

## ***Stresses and Strains: “Plus ca change” in the Parties and Voting***

John R. Petrocik  
University of Missouri

### **Abstract**

The paper is a narrative about the diversity of the American party coalitions and how that diversity influences the issue agendas of the parties, the conduct of American elections, and, particularly, the relationship between issue preferences and voting choices in the contemporary period. The following data demonstrate constant voting patterns and election dynamics in a party system with significantly different voter coalitions than those that emerged from the New Deal. The change is appropriately a “Reagan Realignment,” although Goldwater’s candidacy in 1964 was the catalyst and Bush the president who inherited it. But it is a complicated change, made up of parties that are more symbolically polarized while they continue to be fractured by many issues. The outcome is party coalitions that require candidates and office-holders who can broker centrifugal diversity and capitalize on it to create winning coalitions.

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This chapter is a narrative about the diversity of the American party coalitions, how it changed in recent years, how that diversity influences the issue agendas of the parties, and, particularly, the relationship between issue preferences and voting choices in the contemporary period. The change from the New Deal to the current coalitions is a “Reagan Realignment,” although Goldwater’s candidacy in 1964 was the catalyst and (the first) George Bush was the Republican who was the immediate heir. But the way in which the diversity of the coalitions influences voting (and, although it is not addressed here, the conduct of campaigns by the candidates and parties) has changed very little. The parties are more symbolically polarized today but they continue to be internally fractured by many issues.<sup>1</sup> As a result, American elections continue to require candidates and office-holders who can broker centrifugal diversity and capitalize on it to create winning coalitions.

### **The New Deal Coalitions and American Politics**

The Democratic and Republican electorates that shaped American campaigns and governance until the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were a product of a party realignment that began in the 1920s and took its final form in the 1930s. Issue divisions and strategies in almost every election conducted for the next 50 years and the programmatic thrust of government policy reflected sensibilities linked region, religion, national origin, race, and social class. The GOP was linked to higher status groups (Protestants, the middle and upper class) or social segments that embraced the traditional values of American society (small town residents). The Democratic Party was the political home of ethnic and religious minorities (African-Americans, Jews, and Catholics) and the less well-off (the working class, union members). An additional overlay was a regional fracture traceable to a century-past Civil War and equally old economic relationships that separated the northeast from the Midwest, and both from the prairie west. The Civil War-induced divide between the north and the south was central. In the eleven states that defined the Confederacy, 69 percent of the white

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<sup>1</sup> Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw (2008) make this argument about the intense symbolic divisions that exist in the place of a relatively modest increase in actual issue divisions.

population supported the Democrats while only about 21 percent considered themselves Republicans.<sup>2</sup> Social class (viewed through the perspective of education, income, or subjective identification) did little to influence the Democratic preference of southern whites, which was also unmoderated by age, gender, ethnic origin, religion, religiosity, or size of place of residence. This southern homogeneity and their numerical contribution to Democratic identification contributed to a fractious Democratic majority because the views and preferences of southerners differed in many ways from other elements of the Democratic coalition.

**Table 1: The New Deal Party Coalitions in the 1950s**

	Size of the Group	Partisanship <sup>1</sup>		The Party Coalitions <sup>2</sup>	
		Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
Southern Whites	16%	69%	19%	19%	11%
Border South Whites	6	57	35	6	8
Jews	3	77	13	4	1
Blacks	9	78	12	12	3
Catholics	13	60	28	14	11
Union households	18	61	28	21	15
Downscale WASPs	10	41	45	8	14
Middle Class WASPs	9	29	60	5	16
Upscale WASPs	6	23	71	3	13
Hispanics	1	77	12	2	0
Others	7	46	41	6	8
Totals	100%	55%	34%	100%	100%

1. Partisanship is the percent identifying with the Democratic and Republican parties. The percentage thinking of themselves as Independent is not reported.
2. The party coalitions columns report the group composition of party identifiers.

Table 1 summarizes the group-party alignment as parsimoniously as possible.<sup>3</sup> Finer distinctions (by national origin among Catholics, for example) are

<sup>2</sup> Whites in the border states – West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Maryland – were only slightly less committed, with 63 percent calling themselves Democrats and 32 percent identifying as Republican. Outside the south, whites were only 47 percent Democrat and 43 percent Republican. These percentages are average party identification rates from the national Election Study surveys from 1952 through 1960. The individual datasets are combined in the ANES cumulative file.

<sup>3</sup> The segmentation of the electorate is accomplished by an asymmetric analysis of variance in which social characteristics are used to predict party preference. The result

possible but do very little to identify significant differences in party preference either because the resulting group would be very small or the distinction would only identify a more Democratic segment within a heavily Democratic group. Consequently, the groups in Table 1 are a nearly optimum social differentiation of the social base of the parties. The groups are simultaneously (1) as different as possible in their party preference and (2) sufficiently homogeneous so that no additional social characteristic provides a better description of the types of Americans who rallied to the GOP and the Democratic Party during the New Deal realignment.

### *The “Big Tent” of the American Parties*

There was nothing novel about the social characteristics that differentiated Democratic and Republican supporters. Similar cleavages influenced party supporter in comparable west European party systems during this period.<sup>4</sup> But there was an American distinction: social differences were more weakly correlated with party preference in the US and the democratic and Republican constituencies were significantly more heterogeneous. Although each party had distinctive social bases, both had support in almost all segments of the population. The Democrats were especially diverse. A few examples: southern whites were overwhelmingly Democrats, but they represented a minority - 33 percent - of all Democratic supporters during the 1950s. Catholics, 68 percent of whom identified as Democrats, contributed only about 26 percent of all Democratic support in the 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, union households were overwhelmingly Democratic but – even with their larger share of the workforce during this period

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yields a combination of social characteristics that identify distinct segment of the population, which, if they are substantively sensible, provide a portrait of the social basis of the party constituencies. The groups in Table 1 are exclusive. No individual appears in more than one category in the table. The method by which this segmentation is accomplished and how each group is defined is described in detail in Petrocik 1981 and 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Rose and Unwin 1969, 1970; Rose 1974.

<sup>5</sup> These percentages do not match the numbers reported in the table because Table 1 clusters members of some of these groups in other categories in the table. Catholics, for example, represent half of the samples clustered in the “union household” category. The reason Catholics appear there is that individuals in union households – whether Catholic or Protestant are significantly more Democratic in their partisanship than co-religionists who are not in households with a union member. The table clusters southerners in three categories but there are southern whites in other categories.

