

Age at Immigration Matters: Explaining Immigrants' Political Participation from a Socialization Perspective

Abstract

In this paper we examine the effect of age at immigration on political participation based on two political socialization theories, the formative years theory and the lifelong persistence theory. We hypothesize that, 1) immigrants who migrated before the formative years will participate at the same level as the native-born population, immigrants who migrated after the formative years will participate less; 2) age at immigration continues to have negative effect on individuals' political behavior even when the age at immigration goes beyond the formative years. Using the Current Population Survey 2008 civic engagement supplement data, we find support to both hypotheses. We also find distinctive behavior patterns of immigrants from different regions of the world. Our findings have implications for both the socialization and immigration politics literature.

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Introduction

The political socialization literature has long focused on the role of age in the socialization process. Scholars in this field have developed at least three different theories that might help us to understand how one's socialization affects subsequent political participation. The formative years thesis argues that the age period from preteen to early adulthood is the time during which one's political perceptions crystallize and mature (e.g. Alwin 1991, Merelman and King 1986, Merelman 1972). Several studies have demonstrated that behavior during the formative years has a strong effect on the political involvement during adulthood (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, McFarland and Thomas 2006, Merelman and King 1986). The persistence thesis argues that, after the formative years, individuals' political attitudes (and, presumably, behaviors) are highly stable throughout lifetime (e.g. Prior 2010, Stoker and Jennings 2008, Jennings and Markus 1984). The lifelong openness thesis argues for the theoretical possibility that individuals are capable of lifelong learning and updating of political attitudes and behavior, although they may or may not do so depending on whether they receive enough inconsistent messages from the political environment (e.g. Jennings and Niemi 1978).

The political assimilation of immigrants can be understood in terms of political (re)socialization. An essential component of political socialization includes cultivating norms of political participation. These norms include beliefs about the importance of political participation, sense of political efficacy, etc., and these norms affect subsequent political behavior (e.g. Campbell 2006, Hyman 1969, Jennings and Niemi 1968). When individuals move from one political environment to another, they are presented with an opportunity to gradually establish a new set of norms, or to modify their original set of norms about political participation, which will then affect their political behavior. Cho (1999) goes as far as to argue that factors such as socioeconomic status *per se* do not affect immigrants'

political participation. Higher socioeconomic status provides the resources necessary to participate, but it is political socialization that translates (or fails to translate) resources into actions.

Given that immigrants' political assimilation is a (re)socialization process, it is therefore important to investigate the effect of the age during which immigration and its subsequent assimilation occur. Immigrants who leave their home countries before or early on in their formative years probably have a different political (re)socialization experience compared with those who migrated at an older age. However, the literature on immigrants' political (re)socialization does not give sufficient attention to the age at immigration and its impact on political participation. Some focus on the source country effect (Black 1987), others focus generational effects (Chui, Curtis, and Lambert 1991) ; very few have noted age at immigration effects. White et al. (2008)'s work comes the closest and draws attention to the effects of length of residence and age on immigrants' political participation. However, the authors do not directly account for effect of the age at immigration in their study. Given the evidence suggesting that political interests and beliefs are cultivated during the formative years, the age at immigration is as important, if not more important, than length of residence.

In this paper we address a gap in the literature by studying the effect of age at immigration on political participation. By linking the immigration literature with the socialization literature, we hope to make contributions on both accounts. In fact, as Jennings (2009) noted, the research on immigration provides a unique opportunity to contribute to both the immigration politics and political socialization research:

A missed opportunity concerns the large influx of immigrants into a number of countries over the past few decades. Not only did this present a chance to study the socialization processes and outcomes regarding per-adults, but it also represented a unique opportunity to analyze the resocialization of adults. Some relevant work, often flying under the conceptual banner of integration and differentiation, has appeared. For the most part, however, systematic inquires with a focus on socialization as much have

been lacking (Jennings 2009: 39).

