not symmetric, with its lower-income and middle-income pieces effectively at .00, versus an upper-middle at +.25, and upper-income at +.41.
- The marginals then make this distribution of cultural preferences additionally complex, in that categories containing 60% of society are at .00, 30% at +.25, and 10% at +.41.

To jump ahead of the story: there are all sorts of strategic implications inherent in just these two distributions, of political values on economics and culture by family income. For example, conflict over economics should presumably have a more regular and orthodox pattern than conflict over culture, where the prospect of satisfying the more

varied social groups (when classified by income) should be more difficult. Though if culture appears to offer more strategic possibilities, economics looks to be more entrenched as an incipient political conflict. Alternatively, if voter turnout varied by income, or if different income categories were better represented at the nomination stage than at the general election—both logical possibilities that are empirically correct—then the prospect that culture could generate a set of options that were farther from the preferences of the general public seems greater than the prospect that economics would do so. Chapters 6 and 7 will be centrally focused on these matters.

Table 1.B aggregates these same surveys by presidential election year, while dropping the single largest outlier from each of the columns of Table 1.A. Presumably, this focus on particular elections will itself have a smoothing effect on the coefficients as a whole, and Table 1.B does largely repeat the same picture: a tripartite division on economics, which is neatly symmetric, along with a bifurcation on culture, with the wealthy taking an additional leap off to the cultural left. What 1.B is particularly good at is underlining the stability in these values, across the generation for which we have adequate survey data: these preferences do seem to be consistently linked to family income across time for each income category.

Said the other way around, there is little evidence either of instability or of change across this generation in the relationship between cultural or economic preferences and family income. There is some slight indication that the upper-income sector shifts its preferences a bit more from year to year, especially its economic preferences. But because this is also a considerably smaller group than the other three, that apparent effect might always be due to sampling rather than to substance. Either way, what appears from Table 1 is a familiar and apparently stable relationship between cultural or economic values and this first great indicator of social class.

Social Class: Education

Table 2.A presents essentially the same analysis, but using education rather than income as the key demographic variable. (Recall that income remains in the model when focusing on education, just as education was in the model when analyzing relationships with family income.) Cultural values prove to be strongly aligned with education across the full range of educational attainments. High-school drop-outs, the lowest educational category, are more conservative than the reference category on cultural values, with an average score of -.24 and a median score of -.21. High-school graduates are that reference category this time, standardized at .00. The some-college category, those who obtained some further education or classroom training beyond high school, are considerably more liberal on cultural values than these high-school graduates, with an average score of +.53 and a median of +.51. And college graduates, the highest educational category, are wildly liberal, with an average of +.94 and a median of +.98.

Table 2

That is a consistently stepped relationship, from -.24 to .00 to +.53 to +.94 in average scores. And this underlying order is repeated in every year. In that sense, the relationship between educational attainment and cultural values is certainly linear. Moreover, one should not lose sight of the fact that it encompasses a huge range of cultural views, from -.24 to +.94 by virtue of educational attainment alone. And this does not include the contribution of that other, major, correlated indicator of social class, family income, which ranges from .00 to +.41 at the same time. On the other hand, the two big steps in this relationship of cultural values to educational attainment are contributed by the some-college group and, especially, by college graduates.

The pattern is not unlike the one characterizing the relationship between family income and cultural values, in the sense that the two bottom categories, high-school drop-out and high-school graduate this time, are once again closer to each other in preference than to either of the top two categories. Likewise, the bulk of the variation is once again contributed by these top categories, the some-colleges and the college graduates. Yet this contribution is just much more extreme in the case of education. The some-colleges are already farther to the left of the reference category on culture than the high-school drop-outs are to the right. And the college graduates then pull wildly farther off to the left.

Table 2.B goes on to suggest that these responses are a stable part of the modern political landscape. When cultural scores are aggregated by presidential election year, the cultural preferences of each educational category are impressively consistent, with perhaps the greatest variation in the lowest category, the high-school drop-outs, this time. Though the presence of only one survey (rather than two) for the 2000 election may be contributing as much to any apparent variation. In any case, note that measured either way, by individual survey or by election year, the relationships between social class and cultural values are stronger for education than for income, as between these two great indicators. Indeed, in Table 2.B, every coefficient for this relationship is higher for education than for income—either more conservative or more liberal, depending on the direction of the effect.

Moreover, with education much more than with income, the marginals—that is, the distribution of American society across educational categories—have more to contribute to the strategic implications of these educational relationships, and in two senses:

- In the earliest of these Pew surveys, the clear modal category is high-school graduates, with society divided roughly 20/40/20/20 across the four great educational categories. Candidates whose cultural positions were not attractive to high-school graduates (the 40% category) should at least have faced a problem needing compensation elsewhere.
- Yet in the most recent Pew surveys, the onrush of education has altered the underlying distribution, with society now divided roughly 10/30/30/30. This makes the cultural preferences of high-school drop-outs much less consequential, while it simultaneously makes the ‘winning’ position on culture less obvious, since rough

thirds of American society are in categories strung out at roughly equidistant (and quite distant!) positions.

Economic values, too, prove to be aligned with educational attainment, though in a noticeably different way across the range of educational categories. (Table 2.B) High-school drop-outs, the lowest educational category, are clearly more liberal than the reference category on economics, with an average score of +.28 and a median score of +.21. High-school graduates still contribute that reference category, at .00. The some-colleges are now clearly more conservative than this category on economic values, with an average score of -.26 and a median score of -.29. And this time, the college graduates are no more conservative than these some-colleges, though still clearly conservative, with an average of -.22 and a median of -.26.

That too is an overall pattern similar to the one involving family income: bottom category versus middle category versus upper-middle and upper categories combined. Though it is worth recalling that a similar pattern can have different strategic possibilities when the sizes of its categories differ, a point to which we shall return in Chapter Four. Here, the key point remains that the pattern of relationships between our two main measures of social class and public attitudes on culture and economics are roughly similar. And they work in the same manner in the presence of each other: they do not generate similar relationships to cultural or economic values only because they are themselves in essence the same thing.

On the other hand, the analyst should not lose sight of the other side of this coin: there is a major difference of scale in these two roughly similar effects. Even in the case of economic values, education is more tightly aligned to public preferences than is income. (Compare Tables 1.A and 2.A.) If we compare coefficients for economic values in the nine surveys for which we have data, that is, if we compare the bottom categories on education versus income, the upper-middle categories on education versus income, and the top categories on education versus income—the lower-middle categories being standardized at .00 in both cases—there are stronger coefficients for the relationship to education in 19 of these 27 available comparisons, with only 2 of 27 coefficients for the relationship to income being higher (and 6 being equal). Not all of these differences would be statistically significant, but their drift is evident and consistent.

So, among aspects of social class, education dominates income even with regard to economic values. Yet it is with cultural values that educational attainment really comes into its own. Again, education and income show roughly similar relationships to culture. It is just that the relationships to education are much, much stronger. Of those 27 coefficients available for comparison between income and education (in Tables 1.A and 2.A), 25 feature a stronger relationship to education and none—0—to income (with 2 equal). Moreover, the comparison of average coefficients between cultural values and income versus education are eye-opening: +.01 vs. -.24 for the bottom categories of income versus education; +.25 versus +.53 for upper-middle categories of income versus education; and +.41 versus +.94 for the top categories of income versus education.

Even that is not quite all the educational story, however. One final, further piece leaves most of the relationships between educational attainment and cultural or economic values intact, and thus leaves the overall relationship between culture and economics intact as well. But this final piece does change the relationship between education and each set of values in one major way, thereby changing the comparison between the two relationships as well. For the four surveys from 1994 through 2002 but not for the five from 1987 through 1993, it is possible to divide the upper-education category into college graduates versus those who attained post-graduate degrees. Which is to say: from 1987 through 1993, those who had taken advanced degrees beyond the baccalaureate are included in the category “college grads”. But from 1994 onward, it is possible to give these “post-graduates” a category of their own, so that they are no longer included in that blended category.