- only constituted about 30 percent of Democratic identifiers (these proportions overlap so they should not be summed). SES differences did little to distinguish support, contrary to the popular wisdom. Although Republicans were slightly more likely to be upscale than working class in income and education, Democratic identifiers were as likely as not to be high income and well-educated.<sup>6</sup>

The diverse social groups that defined each party's constituency - without any group providing enough voters to allow either party to be an unchallenged political vehicle for that group - had consequences for the programmatic commitments of both parties. Neither party could offer sharp differences on any but a limited set of issues because both depended on groups whose policy preferences diverged from those of other constituencies within the coalition. This social-group-based ideological and programmatic factionalization is a defining quality of the American "big tent" parties, hospitable to many viewpoints because of traditional support from groups who often disagreed with other traditional supporters of the party. In the office-seeking tradition of the American party system, traditional support was more important to candidates than programmatic orthodoxy; so parties collected constituencies that commonly disagreed (often deeply) with the policy expectations of other groups who were also loyal supporters. This was especially true of the Democrats, who managed a coalition of traditional conservatives in the south, racial minorities, Catholic immigrants, and social welfare liberals but the GOP had factional divisions as well.

#### *Thinking about the Issue Consequences of Diverse Support*

Groups support a party because of the policies it promotes; the party promotes certain policies because it draws supporters, activists, and candidates from particular groups. The relationship is completely recursive. The specificity of the party's position on any issue will reflect the diversity of the party's constituency. A party with a support base that is specific to a small number of groups has, *ceteris paribus*, a greater likelihood of adopting highly specific and detailed positions on issues because the voters expect it and there is little contrary pressure created by several competing groups.

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<sup>6</sup> See Stonecash 2000 for a fuller assessment of SES differences between the parties.

The diverse “catch-all” character of the American party coalitions reflects their social heterogeneity and creates issue divisions within them because the divergent and sometimes competing interests of the constituent groups often make it possible to find common ground. The parties tend to avoid high levels of issue specificity, issue differences between them are few, and intraparty issue space – the range of opinion for any given issue among partisans – is relatively large. It is a structure widely and publically lamented by academics, activist critics, and public intellectuals of many persuasions, but it has been a feature of the parties almost from their creation and it remains responsible for much of the non-programmatic, broker-party style of American politics.<sup>7</sup>

Again, the Democrats provide the example. The Democratic agenda of “governmental nationalism” commanded majority support from southern whites, blacks, Jews, the northern urban working class, and ethnic Catholics.<sup>8</sup> Unions expected the Democratic Party to promote policies that would benefit organized labor as an institution and social policies that contributed to the net welfare of labor’s more working class and downscale membership. There was internal dissent. Southern whites (and some northern Democrats) opposed union initiatives and many social policies for economic reasons and because of a conservative worldview, but, generally, social welfare questions unified the Democrats. Foreign policy, race relations, and social issue divisions in the late-1960s, by contrast, were divisive and precipitated conversions which finally realigned the groups.<sup>9</sup> The civil rights era was especially important as a trigger, though not the complete cause of the change. Blacks promoted a civil rights agenda which white southerners opposed, and enough northern Democrats were unsupportive of the early civil rights movement to make civil rights *the* fractious issue for the party. African-Americans may see discrimination and the economic conditions of blacks as problems in need of attention by the government, but southern whites

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<sup>7</sup> APSA 1950.

<sup>8</sup> “Governmental nationalism” is Everett Ladd’s term for a national policy orientation that assigns to government significant responsibility for the social welfare of the population and the regulation of the economy. See Ladd 1970 and Sundquist 1983.

<sup>9</sup> Petrocik, 1981, 1987, 1998; Carmines and Stimson, 1989.

and northern working class whites usually didn't share this concern (and a majority of both groups do not to this day).<sup>10</sup>

### **The Transformation**

The civil rights movement, Vietnam war, and the counter-culture of the late 1960s transformed the New Deal party coalitions. Race has become a much more consequential social difference. A plurality of whites are Republican today (by 47 to 43 percent) but a majority were Democrats in the 1950s (by 53 to 37 percent); the preference of blacks for the Democrats has doubled (from 57 to 19 percent to 84 to 7 percent).<sup>11</sup> Related to this, the south is no longer a foundation for a Democratic majority. The popular vote of the region has tilted to the GOP for the last 40 years and the party balance among southern whites today is Republican. The politics of the region have shifted so completely that southern whites have not even supported one of their own for the presidency since the middle 1960s. Jimmy Carter and Barak Obama won southern states because the high turnout and overwhelming support of African Americans created marginal majorities for him in a few of these states; but whites in the region voted for the Republican in both elections. Similarly, Clinton's victories in 1992 and 1996 did not come from southern white votes and, of course, Gore's defeat in 2000 was assured by his inability to carry any southern state – even Tennessee, which he had represented in the Senate.

The relationship of partisanship to social status indicators also changed. Despite the received wisdom about the class basis of New Deal party system, the correlation between party preference and class was weak and largely confined to white Protestants. Southerners, Catholics, Jews, Blacks, and union members were Democrats, without regard to social class. Income is no longer a marginal influ-


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<sup>10</sup> Tangible economic interests were behind much of this divergence. But conflict on largely symbolic issues, e.g., ethnic self-esteem, is often at issue and they are commonly as divisive and enduring as material disputes.

<sup>11</sup> The percentages cited in this section are calculated from the 2000, 2002, and 2004 ANES. Strong, weak, and leaning identifiers of a party are treated as partisans of that party. See Petrocik 2008.

ence on the vote, but a relatively strong predictor of a person's party preference, especially among whites.<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 1: Divisions Then and Now**  
Whites Only



<sup>12</sup> McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006 have compelling data on income and partisanship, albeit with a different focus.

Religious differences in party loyalty are also not what they were in 1950s. Fifty years ago Catholics who regularly attended religious services were more loyally Democratic than those who did not; while among Protestants, religious observance predisposed individuals to be more Republican. The pattern spoke of a denominational divide, partly reflecting immigration and nationality divisions. That influence is absent today. The Catholic-Protestant divide has diminished, although it is still substantial, to be replaced with a pronounced cleavage between those who are religiously oriented and observant and those who are not. The most religiously observant are among the most loyal supporters of the GOP.<sup>13</sup> The bottom half of Figure 1 reports the data.