Table 3

Table 3 does this, facilitating a further comparison between social groups as well as between relationships to culture and economics. Recall that without this further division in the upper-education category, college graduates had joined with the some-colleges to contribute the conservative pole on economic values by education. In this, they were roughly equidistant from the reference category by comparison to the high-school drop-outs at the opposite pole. (Table 2) Though the some-colleges actually appeared to be ever so slightly more conservative than the college graduates overall. Now, Table 3 restores a neatly linear character to the social categories used in Table 2, while even more clearly disrupting the overall relationship between educational attainment and economic values.

The previous pieces remain essentially as they were. Though now, the college graduates resume their position to the right of the some-colleges, being an average of $-.29$ off to the right of the reference category, the high-school graduates, while the some-colleges stand at $-.25$. High-school drop-outs, with an average economic score of $+.32$, are still leaning left. Isolation of the post-graduates has in that sense restored a nearly linear character to the previous educational relationship. Yet rather than move further to the right with greater educational attainment, the post-graduates actually move back toward the economic center, being only moderately more conservative than the high-school graduates, at an average of $-.16$ for the four available years.

They are therefore more conservative than the reference category, those high-school graduates, and much more so than the high-school drop-outs. But they are actually more liberal than both the college graduates and the some-colleges. And note that this is not an implicit income effect, whereby post-graduates move to the center because they make less than college graduates or some-colleges. Income is, as ever, already in the model in its own right. As a result, recognition of the post-graduates as a separate educational category, while it puts the previous educational categories back into a neat order on economic values, completely disrupts that order in terms of its own placement—where the extreme educational category becomes the middle group on economic values.

Yet if these post-grads move back toward the center on economics, they do the precise opposite on culture. Recall that in the absence of this division within the upper-education category, college graduates contributed the far cultural left, being substantially more liberal than the some-colleges and wildly more liberal than the rest of society. Still, the real division in society on cultural matters was between the high-school drop-outs and high-school graduates on one side and the some-colleges and college graduates on the other. Yet now, with college graduates and post-graduates separated, it is clearly the post-graduates who form the far cultural left, and by an impressive margin. Indeed, education takes them as far away from the some-colleges as the latter are from the high-school drop-outs.

Again, most of the rest of the story remains as it was. The high-school drop-outs have an average cultural score of -.21 for the four surveys where post-graduate status is available, making them the cultural right. (Table 3) High-school graduates remain the reference category at .00. The some-colleges have an average cultural score of +.59, making them look like the cultural left by comparison to high-school graduates. And education take the college graduates well off to the left of these some-colleges, at an average of +.86, though not as far off as they would be if the post-graduates were included within college-graduate ranks. For the post-graduates actually end up with a whopping +1.34 as an average score on the scale of cultural values.

On the one hand, then, it remains true that the post-graduates sustain the ordinal ranking that existed before this group was isolated. In terms of this ordinal relationship, they are not disruptive with culture, as they were with economics. On the other hand, what they also do is to extend the range of this ordinal ranking very, very substantially. Recognizing them as a social category thus makes the strategic environment for politics potentially more complex, a complexity that is only magnified when we attend to the distribution of educational attainment in society. For now, with the post-graduates as a separate category, that distribution, of high-school drop-outs through post-graduates, becomes 10/30/30/20/10.

For most purposes in the analysis to follow, it will be more useful to have precisely comparable educational categories, so that the post-grads will not appear separately. For other purposes, a more accurate picture of relationships—and more explanation of variance in the vote—can be gained by bringing these post-graduates into the analysis as a separate category when the survey allows. On the one hand, they surely are a growth sector of American society. On the other hand, they cannot have been a large group in earlier surveys, since even at the end of our survey sequence, the post-graduates still represent only 10% of society. This is about the same share as the high-school drop-outs, just enough to imply that checking the analysis both ways will be essential from time to time.

Social Background: Race and Ethnicity

The available categories for race and ethnicity are not as rich across the full theoretical array as those for income or education. Even working with survey data as

extensive as those from the Pew Trust, the analysis must in effect be limited to black/non-black on matters of race. It is not possible, for example, to have reliable figures for Asian Americans or Native Americans as well. Likewise, it is effectively necessary to focus the ethnic analysis on Hispanic/non-Hispanic, though this stricture does have the virtue of capturing the major immigrant category of recent years. Older ethnic categories, as with Italian-American or Polish-American, are simply no longer asked in most national surveys. Newer ethnic categories, as with Haitian-Americans or Sikh-Americans, are not yet sufficiently numerous to sustain the same kind of analysis.

On the other hand, the pay-off from the major available categories is still high. If we intended to have one main category of race and one of ethnicity in their main contemporary incarnations, that intention would lead naturally to the two key groups available for such an analysis, namely Black Americans and Hispanic Americans. More to the analytical point, race and ethnicity in their main contemporary incarnation turn out to matter a great deal to the shaping of cultural and economic values, modestly but consistently for culture and just hugely for economics.

Table 4

Black Americans prove to be moderately but consistently conservative on cultural values, with an average score of -.21 and a median score of -.17. (Table 4.A) While these are not large negative scores in most years, though they are in a few, they are also never positive. This is a social group that is reliably more conservative than white Americans, the reference group here, on cultural values. Yet where Blacks as a social group truly distinguish themselves is not on culture but on economics. Black Americans anchor the economic left in the United States, with an average score of +.75 and a median score of +.80. No one else comes close, and recall that this is not because Blacks tend to have lower incomes or lower educational levels. They do have both, but neither is reflected in these figures, which deal only with race.

That distinction, between a key social characteristic and other characteristics that are often associated with its appearance in society, probably means that it is time to stop and notice the sense in which these particular racial scores still understate the relationship between race and economic liberalism. Being a Black American adds an average score of +.75 on economics to the reference category. That is the specific contribution of race. Yet being a Black American also makes it much more likely that the respondent is low-education and low-income in class terms. As we have already seen, a Black American who did not complete high school would add +.28 on average to his or her economic score. If he or she was also low-income, they would add a further +.19 on average, for a total shift of +1.20 on economic values.

Beyond that, to the extent that there is any change in these figures over time, it is worth noting that this change is in the direction of greater economic liberalism as time passes. In fact, all of the Black economic scores from 1994 onward are higher than the average for our total period. (Table 4) For what is already the far economic left among major social groups, it would not be wise to read too much into this apparent further shift.

Except to say that there is certainly no evidence that Black economic liberalism is in retreat. As a result, it would take a genuine cataclysm for Black Americans not to anchor this particular ideological continuum for some time to come.

A more modest version of the same thing can be said about Hispanic Americans, our largest contemporary immigrant group. They too tend to be moderately but consistently conservative on cultural values, with an average score of $-.11$ and a median score of $-.13$. While group scores for individual years are similarly modest, they are also, with one exception, reliably negative. A Hispanic identity pulls the identifier very modestly to the right of the reference category (non-Hispanics) on culture. Like Black Americans, however, Hispanic Americans tend to be more clearly liberal on economic values, with an average score of $+.25$ and a median score of $+.31$. And here, some individual years do feature strong liberalism, while none are ever negative (and hence conservatizing).

On the one hand, neither set of values, on culture or economics, is as sharply etched for Hispanics as those characterizing Black Americans. On the other hand, Hispanic economic values are still more sharply etched than, for example, those characterizing low-income respondents or high-school drop-outs, the two most liberal categories on social class. Moreover, Hispanics, like Blacks, are more likely to be found in those lower-class categories. When they are, their economic scores will move off from the reference category in a further liberal direction, respectively, adding $+.28$ for low education and $+.19$ for low income to their economic scores, for an overall score of $+.62$.