### **The Contemporary Party Coalitions**

Multiple disagreements within the Democratic Party provided opportunities for GOP election strategists to dominate presidential elections after 1964, ultimately turning election-specific defections into a new party allegiance. The white south was the first to leave for the GOP, not returning even in 1976 when a majority of white southerners voted for Ford rather than fellow southerner Jimmy Carter.<sup>14</sup> A concerted GOP promotion of conservative positions on cultural issues and the role of government as an economic actor reduced Democratic support in other traditionally Democratic constituencies. It attracted to Republican ranks the most religiously observant (who were conservative on cultural issues – such as abortion and homosexuality – and concerns related to traditional expressions of patriotism) and those who shared the GOP doctrine of “small government,” low

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<sup>13</sup> These demographic distinctions are conditioned by race and ethnicity, and apply mostly to differences among white voters.

<sup>14</sup> It is an erroneous conventional wisdom that Carter’s win in several southern states “reassembled” the Democratic majority (a fact which has in turn created notions about the importance of a southerner on the Democratic presidential ticket). In fact, Carter received only 41 percent of the vote of white southerners, carrying many southern states only because of relatively high turnout and virtually unanimous Democratic voting by blacks. Of course, Carter did better among white southerners than Humphrey and McGovern before him and any Democratic candidate after him, so there is room for a savvy discussion about a southern candidate for president on the Democratic side. However, Southern Democrats have been voting for GOP presidential candidates since 1968.

taxes, and the pre-eminence of the market.<sup>15</sup> The economic conservatives were particularly likely to be middle class. The Republican coalition that emerged in the 1990s blended religiously traditional voters, Protestants, the middle and upper-middle class, and business-oriented voters of all stripes and sizes into a *Christian Democratic-like* party coalition. Social-cultural conservatism, a commitment to a robust defense establishment, and low taxes coupled with minimal government regulation of the economy became the three issue legs of the stool that supported this new Republican coalition. The Democrats lost a distinctive southern constituency, retained a modest plurality among Catholics, large majorities among other ethnic and religious minorities (blacks, Hispanics, Jews), and heavy support among the least religiously inclined. By the early 1990s – despite Bill Clinton’s election in 1992 and re-election in 1996 – Republicans used this new coalition to elect a majority in the House and Senate, control a majority of governorships, and a plurality of state legislatures.<sup>16</sup>

#### *The New Coalitions*

Table 2 presents a coalitional breakdown of the party’s support during the last decade.<sup>17</sup> Table 3 summarizes the vote of these groups from 1992 through 2004.

The first column of data in Table 2 reports the size of each group in the overall electorate during the most recent presidential elections. The second two columns report the percentage of Democrats and Republicans in each group. The fourth and fifth columns report the relative size of each group among Democrats and Republicans. These latter values represent the “political weight” of the group in each party’s coalition. In some theories of political influence great importance is attributed to small groups who provide the margin of victory. In electoral politics, most of the time, large groups are most consequential because they define the base of the party, typically constitute the groups out of which a large

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<sup>15</sup> Layman (2001) offers an extensive analysis of the religious dimensions. His storyline emphasizes cultural issues but in fact non-cultural issues of many types are significant correlated with religiosity. See also Jelen (1991) and Smidt (1993).

<sup>16</sup> These changes eliminated the Democratic majority. Through the 1950s Democrats enjoyed a 55 to 35 percent advantage in party identification. Democratic identification has averaged about 48 percent compared to 41 percent Republicans since the 1990s.

<sup>17</sup> This segmentation exclusively categorizes each of the groups. See footnote 2.

fraction of party leaders are recruited (there are not, for example, many African-American leaders in the GOP but they are numerically and politically prominent in the ranks of Democratic leaders – and that was before Barak Obama became a candidate for president), and provide the issue concerns and policy proposals of the party.

**Table 2: The Contemporary Party Coalitions**

	Size of the Group	Partisanship <sup>1</sup>		The Party Coalitions <sup>2</sup>	
		Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
African Americans	12%	84%	7%	20%	2%
Hispanics	8	53	34	10	6
Jews	2	81	18	4	1
Union household	8	57	31	14	11
Low SES Whites	15	49	37	12	14
Upscale Whites	14	43	49	10	17
Other Whites	8	43	45	8	10
Religiously observant Whites	28	35	58	16	35
Other (Asians, Native Americans)	4	43	46	3	4
Totals	99%	49%	41%	100%	100%

1. Partisanship is the percent identifying with the Democratic and Republican parties. The percentage thinking of themselves as Independent is not reported.
2. The party coalitions columns report the group composition of those who identify as Democrat or Republican.

Race is the preeminent division in the current alignment; and virtually no social difference creates variation in the partisanship of blacks or Hispanics.<sup>18</sup> Religion emerges as the second most prominent division, and is the most significant political division among whites. Jews have retained an overwhelming preference for the Democrats. But a Catholic-Protestant divide persists. As fully integrated as Catholics are in every dimension of American life, their historical ties to the Democrat party remain observable today. For any given level of education or religiosity, Catholics are more likely to be Democratic in partisanship and vote for

<sup>18</sup> I offer the interesting factoid that one “membership” characteristic of continuing controversy in America does distinguish black party preferences: the ownership of firearms. Republicans are more likely than a comparable Democrat to own a firearm and firearm owners are more likely to be Republican than Democrat. This applies to whites who own firearms, and also black, Latino, Asian, and Native Americans who own firearms.

Democratic presidential candidates. However, the more significant “religion fact” for contemporary party politics is the *religiosity* divide (which is why religiosity is represented in Table 2 rather than denomination). The most religiously observant, defined any number of ways, are Republicans. The effect of religious observance is strong among lower SES Catholics, who have followed the sentiments shaped by their religious observance toward the GOP rather than latch on to the SES-related agenda of the Democrats. SES differences, which are represented in the table, have become a division that was more in the mythology than the reality of American politics fifty years ago (see Figure 1).<sup>19</sup> Today, however, SES differences drive party preference to a significant degree. Its greater impact is particularly noticeable among southern whites.

Table 3 documents how closely the vote of these groups matched their partisanship in recent presidential elections. African-Americans and Jews are the most Democratic-inclined and their votes in the last four presidential elections have been heavily Democratic. Upscale WASPs and religious Protestants are aligned with the GOP, contribute almost 40 percent of all Republican identifiers, and voted between 10 to 25 points more for the Republican candidates in 1992 through 2004 than the electorate as a whole. Other groups – religious Catholics and upscale Catholics – have a more divided partisanship and their votes in the last four presidential elections were less lopsidedly Republican than similarly situated white Protestants, but their vote record matches the partisanship of Table 2. Overall, the party coalitions are more straightforward than they were in the 1940s through the 1970s. Religiously observant Christian whites – regardless of their social status – are a core constituency of the GOP. Upscale but less religious whites also strongly contribute to the Republican vote. Union households and lower SES whites are swing constituencies who, when their Republican vote rises, elect Republican presidents. African-Americans, Latinos, and Jews are overwhelmingly Democratic in the presidential votes for as far back as we have data to examine them – and certainly for the four recent elections in Table 3.

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<sup>19</sup> For different views, see Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989.

**Table 3: The Contemporary Party Coalitions and the Presidential Vote**

	Republican Presidential Vote in:			
	<u>2004</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1992</u>
African Americans	10%	8%	1%	6%
Hispanics	33	35	20	35
Jews	17	8	7	9
Union household	42	39	20	30
Low SES Whites	54	53	35	30
Upscale Whites	63	57	48	42
Religiously observant	68	66	63	56
No religious preference	52	40	33	45
Others	74	40	33	54
Totals	52%	48%	41%	38%

Note: The relatively low GOP presidential vote among some groups in 1992 reflects Perot's success in 1992.

### Issues and the New Party Coalitions

Candidates and their election strategists think about elections in terms of these groups and they are attentive to the real and perceived policy preferences among them. The attention paid to the different constituencies of Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama during the 2008 primary contests and speculation about what the difference might portend for the general election is an example from current headlines. Whether Democratic women would come to terms with Hillary Clinton's defeat and support Obama was, for a while anyway, the political item *de jour*.<sup>20</sup> All of this mattered because the social groups that define the coalitions are central to all party planning. Political strategists recognize that opinion travels with social characteristics (a fact of social life that does not require a commitment to any determinism). They shape issue agendas and campaign around group ap-

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<sup>20</sup> Gender was in part such a hot topic because to a great extent political legitimacy within the Democratic party is linked to credible claims to represent groups whose interests are embraced by the party, and gender has become a category of interest for the Democrats. Gender differences in political attitudes and behavior were rarely noted 50 years ago, and the detectable differences found women more inclined to support Republicans. That has reversed, with a majority of women – at least those who are not married – in the Democratic column and a near majority of men inclined toward the GOP. If only white men are considered, the Republicanism of men is pronounced. The source of this change, contrary to the popular wisdom, was not a change in the partisanship of women. Their inclination toward the Democrats is unchanged from what it was fifty years ago. Men on the other hand shifted toward the Republicans, and it is their change that created the gender gap. See Kaufmann and Petrocik 1998 and Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008. Also see Freeman 1986.

peals and the targeting plans of virtually all national campaigns organize voters into these or similar categories.

*The More Coherent Parties*

Viewed from a distance these coalitions seem more manageable than the heterogeneous New Deal-era coalitions. However, social diversity remains high, and there are issues that divide both parties and offer campaign strategy opportunities for the opposition. The greater coherence of the parties is worth documenting before one considers the issues that still divide the parties internally.

**Figure 2: Programmatic Orientation of Party Identifiers**





Figure 2 graphs the relative balance of liberal and conservative preferences among Democrats and Republicans over 50 years.<sup>21</sup> The long series requires two different measures but the similar results for the two years of overlap (1972 and 1976) confirm an increased ideological distance between the parties since the 1970s.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The number in the figure is a percentage difference based on subtracting the liberal percentage from the percent who are conservative in the attitudes (the 1952-1976 period) and - for 1972 through 2004 - the liberal identifiers from conservative self identifiers.

<sup>22</sup> The early and late data are not completely comparable. For the early measure see Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979). The ideology measure is the standard ANES ideological self-identification question.

Much of this increased ideological divergence reflects coalition changes since the early 1980s. If the parties had the same regional, social class, and denominational linkages today they had in the 1950s and 1960s, the change from the late 1960s to the late 1980s would be halved.<sup>23</sup> While more Democrats came to regard themselves as liberals and Republicans increasingly thought of themselves as conservative, the movement of southern whites, the religiously observant, and upper income groups into the GOP increased the inter-party difference by taking their more conservative orientation out of Democratic ranks and augmenting the increased conservatism of groups that were Republican in the 1950s and 1960s and remain so today.

**Figure 3: The Ideological and Partisan Structure of the Vote**




Note: The 1952 through 1972 series uses the same measure of ideological belief used in Figure 2. The correlation measure for this series for the 1972 data is .42, compared to the 1972 correlation of .41 for the 1972 through 2004 data.

One consequence of this increased ideological divergence is a greater correlation of the national vote with party identification and ideological identification. The correlation grew consistently through the 1980s and, after 1984, exceeded the highest value it had ever reached before (which was .69 in 1956). Party identifi-

<sup>23</sup> Petrocik 1987 and 1998.

cation and programmatic orientation are also more correlated with each other. Figure 4 graphs a decomposition of the variance in the presidential vote into four components: the unique contribution of party identification to the vote choice (“Party” in Figure 4), the unique contribution of issues (“Issues” in the figure), the share of the variance that reflects the correlation between party and ideology (“Party and Issues”), and the residual variance that reflects personal judgments about the candidates and assorted measurement errors.

**Figure 4: The Party and Issue Components of the Vote**



This decomposition of components confirms the earlier finding of a net increase in the correlation of the vote with party preference and ideological orientation. It also shows that the increase occurred as partisanship and ideological self-identification became more correlated.<sup>24</sup> Virtually all of the increased correla-

<sup>24</sup> Two caveats need to be recalled in assessing the figure. First, the issue data between 1952 and 1968 are not fully comparable with the issue data after 1972 (see footnote 4). However, most of the change demonstrated in the graphs occurred after the 1970s, where a constant measure of ideological orientation is used. Second, the component shares

tion of party identification and ideological identification with the presidential vote in Figure 3 reflects the greater correlation between party preference and ideological identification documented in the “Party and Issues” component of Figure 4. The unique issue component of the presidential vote was as small in 2000 and 2004 as it was in 1952, 1956, and 1960. The fraction of the electorate guided only by issues has remained trivially small (the “Issues” area in the figure) while the portion of the vote shaped by a party identification that coincides with policy preferences has grown greatly.