We cannot know, from these data, whether other immigrant groups, more recent or more distant, would have displayed the same pattern of values at the same point in their assimilation. Modest cultural conservatism and strong economic liberalism seem appropriate to the immigrant experience in general, but we have no data to confirm this perception. Conversely, we do know, but cannot profit from the fact, that the Hispanic data miss a large further population of illegal immigrants, whose values might in principle be different. All we can say there is that we believe that these individuals are largely irrelevant to any voting analysis. What we can know nevertheless is that Hispanic Americans are actually the next most liberal group in American society on economic values, second only to Black Americans.

Table 4.B then merely repeats these findings in a slightly altered format. Portrayed by election year rather than survey by survey, Black Americans look, if anything, even more liberal in their economic preferences. Just as, portrayed this way, Hispanic Americans look more stable in their modest cultural conservatism. Seen the other way around, across social cleavages, race contributes about the same impact to cultural values as does ethnicity for these two key groups. While race contributes far more than does ethnicity to economic values. Yet in the end, membership in both social groups remains especially noteworthy for its impact on economic liberalism, coupled with that more modest contribution to cultural conservatism.

Religious Background: Denomination

Religious backgrounds can influence political values in a variety of ways. Theologically, different faiths are organized around different central values, extending out to different propositions about the good life. In principle, these can provide means for evaluating arguments in all walks of life, including politics. Yet the evolution of different faiths also provides them with (indeed, leads them to emphasize) different specific strictures, which can have a more direct relevance whenever these strictures happen to be engaged by particular public policies or political conflicts. Lastly, there can be an organizational and not just a theological link from religious background to political values. In this, different organized faiths, that is, different churches, can communicate specific policy positions directly to their assembled congregants, in a process whereby the official church leadership bypasses the indirect shaping of political values and explicitly translates denominational positions into cultural or economic preferences.

Table 5 presents all of the coefficients for our first measure of religious background, denominational attachment, in its relationship to public values on the cultural and economic scales. Religious denominations are classified here into five broad ‘families’ of theological attachment:

- “Catholics” combine both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox branches of attachment to the Catholic Church. This puts back together the split in the original Christian church, tracing to St. Peter, which is the conventional way of proceeding in the literature on religion and politics.
- By contrast, “Protestants” are here divided into two main branches, sometimes defined as “Pietistic” versus “Liturgical” but more commonly encountered as “Evangelical” and “Mainstream”. From the Pew surveys, this division is accomplished through the item asking about a “born-again” experience. Evangelical Protestants are born-again; Mainstream Protestants are not. The latter then become our reference category, creating the zero point (.00) on both culture and economics.
- The category “Non-Christian” gathers Jews, miscellaneous other identifiers, and those who answer “none” when asked about denominational affiliation. For some purposes subsequently, we shall disaggregate this fourth category into its principal pieces. For most purposes, however, these individual pieces do co-vary, while they are too small individually to offer the stable coefficients that remain a desirable characteristic of a search for the relationship between social background and political values.
- Lastly, we acknowledge the argument that the historically black churches have developed a Protestant theology that deserves to be called distinctive. Black Mainstream Protestants do not look all that different from their white brethren; in our time, many Black Mainstream Protestants are in fact members of what were historically White Mainstream congregations. At first blush, Black Evangelical Protestants may not look all that different in terms of church ritual from White Evangelicals either. Yet enough of Black Evangelicalism has been built upon the specifically black experience that it has moved off from generic evangelicalism theologically, most especially through a greater emphasis on social justice.

Note that the value of this final, further distinction remains an empirical question. Should the theological argument prove to be overstated when encountered in the survey data, we can fold “Black Evangelical Protestants” back into Evangelical Protestantism generally. Table 5 will, however, argue immediately against any such condensation, at least until we have considered the social group basis of political opinions in Chapter Four. So, we carry five great denominational families into the analysis of social cleavages in Table 5, and we shall end up carrying all five families into the related analysis of social groups in Chapter Four.

It is a commonplace to argue that religious background, like social class, has waxed and waned in its direct relevance to politics. It is always present as a social locator. It is rarely irrelevant to political conflict. But the degree of its connection has still varied enormously in different political eras. The point here is just that there is much contemporary argument that religious background has become more relevant to politics in recent years. If this is true, it may also give religious background somewhat more license to change across (recent) time. In particular, the role of Evangelical Protestants in American politics has gathered increasing attention, and debate. The single generation represented by the Pew surveys may be too short to capture any such variation, but we shall remain alert to it.

Table 5

In any case, Table 5 once again tells a strongly patterned story: these social categories, too, matter. White Evangelical Protestants are drawn conservative—very strongly conservative—on cultural values, with an average contribution from their denominational family of $-.58$ and a median contribution of $-.54$ across all of the Pew surveys. Mainstream Protestants and Catholics then sit right at the center of the denominational distribution on culture. Once more, this is artifactual in the case of Mainstream Protestants, who serve as the reference category here (at $.00$). But there is nothing artifactual about the contribution of American Catholicism, nor about the fact that Catholics join Mainstream Protestants in making no further denominational contribution to cultural values, with an average score of $+.00$. It is the two groups together that contribute the center of the relationship between denominational family and cultural values. Non-Christians then anchor the other end of the cultural continuum, moving their adherents in a strongly liberal direction on cultural values, at $+.52$ for their average score and $+.54$ for their median.

Black Evangelical Protestants, finally, join their white brethren in being pulled in the very conservative direction on cultural values by their denominational attachment, a result that may require additional comment in two regards. First, note that it is Black Evangelicalism, not Black Protestantism, that makes a separate contribution to political values. We were able to confirm that nothing additional would be gained by yet a sixth religious category called “Black Mainstream Protestant”, and we do not provide such a category here. Black Mainstream Protestants retain the contributions to cultural and economic values contributed by race, of course. But they acquire no further—extra,

additional—contribution to political values by way of a racialized denomination. We shall see more of this particular (non)impact in Chapter Four.

Second, not only do Black and White Evangelical Protestants appear to be driven similarly, on culture and even, subsequently, on economics. The summary numbers in Table 5 actually understate this situation. For in fact, Black Evangelicals appear to have undergone a major ideological shift during the generation tapped by these Pew surveys. The first pair of available surveys in this sequence still places Black Evangelical Protestants in nearly the same place on culture as the Mainstream Protestants and the Catholics. These three great families, together, are effectively the center of any denominational contribution to cultural values. By 1990, however, the Black Evangelicals have moved off to the right, and they show no evidence of moving back, at least as this is written. Averaged over all surveys, these Black Evangelical Protestants have a mean score of -.39 and a median of -.45. But averaged over only the surveys from 1990 onward, their average would be -.50 and their median -.58. These scores track very closely with those of White Evangelical Protestants, with their average of -.57 and their median of -.55.

There is no simple and self-imposed ‘order’ to these great religious families, at least none that can be given the numerical precision of family income or educational attainment. But it is not hard to perceive an ordering integral to a denominational continuum, especially once the relationship between the great religious families and cultural values has been revealed. At one end of this continuum are what we might call the ‘committed Christians’, those for whom denominational attachment implies adherence to the literal truths of Christianity. This unites both White and Black Evangelicals, at least after the latter began applying their beliefs differently to politics. At the other end of this continuum are the non-Christians, who by definition have no adherence to Christianity, whether literal or interpreted. And in the middle are those Christian denominational families, gathered here as Mainstream Protestantism and Catholicism, which adhere to Christianity as interpreted by modernizing elites across time.