Briefly, the realignment that reformulated the party coalitions removed the most programmatically discordant groups from both parties, but especially from the Democrats, creating a current partisanship that is more closely linked to issue preferences and how Americans think of themselves in programmatic terms.

### ***Plus ca Change: The Continuing Issue Divide***

Party polarization at the mass level is minimal despite a growing divergence between Democratic and Republican activists and office holders because there is substantial variance at the mass level within the parties on all issues, and both party’s supporters adopt positions on issues that are at variance with the programmatic thrust of the party.<sup>25</sup> Many Democratic identifiers have undeniably conservative positions on some issues. Similarly, the conservative GOP has identifiers who profess liberal positions, even on issues that define contemporary GOP ideology.

Figure 5 illustrates this by plotting the positions of Democratic and Republican identifiers on two aspects of twelve issues in 2004. The identity of each issue is indicated in the figure with a number that corresponds to the issues listed in the legend at the bottom of the figure. The left-right horizontal dimension distin-

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graphed in Figure 4 do not include an assessment of the changes. Its inclusion would change the shares apportioned to party and issues. It would not, however, change the trend in the graph. The decomposition is complete enough to demonstrate that when the realignment of the 1970s reduced the ideological heterogeneity of both parties. The increase in the share of the vote that was contributed by Democratic liberals who voted for the Democratic candidate, and GOP conservatives who voted for the Republican candidate (the “party and Issues” share) is the result.

<sup>25</sup> On the latter see: McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006.

guishes liberal and conservative opinions. A value of .50 is equivalent to the middle position of the range of possible answers. The specific left-right placement of the issue is determined by the average score of each party's identifiers on measures. The vertical placement in each space uses the standard deviation of the mean to represent the variability of opinion on the issue.<sup>26</sup>

Democratic identifiers voice a strong preference for treating women and women similarly, but given this near consensus (70 percent strongly support gender equality), it is noteworthy that nearly 25 percent are ambivalent or opposed. Compare that to the position of Democratic identifiers on social spending issues. Only about 30 percent take the most liberal position, but another 50 percent are clearly on the liberal side of the question, and only about 5 percent take a distinctly conservative stance. Summarizing these facts, the position of Democrats on social spending (the "3" in the figure) and gender equality (the "6") in the graph indicates that there is relatively more dissent from the strongly liberal position of Democrats on gender equality than there is for the slightly less liberal position on social spending. The death penalty is the most divisive issue for the Democrats: a 59 percent majority supports it (ergo the "11" is right of center on the graph) but a 40 minority opposes it (creating a lot of statistical dispersion and putting it high in the space).


Democrats are the most consensually liberal on social welfare spending (issue 3), more divided but essentially as liberal on contemporary conflicts about homosexuality (issue 8) and about how active the government should be in advancing solutions to the country's problems (issue 1). They are a bit less liberal and slightly divided about abortion and on whether it is appropriate to adjust moral views in response to social changes (issues 7 and 10, respectively). They are slightly more conservative than liberal on matters related to addressing the needs of minorities (issue 4) and in their willingness to support defense spending and use force in international affairs (issue 2). Democrats are clearly conserva-

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<sup>26</sup> There are few statistics that are less intuitively interpretable than the standard deviation because it is difficult to decide when it is big or small or "what it is". But the fact that it is a direct measure of the spread around an average yields, for a set of variables that have a common metric and range (as these do), a convenient measure of consensus on the group's opinion.

tive in their majority support for the death penalty (issue 11), traditional religiosity (issue 9), opposition to immigration (issue 12), and expression of traditional sentiments regarded as patriotic (issue 5).

**Figure 5: Issue Position and Issue Consensus within the Parties**



Three things stand out about this distribution of Democratic issue positions in Figure 5. The first is that the centerpiece of Democratic consensus in the contemporary party system - 70 years after the New Deal majority was forged - remains the commitment to the use of the government to regulate the economy

and ensure the provision of social welfare goods in the society. The second is that cultural issues and questions related to national security evoke generally conservative responses. The third point would be that Democratic identifiers occupy a relatively wide issue space - liberal on some issues and conservative on others to a degree that is similar to the issue heterogeneity of the Democratic coalition that emerged from the New Deal. The Reagan revolution and realignment did not create a liberal Democratic party at the mass level, however fervently liberal Democratic activists and office holders might be today.

The other “macro” fact about the party electorates is that Republican identifiers are slightly more consensual – generally conservative - on all the issues except the status of women and social spending, although the vertical placement indicates some diversity on these preferences. The realignment of the party coalitions created a more diverse GOP coalition but it has not created obviously great programmatic diversity within the GOP. Republican identifiers are more uniformly conservative than the Democrats are liberal. The range of the horizontal spread of Democratic positions compared to the preferences of Republican identifiers documents that the old fact of greater Republican consensus remains a contemporary fact.

There was a particularly strong consensus among Republicans in 2004 on traditional patriotic sentiments (issue 5), support for defense spending and willingness to use force in international affairs (issue 2), opposition to use government on behalf of minorities (issue 4), and opposition to illegal immigration (issue 12). Republican positions on these four issues were homogeneously conservative. Two other issues – abortion and the flexibility of moral views - also commanded a conservative majority, but opinion was less consensual on these issues.<sup>27</sup>

### *The Odd Couple of American Politics*

The most striking feature of the issue profile of GOP identifiers in Figure 5 is the absence of the traditional Republican agreement on limited government (issue 1) and a clear, albeit modest, preference for government spending and policy

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<sup>27</sup> The appendix has a graph that presents the distribution of Democratic and Republican identifiers on each of these issues. This graph presents histograms for each issue.

initiatives on a large number of social welfare goods (issue 3). Republican identifiers are not as accepting of activist government and social welfare spending as Democrats but the support for social spending that characterizes Republicans and their only slightly conservative posture toward active government documents a major step away from two defining issues of the New Deal Republican Party and the small government persona of the Reagan GOP. The contemporary Republican electorate is largely defined by conservative cultural views and a relatively “hawkish” (to employ a Vietnam-era term) posture toward dealing with other nations (especially when they are adversaries). But they are quite ready to see a more activist government, especially around economic and social welfare questions, contrary to a long-established conventional wisdom and the identification of the GOP elite with low taxes and small government.