So, the literalists are drawn strongly conservative on culture, the non-believers are drawn strongly liberal on culture, and the interpretivists end up being culturally moderate. Economic values, however, tell a different story, and this in two senses. The first of these clear points of difference derives from the familiar and straightforward comparison of membership impact. White Evangelical Protestants are pulled modestly but evidently and consistently conservative on economic values and not just culture, with an average score of -.17 and a median score of -.16. Those scores, while not huge, are sufficient to make them the conservative religious anchor on economics. Mainstream Protestants, our reference category at .00, are again roughly equidistant from the ideological extremes, for economics and not just for culture, though the distance in either direction is smaller, a point to which we shall return below. That much is similar with regard to religious background as an influence on both culture and economics.

From there on, however, the story changes. On culture, American Catholics were aligned with these Mainstream Protestants to constitute the broad denominational middle. On economics, Catholics are aligned instead with the Non-Christians. The latter again provide the liberal anchor for this denominational continuum, with an average score +.17 and a median of +.14. Yet the comparable Catholic scores, an average of +.10 and a median of +.10 as well, are not all that different. It would be possible to put the Black Evangelical Protestants into this liberal policy coalition as well, by using an average score of +.15 and a median score of +.23 for all survey years. Yet this looks to be a mistake. For once again, there appears to be a major change in the political values of Black Evangelicals within the past generation. From 1994 backward, their average economic score was +.28. From 1997 forward, it was instead -.11. That is a bigger shift within the category than the distance between the most conservative and the most liberal among the other denominations.

This shift is still not as clear-cut—as consistent and lacking in exceptions—as the counterpart shift among Black Evangelicals on cultural values. Yet an overall shift does appear, and it gains consequence because it dovetails neatly with the events of contemporary politics during these years. The argument from Evangelical Protestant theology among White Evangelicals had already become very straightforward. Cultural issues were the centerpiece of their political positioning, where things like the sanctity of human life have been very important to evangelical thought. But there was a further spillover from the argument that self-realization—salvation on an individual basis, by way of righteous living—implies less collective action on economic matters. That, indeed, governmental programs as a substitute for personal conversion are a bad thing.

For White Evangelical Protestants, these preferences are present in the data from the first Pew survey that we have: strong cultural conservatism coupled with moderate economic conservatism. For the opening surveys in this sequence, those tapping political choice at the 1984 election, Black Evangelicals are unmoved on cultural values by their denominational attachments, in common with the Mainstream Protestants and the Catholics. (Table 5.B) For surveys tapping the very next presidential election, however, the election of 1988, they had shifted: Black Evangelicalism would pull its adherents strongly in a conservative direction on culture in every election year thereafter. Yet it was not until two elections later, with surveys tapping political choice in the 1996 election, that the conservative shift on economic values really arrived among these Evangelicals Blacks. Though it would be every bit as fierce when it finally came: the shift from +.42 at the 1992 election to -.15 at the 1996 election is huge indeed.

And at this point, it is probably important to stop and emphasize exactly what this does and does not mean. It most definitely does not imply that Black Evangelicals, in the totality of their existence, have become conservative on economics. Being Black, they start out with an average score of +.82 for these three surveys (1997-2002) on economics, courtesy of their racial background. From the survey of 1997 onward, this was reduced by an average of -.11 for those Blacks who were members of Evangelical Protestant churches as we have defined them. This gives them an average economic score of +.71. By contrast, White Evangelical Protestants were being drawn in a conservative direction,

courtesy of a similar denominational connection, by only a bit more than their Black counterparts: an average of -.18 for White Evangelical Protestants versus that -.11 for Black Evangelicals. Yet being White, White Evangelicals begin at .00 on economics, so that their average score for these three elections, when denominational attachment is added to racial background, is -.18—versus +.71 for Black Evangelicals.

Finally, note that there is a second sense in which the economic story is different from the cultural story when the focus is a relationship to religious background via denominational families. This involves the comparative power of denominational affiliation for culture versus economics. The story has two important twists, but overall it is clear enough: denominational attachments add or subtract much more to cultural than to economic values. This is especially true at the extremes, among the committed Christians and the non-Christians. (Table 5.A) Self-identification as a White Evangelical is far more strongly related to cultural than to political values, and so is self-identification as a Non-Christian. Loadings are opposite for both sets of values—jointly conservative for the White Evangelicals, jointly liberal for the Non-Christians—but the difference between policy realms is still very clear.

The same can be said of Black Evangelical Protestants, though this is the first of those two twists on the comparative strength of these cultural versus economic relationships. Once Black Evangelicals begin to be pulled in a strongly conservative direction on culture, Evangelical Protestantism contributes much more to cultural than to economic values for them, too. But this is true only after the shift occurs. Before that, Black Evangelicalism contributes more to economics. And the other twist on the story is the one clear exception that does not fade away. For American Catholics, Catholicism usually contributes more to economic values. Both the economic and the cultural contributions among Catholics are relatively stable across surveys, and both are quite modest in their impact. Yet the average contribution to economic values among these Catholics is clearly larger than the contribution to cultural values. Accordingly, even in the current climate, not everyone is drawn more strongly on culture than on economics by their denominational attachments. And American Catholics provide the great and continuing exception.

Religious Background: Religiosity

A different aspect of religious attachment, with a potentially different relationship to cultural and/or economic values, involves generic religiosity, and requires a different measure. Where denomination features specific beliefs and practices within distinct theological traditions, religiosity is the intensity of religious practice, quite apart the denomination within which that practice occurs. On the one hand, the analyst would expect that those who practice their religious faith on a regular basis would be more likely to absorb the particular values that go with their denomination. That would make religiosity an extrapolation, not an alternative, to denominational attachment. Yet the interaction of these two grand indicators of religious background is actually much more complicated, and conditional, than that.

As we shall see in Chapter Four, religiosity, measured as the regularity of church attendance, is itself differentially distributed across the various denominations, with Evangelicals, White or Black, the most regular attendees and Non-Christians the least regular. This alone raises the possibility that denomination and religiosity would need to be distinguished, merely to be sure that the same phenomena were being compared across social groups. Yet there is an additional possibility: that religiosity as a generic influence—that is, the regularity or irregularity of attendance, quite apart from religious denomination—would influence cultural and/or economic values. If this were true, then some of the apparent effect of denominational attachment, examined independently, might well be due to religiosity rather than denomination.

The Pew surveys are not ideal for pursuing these possibilities. The first two surveys in our sequence, those of 1987 and 1988, did ask about church attendance. But the question then fell out of the surveys until 1994, after which it has again been reliably present. As a result, it is not possible to ask about the role of religiosity across the full range of our samples. On the other hand, it is possible to ask at the beginning and at the end of our sequence, so that any change in this role should be captured. Even that is not quite as neat as it might be, since the available categories changed in 1997, going from six to seven alternatives and mixed somewhat differently. Yet if we take the category “once or twice a month”, which is asked in that form in all surveys, and make it the mid-point of the attendance scale, then it is possible to have the same measure in all years when the question was asked. And such a division does at least offer identical marginals for 1994 and 1997, the two years that represent the change in response format.

Accordingly, Table 6 shows the result of dividing responses to the query about religiosity into those who attend regularly (almost once a week, or more), occasionally (once or twice a month), and rarely (a few times a year, or less). Because it is not good practice to take the least frequent response as the reference category, we have given “Rarely/Never” the standardized score of .00. The result, while not as powerful as Table 5 on denominational attachment, is nonetheless additionally instructive, and in two major regards. First, it has a story of its own to tell, the story of the impact of religiosity on cultural and economic values. But second, it differentiates those aspects of denomination which are due to denominational attachment in its own right from those which are instead the product of the fact that some denominations have a much better attendance record than others.