Figure 6 elaborates upon this unexpected placement of Republicans by reporting the position of Republican and Democratic identifiers on each of the nine separate issues that are used to measure the position of a person’s social spending preferences.<sup>28</sup> Democrats take liberal positions on almost all of the social spending questions. They drag their feet only on the single question of whether they “favor increases in the taxes paid by ordinary Americans in order to increase spending on domestic programs like Medicare, education and highways” (item 9). Republicans, by contrast, are divided on social spending depending on the way the question and options are phrased. When asked whether “Federal government spending” should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same in order to deal with some problem, Republicans opt for more rather than less spending on almost every issue (more spending for “welfare” is the exception). Issues 4, 5, 7, and 8 are examples (issue 6 is the welfare spending question). However, when the question presents a choice between the government doing more about some social problem or leaving it to individuals, Republicans are inclined to oppose government action and prefer individual solutions – although

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<sup>28</sup> That is, Figure 6 reports, in some cases, issue positions that are measured by many variables (see the appendix). The social spending measure is a multi-item index that uses answers to several questions about social spending.

not by massive margins (see items 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 6 and the general size of government question in Figure 5).

**Figure 6: Social Welfare issue Positions within the Parties**



LEGEND  
 1 Services & spending/G 2 Health care/G 3 Jobs & living standards/G 4 Social security spending  
 5 Education spending 6 Welfare spending 7 Child care spending 8 Spending on poor  
 9 Tax more/spend more/G

The average of all these specific answers places Republicans slightly supportive of government social program activity and spending, highlighting an issue diversity within GOP ranks that makes them vulnerable to Democratic appeals. Republicans are inclined to see a need for government action to promote and

protect desirable public goods – social security, child care, and education are examples. Democrats are more enthusiastic about these goods, but the important point is that Republicans, on balance, share, albeit not as strongly, the Democratic Party’s commitment to social welfare spending and government action in principle. This union of individualism, suspicion of government competence, and a general desire to see government do more and spend more on palpable social problems creates some of the intra-party issue fracture that allows candidates to appeal across party lines. Democratic candidates can attract Republican votes with an emphasis on social problems that require attention; Republicans can attract Democratic voters by emphasizing individual responsibility and the ineffectiveness of government activity.<sup>29</sup>

### **Issues and Voting**

This variety gets played out as parties formulate issue appeals. Every campaign in America begins with a question about the collection of voters who will provide a winning coalition. The questions are always: “Who is with us?” Who might we attract?” “Who might we lose?” The next questions parallel the first three. “What issues will keep the first group, attract the second, and forestall the potential losses in the third?”

A campaign strategist looking at Figures 5 and 6 would have no trouble answering the second part of the question. Social welfare issues should be assets for the Democrats. Voters are mostly liberal on these matters and inclined to believe that Democrats are more interested in the problem than Republicans.<sup>30</sup> Cultural issues and questions related to the nation’s security should benefit Republicans because Democratic voters share the conservative viewpoints of Republican identifiers and agree that Republicans are better at handling these issues. Cultural and national security issues reinforce those with GOP inclinations and create a wedge among the Democrats that might benefit a Republican candidate. Table 4

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<sup>29</sup> This is a wrinkle to the ownership of issues by the parties. Democrats prosper when social needs are salient; Republicans do better when the issues turn not on the social problems but on the size, scope, and competence of government.

<sup>30</sup> Petrocik 1996, 2003.

offers the first evidence that these issues, net of party preference, are influences on the vote, or at least were in 2004.<sup>31</sup>

Each issue had a significant simple correlation with assessments of George Bush and John Kerry and the vote in 2004. Several of the correlations are very large (using force, social spending policies regarding minorities, and traditional patriotic sentiments); a couple (the respondent’s religiosity and feelings about illegal immigrant) are rather weak. However, all of the issues mattered to some degree in 2004. What is most impressive about these issues is that each had an influence on the vote after controlling for the voter’s partisanship.

**Table 4: Issue Influences on the Vote and Candidate Assessments**

Issue	The 2004 Vote		Bush-Kerry Evaluation	
	Observed	With party id controlled	Observed	With party id controlled
1 - Role of government	.34	.15	.30	.12
2 - Use of force	.53	.37	.52	.36
3 - Social spending	.51	.31	.46	.24
4 - Minorities	.47	.29	.45	.26
5 - Traditional patriotism	.40	.25	.43	.30
6 - Status of women	.23	.14	.23	.14
7 - Abortion	.39	.28	.34	.21
8 - Homosexuality	.35	.20	.34	.20
9 - Religious orientation	.15	.13	.17	.15
10 - Adjusting moral views	.31	.15	.27	.11
11 - Death Penalty	.35	.20	.29	.12
12 - Illegal immigration	.15	.16	.13	.12

Note: Table entries are correlations of each issue with the vote in the “Observed” column and partial correlations that control for party affiliation in the “With party id controlled” column.

### *Wedges and Magnets, Defection and Loyalty*

Table 5 groups the issues into three types. The first - “Winning Republican Issues” - are those issues in Figure 5 on which Republican **and** Democratic identifiers have generally conservative preferences. Winning Republican Issues are

<sup>31</sup> The correlations are always going to be positive because the issue variables are scored from liberal (lower value) to conservative (the higher number) and the vote is coded so that the higher value reflects a Republican vote. Simple correlations are used in Table 3 to permit straightforward comparisons among the variables. This coefficient has some limitations with binary variables but the substantive losses are trivial compared to the greater intuitiveness of a Pearson correlation coefficient over any alternative.

those related to defense spending and the use of force, minorities, patriotic sentiments, religiosity, the death penalty, and illegal immigration (issues 2, 4, 5, 9, and 11, respectively). These issues should (1) strengthen a Republican’s inclination to prefer the Republican candidate and (2) contradict a Democrat’s inclination to prefer the Democratic candidate. Not all Democrats will take a conservative stance on these matters, but since many do (see the means of Democrats in Figure 5) the more conservatively-inclined any given Democratic identifier is on one of these issues and the more the issue type is salient in an election, the more likely it is that Democrats will defect and Republican candidates will be advantaged.