Table 6

What stands out most strongly in Table 6 is a consistent and powerful difference between the most and the least religious in the scope of the contribution from religiosity to cultural values. Regular church attendance is a strong contributor to cultural conservatism. Just as regular non-attendance is a strong contributor to cultural liberalism. The smallest difference, at the very beginning of the survey sequence, is still .31. But the average is .42, with a median of .41. Moreover, there appears to be a further temporal shift as time passes. Before the question about religious practice departed the Pew

surveys, the average difference was .33. After it returned, a half-dozen years later, the average difference had risen to .48.

There is an echo of the same story with economic values, though it is considerably weaker. In all but one of the six available surveys, regular church attendance is a moderate contributor to economic conservatism, and regular non-attendance to economic liberalism. Yet not only is this a much weaker relationship than the one with culture. It appears additionally jumbled when the middle category on religiosity, occasional church attendance, is considered. This middle category performs exactly as a generic ‘middle category’ should in its relationship to cultural values: it always fall between the regular attendees and the regular non-attendees, albeit being sometimes closer to one and sometimes closer to the other. Yet besides being less stable with regard to economic values, this middle category also does not reliably follow a middle course.

This composite picture suggests two things. It suggests that the main impact of religiosity is on culture and not on economics. And it suggests that the main contribution from religiosity comes by way of its two polar categories. Beyond that, it seems wiser not to assert any further substantive findings and to hold any further analysis of this middle category, especially, until it is possible to revisit denominational attachment and see how it works with religiosity now in the fully specified model. Accordingly, Table 7 does exactly this, for those six years where it is possible to have both denominational attachment and church attendance—religiosity—as aspects of religious backgrounds. Three very large findings emerge from such an analysis.

Table 7

Perhaps the most important point made by Table 7, taking religiosity into account when searching for the impact of denominational attachment on political values, is that the main denominational impacts from our previous, independent assessment remain intact. This is to say two main things:

- First and most consequential, the relationships among the five great denominational families of American religious life remain essentially as they were. This in turn has two major sub-aspects:
 1. White Evangelicals are still pulled strongly to the right on culture. Non-Christians are still pulled strongly to the left. Catholics are still closer—much closer—to the Mainstream Protestants, who are the reference category, than they are to either the Evangelicals or the Non-Christians. And Black Evangelicals still desert the Mainstream Protestants and Catholics in order to join up with their White Evangelical brethren, in the aftermath of a major shift on cultural values after the 1988 survey.
 2. On economics, White Evangelicals are still pulled modestly to the right. And Catholics remain more closely aligned with Non-Christians than with Mainstream Protestants on economic values. Indeed, it is still these two denominations, the Catholics and the Non-Christians, that constitute a modest

economic left on the basis of denominational attachment, one counterpoised to the modest economic right contributed by White Evangelicals, in coalition with Black Evangelicals after they make the same, later, parallel economic shift on economics.

- But second, and important not to overlook, the impact of denominational attachment on political values continues to be much larger for culture than for economics. This time there are three sub-aspects to the finding:
 1. The spread between the impact of White Evangelicalism as opposed to Non-Christianity, that is, the impact of the polar categories on denominational attachment, remains breathtaking: an average pull to the right of $-.41$ for the former, an average pull to the left of $+.46$ for the latter.
 2. The counterpart spread between these two polar groups—and they are the same two groups, and the ideological relationship is parallel—is also far more modest: an average pull to the right of $-.11$ for the White Evangelicals, an average pull to the left of $+.14$ for the Non-Christians.
 3. And Catholics continue to be a noteworthy exception. In this, Catholic denominational affiliation is the one that is definitely not more strongly attached to culture than to economics. The difference in average scores may be trivial ($+.11$ on culture versus $+.16$ on economics), but it is large by comparison to the scope of that difference in the other directions for White Evangelicals, Black Evangelicals, and Non-Christians.

On the other hand, and this is the new, third, major point about the influence of religious background on political values, the interaction of religiosity and denominational attachment now has a very different impact across denominations. In other words, it is now possible to see that the interaction of denominational attachment and church attendance itself differs by denomination. In order to see this, recall first the impact of religiosity in its own right. The situation for the two polar categories, “Always/Usually” and “Rarely/Never” was very clear: regular attendees were much more conservative and regular non-attendees much more liberal on cultural values. And there was an echo of the same alignment, in considerably weaker form, on economic values as well. Otherwise, it was unclear whether religiosity had much of a relationship to economics in particular across the middle of its own distribution.

Table 7 returns to the relationship between denominational attachment and political values, this time with religiosity (via regularity of church attendance) in the model. The crucial comparison is thus of Table 7 with Table 5, where religiosity was absent. What is striking is that there are now three separate religious stories for this interaction: one for Evangelical Protestants, one for Non-Christians, and one for Catholics. Or perhaps three and a half stories, in that Black Evangelicals still come into alignment with White Evangelicals, but only after a major internal shift. (The story of Mainstream Protestants, as the reference category, cannot be addressed until we bring them back as a social group in Chapter Four.)

For Evangelical Protestants, both White Evangelicals and Black Evangelicals after their ideological shift, this relationship is additive. Denominational affiliation still makes a much larger contribution to giving identifiers an ideological direction. But now, it can be seen that some of the conservatism associated with Evangelicalism, especially on culture, was previously being contributed by the fact that Evangelicals are also disproportionately regular attendees. The average scores for both great religious families on both value dimensions, but especially on culture, are still strong but noticeably lower as between the prior average at Table 5, which did not contain religiosity, and the revised average at Table 7, which does.

For the Non-Christians, by contrast, religiosity—regular non-attendance in their case—appears to have nothing to contribute to the relationship between religious background and political values. With or without religiosity in the model, their average scores do not change: +.46 versus +.48 on culture, +.14 versus +.17 on economics. In statistical terms, this finding is largely artifactual. Non-attendees were the reference category for religiosity, standardized at .00, and Non-Christians are the denominational category disproportionately characterized by non-attendance. Indeed, the majority of the category is contributed by those who, when asked about their religious affiliation—not attendance or belief, just affiliation—reply “none”. Presumably, this gives them no reason to attend (though curiously, a measurable handful still do), and that may well mean that their non-attendance has nothing further to contribute.

Yet there is a theoretical sense to aligning the religiosity variable this way, too. Or at least, it makes theoretical sense to expect the impact of an activity to increase with the pursuit of that activity and, conversely, to expect an activity to have no direct impact on those who do not engage in it. Being outside the Christian fold makes a huge contribution to the values of these Non-Christians, drawing them solidly left on culture and modestly left on economics. But the fact that they are disproportionately non-attendees should presumably make little further contribution. This theoretical argument, as much as the need for a non-trivial reference category, is why we have set up the religiosity variable in this way.³

On the other hand, a very different story from the interaction of religiosity and denomination arrives with American Catholics. For Evangelicals, the product of this interaction was additive. For Non-Christians, the product was entirely contained by denomination: there was no further interaction. But for American Catholics, the product of this interaction is subtractive. Which is to say: the apparent lack of any impact from denominational affiliation on cultural values at Table 5, with religiosity absent from the model, was indeed an artifact of its absence.

For Catholics, as dramatically opposed to Evangelicals, this was because denomination contributed a modest but consistent pull in the liberal direction on culture.

³ There is a not-insignificant minority of the rest of the cluster that does attend, yet they too fail to generate any difference between attendees and non-attendees on cultural or economic values. Accordingly, while sample size is admittedly very small, disaggregation of this cluster does not suggest that it is purely the behavior of the non-religious that is generating the overall effect among Non-Christians.

That was the impact of denomination itself. It was just that for Catholics as for most others, religiosity contributed a strong conservatizing pull on cultural values—so that it was the substantial body of observant Catholics who were holding the apparent effect of denomination at .00. Once the analysis controls for their differential attendance, Catholicism by itself, that is, apart from attendance, no longer appears as a culturally conservatizing influence.

By the most recent years, the impact of Black Evangelical Protestantism is really not distinguishable from White Evangelicalism. In that sense, it requires no further comment. On the other hand, it is important to remember that this is true precisely because of the shift within Black Evangelicalism, away from a moderating and toward a strongly conservatizing influence on culture and away from a strongly liberalizing and toward a modestly conservatizing influence on economics. Said differently, there is no reason to believe that religiosity would interact with denomination among Black Evangelicals in the period before this ideological conversion in the same way that it did afterward, and Table 7 suggests that indeed it did not.

Instead, for the two surveys that contain a measure of church attendance before this change, Black Evangelicalism drove its contenders in the opposite direction. On economics, denominational attachment was actually making them somewhat more liberal. On culture too, denominational attachment was making them more liberal, and here, the effect was sufficient to give Black Evangelical Protestantism a moderately liberal (and not a conservatizing) influence. In that sense, before their ideological conversion, Black Evangelicals looked like American Catholics. Denomination was giving them a slight liberalizing push. It was the fact that religiosity was imparting a strong conservatizing influence upon a denomination with many attendees that made the denomination look moderately conservative, when religiosity was not in the model.

Social Background: Sex, Gender, and Age

Social class, race and ethnicity, plus religious background are classic locaters in social science research across time. Sex and gender then add the fourth of the big-four social cleavages, bringing with them a myriad of further prospects for shaping political values. Within these, however, certain bedrock instances are inescapable. First among these are straightforward sex differences, between men women, giving rise to various mislabeled ‘gender gaps’. All the Pew surveys are able to track this particular distinction. Beyond sex come the true gendered differences. These are perhaps most often gathered in various aspects of family life, involving the structure of families and the division of labor within them. In preliminary investigation, some produced stable coefficients of no apparent influence on political values, while more involved categories that are too small to provide stable relationships. One basic distinction, however—whether or not the adult respondent is a parent with dependent children at home—is consistently available; we use it here.

In a different category is age itself, and we group it with this last set of social cleavages purely for convenience. It is possible that age has a direct relationship to

cultural or economic values, by way of life stages or by way of cohort differences. All the Pew surveys allow us to hunt for these. It is also possible that particular age bands, the young or the old in particular, differ in their cultural or economic values, especially as these tend to reflect employment status. We can easily test this possibility, too. Those who use age as a demographic influence also conventionally suspect, however, that a simple year by year progression may not capture this complexity: the impact of age 90 is not double the impact of age 45, to take a crude example. In response, conventional users also often investigate age-squared as a definition of the variable; we follow their lead and do the same.

Table 8

Accordingly, Table 8 looks at females, with males as the reference category; at parents, with the currently childless as a reference category; and at age, both in its own right and as age-squared. In this, sex does offer modest but clear differences on both cultural and economic values. Women are regularly if modestly pulled toward greater liberalism on cultural values, with an average score of +.16 and a median score of +.15. Just as women are regularly if modestly pulled toward greater liberalism on economic values, with an average score of +.13 and a median of +.15. Both sets of differences are modest, yet they run in the same direction in all nine of the available surveys. It might be further argued that these differences are modest enough that they could be the result of some other social distinction not in the model. What can be said with certainty here is that social class and religious background are definitely in that model, as is race/ethnicity plus family structure, along with age. At the very least, women are thus modestly more liberal than men on culture and economics in the presence of all of that.

Parenthood presents an ideologically opposite version of the same story. Having children at home draws parents toward a modest but consistent conservatism on cultural values, with an average score of -.18 and a median score of -.16. And having children at home draws parents toward an even more modest but still persistent conservatism on economic values, with an average score of -.08 and a median score of -.08 as well. Moreover, if this economic impact appears truly modest, it also appears to be increasing. In the first three survey of this series, those of 1987, 1988, and 1990, the parental economic score was -.01. In the next two surveys, those of 1992 and 1993, it was -.08. And in the most recent four, spread from 1994 through 2002, it was -.14. Under the rubric of family structure, we also looked at the never-married, the divorced-but-not-remarried, and the widowed, but results were either under-sampled, unstable, or not obviously different from .00.

In a different category is age, which shows a dramatic lack of any relationship to cultural or economic values. For culture, age has an average score of -.02 and a median score of -.01; for economics, an average score of -.01 and a media score of -.01 as well. And squaring age as a measure makes no difference. For culture, age-squared has an average score of +.01 and a median score of +.01; for economics, an average score of -.00 and a median score of -.00 as well. We tested two other dichotomies: greater than or

less than age 65, and greater than or less than age 30. Neither showed any sizable and stable relationship to cultural or economic values.

Accordingly, in this fourth great realm of social cleavages, sex has a modest but clear relationship to both cultural and economic values. With men as the reference category, women are drawn modestly toward the more liberal position on both culture and economics by virtue of their sex. In the same way, current parenthood has a modest but clear relationship to both cultural and economic values. With households currently lacking dependent children as the reference category, parents are drawn modestly toward the conservative position on both culture and economics by virtue of having a dependent child at home. Age and age-squared, finally, appear to add little to the story. There may well be life-stage effects on political values; there may well be cohort effects on political values—we suspect there are. But age as a variable in any straightforward sense, running across the full age spectrum or comparing the top or the bottom against the rest, does not capture these.

Social Backgrounds and Political Opinions, Revisited

That the great social cleavages—social class, race and ethnicity, religious background, sex and gender—should demonstrate powerful influences on incipiently political values should come as no surprise. If these are the great ‘locaters’ of social life, they ought to provide comparable experiences for those in comparable locations. Likewise, if these are the great social ‘locaters’, they ought to provide similar interests for those with comparable experiences. As indeed they do:

- Social class does so, with sufficient power that alternative major aspects of class, like family income and educational attainment, make their own, partially independent, additive contributions.
- Race and ethnicity do so, at least for the leading American division on race, Black versus non-Black, and the leading contemporary division on ethnicity, Hispanic versus non-Hispanic.
- Religious background does so, both for denominational attachment and for generic religiosity, such that these alternative aspects again make their own, partially independent, additive contributions.
- And sex and gender do so, both for straightforward sex differences, women versus men, and for gendered institutions like the family, as with parents versus non-parents.

These are all social cleavages that affect individual values on culture or economics. Chapter Four will shift the analysis from individual characteristics on these great social cleavages to valuational differences among the social groups that are constituted by these individuals. There, the question of the association between social characteristics becomes important. Before going there, however, we should probably stop for one final cross-check, along with its final note of reassurance about the preceding analysis, and then for one last major point, implicit in all that has gone before but made explicit in this concluding section.

First, the final cross-check. We introduced denominational background without controlling for religiosity, because we wanted to show its comparable impact across the entire period for which we have survey data. We then introduced religiosity—church attendance—in those years where we had it, checked its direct contribution, and re-estimated the impact of denomination in the presence of attendance. As with income and education under social class, so with denomination and religiosity under religious background: explanatory power was thereby increased. Yet the impact of denominational attachment was also shifted differently for different denominations. Perhaps all the other social cleavages—they too were introduced without a measure of religiosity in the model, after all—need to be re-estimated because they too would differ in the presence of religiosity?

Table 9

The short answer is that this is unnecessary. We have done the requisite comparisons, but the impact of religiosity outside of religious background, that is, on value derivations from social class, race and ethnicity, or sex and gender, is just trivial. Table 9 offers one example; the others are similar. As a cross-check, Table 9 takes the first and last years of our survey sequence, 1987 and 2002, both years that possess a question on church attendance. For them, it displays the results of modeling the impact of family income on cultural and economic values in the presence and in the absence of the religiosity variable. Table 9.A shows the results with religiosity in the model; Table 9.B shows the results without it. There is simply no spillover effect on the relationships between family income and cultural or economic values. No difference approaches statistical significance or substantive consequence.