**Table 5: Issue Positions of Voters on Different Type of Campaign Issues**

	Voter’s Party Identification			
	Democrats	Independents	Republicans	Total
Winning Republican Issues	.57 (.17)	.66 (.14)	.72 (.12)	.64 (.16)
Winning Democratic Issues	.28 (.17)	.32 (.18)	.48 (.21)	.37 (.21)
Reinforcing Issues	.43 (.25)	.50 (.21)	.64 (.26)	.52 (.27)

Table entries are means of the summary index of each type of issue. A value larger than .50 indicates a generally conservative predisposition. Values smaller than .50 represent a liberal position on the issues. Entries in parentheses are the standard deviations of the means.

“Winning Democratic Issues” are those on which Republican **and** Democratic identifiers have generally liberal preferences. Winning Democratic issues are the responsibility of government to deal with social problems, social spending, the status of women, and homosexuality (issues 1, 3, 6, and 8 in Figure 6). The effects of these issues mirror those of Winning Republican Issues. They should (1) strengthen a Democrat’s inclination to prefer and vote for the Democratic candidate and (2) contradict a Republican’s party id-induced inclination to prefer and vote for the Republican candidate. Not all Republicans have liberal preferences on these matters, but, again, many do (see the placements of Republicans in Figure 5). The more liberal any Republican identifier is on one of these issues and

the more the issue type is salient in an election, the more likely it is that Republican will vote Democratic.

Finally, Table 5 presents “Reinforcing Issues”, which are defined as issues on which Democrats have generally liberal positions and Republican have generally conservative preferences. Reinforcing Issues are abortion and the matter of whether moral views must adjust for changing times (issues 7 and 10). Elections fought around these issues. Campaigns that emphasize them will solidify the preferences of their base, even if it also motivates opposition partisans to vote against them. Reinforcing issues are generally the most helpful to the majority party since they motivate – by definition – a majority in the electorate.

The positions of Democrats and Republicans on these issues (and the variability as indicated by the standard deviation), documents the party advantages associated with each issue. Republicans are considerably more conservative than Democrats on the winning Republican issues, but even the Democrats are to the right on center on the issues (with a mean score of .58 – see Table 5). Winning Democratic Issues have Democrats and Republicans left of the center point. The means mirror those of the Winning Republican issues: Republicans have a moderately liberal score of .44 and Democrats are very liberal at .26. Partisans are opposed on the reinforcing issues but Republicans seem to be more conservative with a score of .64 compared to a relatively moderate .44 for Democratic identifiers.

As Table 6 demonstrates, these issue configurations had strong independent influences on the evaluations of Bush and Kerry and the vote. Winning Republican Issues had a larger effect on voters than Winning Democratic Issues and both were more consequential than reinforcing issues in shaping candidate evaluations (see the coefficients in the table). Their impact on the vote was similarly unbalanced. Winning Republican Issues moved voters more strongly than Winning Democratic Issues and the latter was equal to the impact of Reinforcing Issues. The slightly greater effect of Republican Issues seems reasonable given how conservative many Democrats are on the specific issues in this category (see above).

**Table 6: Issue Position Effects on the Vote**

	Candidate	Vote	
	Evaluation (OLS)	OLS	Logistic Regression
Constant	-56.5	.01	-5.50
Democratic identifier	-28.3 (2.98)	-.34 (.03)	-1.77 (.33)
Republican identifier	37.5 (3.04)	.37 (.03)	2.35 (.33)
Winning Republican Issues	64.0 (6.13)	.51 (.06)	5.23 (.88)
Winning Democratic Issues	28.12 (5.13)	.25 (.05)	2.35 (.69)
Reinforcing Issues	13.7 (3.40)	.19 (.03)	1.89 (.47)
R <sup>2</sup>	.59	.73	.77
-2 Log Likelihood			550.91

OLS table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Entries in parentheses are standard errors. All parameter estimates are statistically significant beyond the .01 level.

### **Nomination Politics in the Reagan GOP**

The 2008 GOP nomination struggle mapped on to the divisions within the Republican Party, especially around economic issues. Mike Huckabee, past Republican governor of Arkansas and ordained Baptist minister, frequently denounced the small government/low tax/limited social programs posture that Reagan inherited from the New Deal GOP. He was repeatedly populist in his public pronouncements, often criticizing the anti-tax policies of the Club for Growth (occasionally referring to them as the “Club for Greed”). He seemed solicitous of labor unions and the struggling wage workers they represented (in theory if not always in practice). He criticized executive pay for being hundreds of multiples of the average worker in their industries. In foreign affairs he sounded like some of the most liberal Democrats, promoting notions of the US as a participant in world affairs rather than the unilateral actor attributed to the country under Bush. His frequent suggestion that the US needed to close Guantanamo Bay did not strike many members of the Reagan Republican Party as pronouncements of a person who embraced the “strong defense-confront all adversaries” posture of Reagan and his GOP successors. Despite strong criticism

from virtually all parts of the leadership of the party's current stakeholders – including its social conservatives, Huckabee was the candidate of Winning Democratic Issues and cultural conservatism in the GOP. He drew a fairly consistent third of the vote in the polls and at the polls into February and March of 2008.

Mitt Romney and Rudy Giuliani represented, in differing degrees, the small government/low tax and strong defense viewpoints of the party. Neither was able to assemble a winning coalition. The quick demise of Giuliani's candidacy may reflect a strategic miscalculation about how to conduct his campaign as much or more than what he presented as an issue agenda, although his poor match with the concerns of the cultural conservatives would have presented problems throughout.<sup>32</sup> Romney's principal identity as the fiscal conservative brought him an occasional primary or caucus victory but he tended to draw about 30 percent of the vote in GOP contests. His suspect conservative credentials on the social-cultural and foreign policy dimensions never allowed him to acquire plurality support and successive wins.