That leaves one last major point to be made about the relationship between social background and political values, a point that is also implicit but strongly present in all the preceding tables. For social class, the relationship between income, education, and the two together from one side, and cultural and economic values from the other, was powerfully opposite. Cultural liberals, as arrayed by social class, were economic conservatives. Just as cultural conservatives, as arrayed by social class, were economic liberals. For religious background, by contrast, the relationship between denomination, religiosity, and the two together from one side, and cultural and economic values from the other, was powerfully parallel. Cultural liberals, as arrayed by religious background, were economic liberals. Just as cultural conservatives, arrayed by religious background, were economic conservatives. And the same differences characterized the other great social cleavages. With race and ethnicity, liberals in one domain were conservatives in the other, and vice versa. But with sex and parenthood, liberals were liberals, while conservatives were conservatives.

The implications of this fact for the strategic environment of American politics are potentially huge, though we cannot explore them directly until Chapters Six and Seven. Here, let it just be noted that whether one underlying cleavage rather than the other is activated in practical politics should have a great deal to do with the political coalitions that emerge. Or, said the other way around, the political coalitions that exist

should have a great deal to do with what programs can and cannot be put together. And the strategic imperatives of these facts must be much more complex when fundamental social cleavages do not align policy preferences in parallel ways. What this also implies, at a bare minimum, is that the strategic landscape of American politics must be substantially different from that of any nation where the underlying social cleavages do align values in an essentially parallel way or, more practically, where one or the other of these cleavages has a very different importance to politics than it does in the United States.

Table 1
Social Class and Political Values:
Family Income

A. Contributions to Political Values by Family Income:
All Surveys

	<u>Lower Income</u>		<u>Middle Income</u>		<u>Upper Middle</u>		<u>Upper Income</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-.01	+.18	.00	.00	+.19	-.11	+.26	-.09
1988	+.03	+.12	.00	.00	+.15	-.14	+.38	-.26
1990	-.07	+.22	.00	.00	+.27	-.07	+.49	-.12
1992	+.07	+.11	.00	.00	+.29	-.13	+.41	-.22
1993	+.02	+.22	.00	.00	-.02	-.28	+.34	-.44
1994	+.04	+.41	.00	.00	+.29	-.06	+.49	-.09
1997	+.13	+.08	.00	.00	+.19	-.15	+.18	-.12
1999	-.06	+.22	.00	.00	+.33	-.22	+.40	-.15
2002	-.03	+.17	.00	.00	+.23	-.12	+.44	-.23
<u>Average</u>	<u>+.01</u>	<u>+.19</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.25</u>	<u>-.14</u>	<u>+.41</u>	<u>-.19</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>+.02</u>	<u>+.18</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.21</u>	<u>-.13</u>	<u>+.38</u>	<u>-.15</u>

B. Contributions to Political Values by Family Income:
Presidential Election Years

	<u>Lower Income</u>		<u>Middle Income</u>		<u>Upper Middle</u>		<u>Upper Income</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	+.01	+.15	.00	.00	+.17	-.13	+.32	-.18
1988	+.00	+.17	.00	.00	+.28	-.10	+.45	-.17
1992	+.03	+.22	.00	.00	+.29	-.13	+.42	-.09
1996	-.03	+.15	.00	.00	+.26	-.19	+.40	-.14
2000	-.03	+.17	.00	.00	+.23	-.12	+.44	-.23

Table 2
Social Class and Political Values:
Education

A. Contributions to Political Values by Education:
All Surveys

	<u>High-School Drop-Out</u>		<u>High-School Graduate</u>		<u>Some College</u>		<u>College Graduate</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-.13	+.19	.00	.00	+.51	-.16	+.98	-.17
1988	-.22	+.17	.00	.00	+.46	-.25	+.98	-.07
1990	-.25	+.30	.00	.00	+.49	-.19	+.86	-.22
1992	-.45	+.39	.00	.00	+.64	-.31	+.98	-.26
1993	-.43	+.20	.00	.00	+.48	-.39	+.68	-.23
1994	-.21	+.42	.00	.00	+.58	-.13	+.89	-.11
1997	-.26	+.46	.00	.00	+.49	-.29	+1.13	-.37
1999	-.06	+.21	.00	.00	+.54	-.30	+.84	-.26
2002	-.15	+.21	.00	.00	+.60	-.31	+1.10	-.32
<u>Average</u>	<u>-.24</u>	<u>+.28</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.53</u>	<u>-.26</u>	<u>+.94</u>	<u>-.22</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>-.21</u>	<u>+.21</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.51</u>	<u>-.29</u>	<u>+.98</u>	<u>-.26</u>

B. Contributions to Political Values by Education:
Presidential Election Years

	<u>High-School Drop-Out</u>		<u>High-School Graduate</u>		<u>Some College</u>		<u>College Graduate</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	-.18	+.18	.00	.00	+.51	-.21	+.98	-.17
1988	-.26	+.35	.00	.00	+.56	-.25	+.92	-.24
1992	-.32	+.31	.00	.00	+.53	-.26	+.89	-.17
1996	-.26	+.21	.00	.00	+.52	-.29	+.84	-.26
2000	-.15	+.21	.00	.00	+.60	-.31	+1.10	-.32

Table 3
Social Class and Political Values:
Education Revisited

Contributions to Political Values by Educational Attainment:
All Surveys

	<u>High-School Drop-Outs</u>		<u>High-School Graduates</u>		<u>Some-College</u>		<u>College Graduates</u>		<u>Post-Graduates</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1994	-.23	+.41	.00	.00	+.62	-.13	+.75	-.14	+1.36	-.02
1997	-.25	+.49	.00	.00	+.49	-.27	+.96	-.35	+1.53	-.28
1999	-.26	+.22	.00	.00	+.56	-.29	+.72	-.27	+1.18	-.23
2002	-.19	+.21	.00	.00	+.65	-.29	+.97	-.39	+1.50	-.11
<u>Average</u>	<u>-.21</u>	<u>+.32</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.59</u>	<u>-.25</u>	<u>+.86</u>	<u>-.29</u>	<u>+1.39</u>	<u>-.16</u>

Table 4
Race, Ethnicity, and Political Values

A. Contributions to Political Values by Race and Ethnicity:
All Surveys

	<u>Race: Black</u>		<u>Ethnicity: Hispanic</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-0.12	+0.72	-0.11	+0.34
1988	-0.06	+0.62	-0.21	+0.16
1990	-0.15	+0.80	-0.11	+0.33
1992	-0.23	+0.73	-0.20	+0.09
1993	-0.30	+0.41	-0.17	+0.39
1994	-0.05	+0.85	+0.10	+0.36
1997	-0.19	+0.84	-0.13	+0.31
1999	-0.51	+0.79	+0.07	+0.08
2002	-0.10	+0.82	-0.22	+0.19
<u>Average</u>	<u>-0.19</u>	<u>+0.73</u>	<u>-0.11</u>	<u>+0.25</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>-0.15</u>	<u>+0.79</u>	<u>-0.13</u>	<u>+0.31</u>

B. Contributions to Political Values by Race and Ethnicity:
Presidential Election Years

	<u>Race: Black</u>		<u>Ethnicity: Hispanic</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	-0.09	+0.67	-0.16	+0.25
1988	-0.19	+0.77	-0.16	+0.21
1992	-0.18	+0.85	-0.17	+0.38
1996	-0.19	+0.82	-0.03	+0.31
2000	-0.10	+0.82	-0.22	+0.19