John McCain's profile was imperfect on all three dimensions but he was obviously deficient on none. His greatest problem was a lingering suspicion about his party loyalty, a suspicion he excited with his relatively bitter pursuit of the 2000 nomination, frequent criticism of President Bush, sponsorship of the McCain-Finegold campaign finance changes, involvement with several Democratic Senators on a plan that thwarted efforts by the Senate's GOP majority to alter the body's filibuster rules, and constant trumpeting of his reputation as a "maverick." His successful nomination bid was probably a tribute to his persistence and refusal to accept defeat (which many pronounced in the late summer and early autumn of 2007), familiarity and an acknowledged status as a national leader of the Republicans, and a reputation rooted in his respected personal history from the Vietnam War.<sup>33</sup> These facts and an ability to occupy the broad GOP issue space more successfully than his significant competitors allowed him to

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<sup>32</sup> [http://www.ontheissues.org/Rudy\\_Giuliani.htm](http://www.ontheissues.org/Rudy_Giuliani.htm)

<sup>33</sup> Jo Freeman 1986 has an insightful essay of differences in the sources of legitimacy within the parties. Republicans tend to acknowledge claims of long service far more than do the Democrats. McCain may have succeeded because of this distinction.

dominate opponents who could not occupy the conservative issue space that defines the current GOP. McCain was not a candidate of any one of the major constituencies, he received some support from all of them, and as the opposition was winnowed down to Huckabee – who was identified only with the social conservatives – McCain assembled majority support for his nomination. McCain was not the best candidate to carry the banner of the social conservatives, the small government conservatives, or the defense conservatives, but he was not the candidate particularly opposed by any one of them. He was and is a fit for the Reagan Republican coalition.

### **Conservative Voting in 2008 and Beyond**

Ronald Reagan consolidated a Republican base in the middle 1980s that was significantly different from the GOP that was created by the New Deal era. His campaigns and posture blended social, defense, and anti-tax/small government conservatives into a winning electoral coalition that seemed on the verge of tying or surpassing the Democratic lead in party identification as early as 1981. Although his coalition has remained smaller than the Democrat's plurality it has been successful in many ways, arguably dominating presidential politics since 1980.

Clinton won two elections in the middle of this era, but with a popular vote that equaled the losing vote of earlier Democratic candidates and was burdened with a GOP majority in the House and Senate for most of his presidency. The most recent President Bush continued the Republican success. Bush's re-election in 2004 on a national security agenda played one of their trump issue strengths of the GOP. Voters expressed their underlying conservatism on defense and security matters – and uneasy feeling of Democratic “weakness on defense” – by rejecting every attempt by John Kerry to persuade Americans that he could be as trusted as George Bush with America's security.

McCain's defeat under the circumstances of the 2008 electoral environment may indicate little about the basic strength of the party coalitions but a great deal about the unwillingness of Americans to “renew the contract” of a party whose president failed to perform adequately in so many areas. The available exit polls,


which provide the best observatory currently available on the 2008 vote, indicate no substantial shift from vote patterns observed in 2004. Barak Obama was elected with an almost uniform shift in the vote away from the GOP. Only the youngest cohort (those under 30) supported Obama noticeably more than they supported Kerry or Gore, but that was less remarkable than commentary wanted us to believe since the partisanship and voting of the younger cohort has been notably Democratic since the late 1990s. There was a Democratic surge among those with very high incomes (incomes greater than \$200,000): Kerry received about 36 percent of their votes, Obama was supported by a 52 percent majority of them in 2008. Angry women did not refuse to vote for the man who denied a presidential nomination to a woman. Women, including white Democratic women, voted for Obama at rates almost indistinguishable from their support for Kerry in 2004, Gore in 2000, Clinton in 1992 and 1996, and other Democrats in recent decades. Whites in general and white Democrats in particular did not cast a racially motivated, heavy GOP vote. The white vote for Obama was up slightly from the white vote for Kerry in 2004, Gore in 2000, and the Democratic vote we expect from whites because of their Republican partisanship.

The normality of the election was striking, considering expectations of a break in voting patterns and predictions of an unprecedented tide of participation and new voters. Overall turnout was not exceptional in 2008. The number of voters increased at a typical rate. Although the turnout rate of voters under 30 years of age increased very slightly, bringing their share of the turnout up two percentage points, to 18 percent, the overall *turnout rate* was equal to that of 2004, as Figure 7 indicates.

In general, continuity, not change, characterized the party coalition groups and the level of mobilization in the 2008 election. Issue dynamics did not depart from familiar patterns. Defense, military security perceptions and beliefs, and cultural conservatism were strengths of the Republican Party and the McCain-Palin ticket. Republicans are conservative on these issues, homogeneously so for the most part. The generally conservative preferences of Democrats on these issues did not provide opportunities for McCain to attract Democratic identifiers

and create a winning majority simply because they were not the major concerns of voters. Dissatisfaction with George Bush's performance as president, discontent with the condition of the economy, and a desire to implement changes to the prevailing state of affairs powered Obama's candidacy to victory. The desire for a change in the country's direction after eight years of Republican government played into Democratic strengths and GOP weaknesses. A consensus on policies and current needs, coupled with a belief that Democrats are better able to handle social welfare needs, created an environment that disabled the issues strengths of the GOP, reinforced the party and issue inclinations of Democrats, and promoted defection among Republicans. Barak Obama was elected with no underlying change in the party coalitions or unusual mobilization of the electorate.

**Figure 7: Turnout for Presidential Elections, 1944 through 2008**




Note: The 2008 data are based on reports as of mid-December of 2008. Counted turnout as of this date was 129,368,906. This represents a turnout rate of 60.7, equal to the turnout rate in 2004.

Party system coalitions and issue dynamics are not eternal. The difficult economic environment Obama faces as he begins his term may, if he is judged successful, transform the issue reputations of the parties as well as the salience of the issues. But if we assume more persistence than change, the next several pres-

idential elections will be conditioned by the same perceptions of the parties and issue preferences within the parties that influenced that past several presidential elections. In that situation, Republicans will attempt to mobilize majorities around conservative cultural policies, a robust and self-interested defense policy, and low taxes and small government. Democrats will try to avoid these discussions, emphasizing the nation's social and economic needs.

## Appendix

These histograms are a categorized distribution of the data that are presented in Figure 5. Opinion does from left to right. Each variable - with the exception of the death penalty measure which was asked as a dichotomy - categories opinion into quintiles.



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