Table 5
Religious Background and Political Values:
Denomination

A. Contributions to Political Values by Religious Denomination:
All Surveys

	<u>White Evangelicals</u>		<u>Mainstream Protestants</u>		<u>Catholics</u>		<u>Non-Christians</u>		<u>Black Evangelicals</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-.54	-.15	.00	.00	-.03	+.21	+.29	+.22	-.04	+.23
1988	-.52	-.16	.00	.00	+.03	+.14	+.51	+.21	-.05	+.45
1990	-.54	-.20	.00	.00	+.03	+.03	+.44	+.14	-.42	-.13
1992	-.74	-.23	.00	.00	-.02	+.05	+.53	+.11	-.38	+.27
1993	-.53	-.15	.00	.00	-.03	+.10	+.42	+.09	-.82	+.25
1994	-.67	-.08	.00	.00	-.12	+.29	+.48	+.27	-.54	+.58
1997	-.60	-.22	.00	.00	+.03	+.01	+.62	+.12	-.63	-.14
1999	-.48	-.14	.00	.00	+.15	+.00	+.59	+.08	+.04	-.15
2002	-.63	-.20	.00	.00	-.01	+.07	+.38	+.10	-.68	-.03
<u>Average</u>	<u>-.58</u>	<u>-.17</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.00</u>	<u>+.10</u>	<u>+.52</u>	<u>+.17</u>	<u>-.50*</u>	<u>-.11**</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>-.54</u>	<u>-.16</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>-.01</u>	<u>+.10</u>	<u>+.54</u>	<u>+.14</u>	<u>-.54*</u>	<u>-.14**</u>

*Average for 1990-2002. **Average for 1997-2002.

**B. Contributions to Political Values by Religious Denomination:
Presidential Election Years**

	<u>White Evangelicals</u>		<u>Mainstream Protestants</u>		<u>Catholics</u>		<u>Non-Christians</u>		<u>Black Evangelicals</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	-.53	-.16	.00	.00	+.00	+.18	+.40	+.22	-.05	+.34
1988	-.54	-.22	.00	.00	+.01	+.04	+.49	+.13	-.40	+.27
1992	-.60	-.15	.00	.00	-.08	+.20	+.45	+.18	-.54	+.42
1996	-.54	-.18	.00	.00	+.09	+.01	+.59	+.10	-.63	-.15
2000	-.63	-.20	.00	.00	+.03	+.10	+.38	+.15	-.68	-.03

Table 6
Religious Background and Political Values:
Religiosity

A. Contributions to Political Values by Church Attendance:
All Surveys

	<u>Always/Usually</u>		<u>Sometimes</u>		<u>Rarely/Never</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-.31	-.15	-.12	+.02	.00	.00
1988	-.35	-.21	-.24	-.08	.00	.00

1994	-.41	-.10	-.25	+.03	.00	.00
1997	-.46	-.25	-.02	-.28	.00	.00
1999	-.56	+.08	-.10	-.05	.00	.00
2002	-.41	-.12	-.04	-.16	.00	.00
<u>Average</u>	<u>-.42</u>	<u>-.13</u>	<u>-.13</u>	<u>-.09</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>-.41</u>	<u>-.15</u>	<u>-.12</u>	<u>-.08</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>

Table 7
Religious Background and Political Values:
Denomination Revisited

A. Contributions to Political Values by Religious Denomination,
Accounting for Religiosity: All Surveys Containing a Measure of Religiosity

	<u>White Evangelicals</u>		<u>Mainstream Protestants</u>		<u>Catholics</u>		<u>Non-Christians</u>		<u>Black Evangelicals</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-.42	-.09	.00	.00	+.06	+.25	+.26	+.20	+.08	+.28
1988	-.39	-.08	.00	.00	+.11	+.20	+.46	+.18	+.04	+.51

1994	-.49	-.05	.00	.00	-.01	+.31	+.46	+.25	-.45	+.55
1997	-.44	-.12	.00	.00	+.13	+.08	+.57	+.07	-.51	-.08
1999	-.26	-.18	.00	.00	+.25	-.01	+.63	+.08	+.18	-.17
2002	-.50	-.15	.00	.00	+.11	+.10	+.40	+.08	-.58	+.00
<u>Average</u>	<u>-.41</u>	<u>-.11</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.11</u>	<u>+.16</u>	<u>+.46</u>	<u>+.14</u>	<u>-.34*</u>	<u>-.08**</u>
<u>Prior Av.</u>	<u>-.57</u>	<u>-.16</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>+.01</u>	<u>+.12</u>	<u>+.48</u>	<u>+.17</u>	<u>-.45*</u>	<u>-.08**</u>

*Calculated for 1994-2002. **Calculated for 1997-2002.

B. Contributions to Political Values by Religious Denomination,
Accounting for Religiosity: Presidential Election Years

	<u>White Evangelicals</u>		<u>Mainstream Protestants</u>		<u>Catholics</u>		<u>Non-Christians</u>		<u>Black Evangelicals</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	-.41	-.09	.00	.00	+.09	+.23	+.36	+.19	+.06	+.40

1992	-.49	-.05	.00	.00	-.01	+.31	+.46	+.25	-.45	+.55
1996	-.35	-.15	.00	.00	+.19	+.04	+.60	+.08	-.17	-.13
2000	-.50	-.15	.00	.00	+.11	+.10	+.40	+.08	-.58	+.00

Table 8
Sex, Gender, and Political Values:

A. Contributions to Political Values by Sex and Gender:
All Surveys

	<u>Female</u>		<u>Parent</u>		<u>Age</u>		<u>Age²</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	+0.15	+0.06	-0.16	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	+0.01	-0.00
1988	+0.22	+0.17	-0.15	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	+0.01
1990	+0.16	+0.10	-0.16	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	+0.01
1992	+0.23	+0.17	-0.21	-0.07	-0.02	-0.00	+0.03	-0.01
1993	+0.16	+0.04	-0.20	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
1994	+0.15	+0.23	-0.35	-0.12	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	-0.00
1997	+0.18	+0.18	-0.09	-0.17	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	-0.01
1999	+0.13	+0.07	-0.19	-0.14	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	-0.02
2002	+0.07	+0.15	-0.15	-0.11	-0.02	-0.00	+0.03	-0.02
<u>Average</u>	<u>+0.16</u>	<u>+0.13</u>	<u>-0.18</u>	<u>-0.08</u>	<u>-0.02</u>	<u>-0.01</u>	<u>+0.01</u>	<u>-0.00</u>
<u>Median</u>	<u>+0.15</u>	<u>+0.15</u>	<u>-0.16</u>	<u>-0.08</u>	<u>-0.02</u>	<u>-0.01</u>	<u>+0.01</u>	<u>-0.00</u>

B. Contributions to Political Values by Sex and Gender:
Presidential Election Years

	<u>Female</u>		<u>Parent</u>		<u>Age</u>		<u>Age²</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1984	+0.19	+0.12	-0.15	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	+0.00
1988	+0.20	+0.14	-0.19	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	-0.00
1992	+0.14	+0.14	-0.19	-0.10	-0.02	-0.01	+0.00	-0.00
1996	+0.16	+0.13	-0.14	-0.16	-0.02	-0.01	+0.01	-0.01
2000	+0.07	+0.15	-0.15	-0.13	-0.02	-0.00	+0.03	-0.02

Table 9

**The Autonomy of Social Class and Religiosity:
Income and Political Values Revisited**

A. With Attendance in the Model

	<u>Lower Income</u>		<u>Middle Income</u>		<u>Upper Middle</u>		<u>Upper Income</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-0.01	+0.18	.00	.00	+0.20	-.11	+0.26	-.09
2002	-.04	+0.17	.00	.00	+0.25	-.11	+0.45	-.22

B. Without Attendance in the Model

	<u>Lower Income</u>		<u>Middle Income</u>		<u>Upper Middle</u>		<u>Upper Income</u>	
	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>	<u>Culture</u>	<u>Economics</u>
1987	-0.01	+0.18	.00	.00	+0.19	-.11	+0.26	-.09
2002	-.03	+0.17	.00	.00	+0.23	-.12	+0.44	-.23