What we are trying to accomplish in this paper is similar to what Jennings envisions. In regard to immigration politics, we examine how the age at immigration affects the outcome of immigrants' political (re)socialization. We find that it is indeed the case that immigrants who arrived at a younger age participate as frequently as the native-born population, both in terms of discussing politics and taking actions. When they migrate at an older age, immigrants seem to have a harder time “catching up” to the native-born population. There are regional variations, more specifically, Asian immigrants are less likely to discuss politics even when they arrive early in life, and Latino immigrants are less likely to take political actions regardless of how early they immigrate.

In regard to socialization theories, we find that our results support the formative years thesis and partially support the lifelong persistence thesis. Previous literature on immigrants' political assimilation finds little support to the lifelong persistence thesis and argues that immigrants' past experiences do not seem to be obstacles for their political assimilation. We find that at least in the case of political action, age at immigration has a consistently negative impact on one's political participation. It does not seem to be the case that individuals are capable of updating their behavior regardless of their past experience.

We structure our paper as follows. First we develop theoretical expectations for the effect of the age at immigration on political participation. We then develop our research design and test hypotheses for different mechanisms through which age at immigration affects political socialization. After presenting both the aggregate and the region-specific results, we discuss our findings from both the political socialization and immigration politics perspectives. Last but not least, we discuss the broader implications as well as the limitations of our research.

Theoretical considerations

How does the age at which immigration occurs affect an immigrant's political behavior? The socialization literature has provided several theoretical accounts that could potentially explain the age at immigration effect. The first theory is the formative years theory, or the impressionable years theory, arguing that individuals' political orientations, including attitudes, interests, activism, etc., develop, crystallize, and mature during the formative years (e.g. Alwin 1991, Meadow 1982, Merelman 1972). There is no strict consensus in terms of what specific age constitutes the formative years. However, most agree that the teenage years (specifically from the age of 12 to 18) are the core period of the formative years (e.g. Alwin and Krosnick 1991). Others argue that, depending on the specific issue area, formative years could start as early as preteen years and last through the middle age (e.g. Henry and Sears 2009, Sears 1983).

The key argument of the formative years theory is that one's political orientations are least stable during the formative years, because it is the period when political orientations are being shaped by one's social environment. In other words, individuals' early experiences matter disproportionately in influencing attitudes and behavior. Valentino and Sears (1998) find that events such as presidential political campaigns have a significant and lasting effect on political predispositions, especially partisan preferences, of ten- to seventeen-year-old middle school students. Beck and Jennings (1991) find that Americans who came of age between 1965 and 1982, a particularly turbulent period of American politics marked by an antipartisan environment, are less influenced by their parents' partisan affiliation. Meadow (1982) finds that children who spent their formative years during the Watergate scandal, therefore "scarred" by this experience, exhibited a less favorable attitude towards the president and the executive branch in general.

A large number of studies find a positive impact between adolescents' involvement in youth voluntary associations and later adulthood political participation, and these studies argue for the importance of preadult political socialization in influencing subsequent political behavior (e.g. Kahne and Spote 2008, McFarland and Thomas 2006, Janoski and Wilson 1995). Callahan, Muller, and Schiller (2010) find that school social studies programs encourage voter turnout among young adults. Beck and Jennings (1982) and Merelman and King (1986) find that school-based voluntarism and family-based political socialization have a significant impact on political activism in adulthood.

Applying the formative years theory to immigrants' political (re)socialization, the argument would be that for those who moved to the United States before or early on during their formative years have a relatively "native" political socialization experience and consequently a relatively "native" political behavior pattern. For those who moved to the States after their formative years, they experienced political socialization in a different political system with mostly different political events, therefore their behavior pattern would be different compared to that of the native-born population. Given that the previous literature finds that the immigration population generally participates less than native-born population both in terms of voting and non-voting behavior (e.g. Bass and Casper 2001, Nelson 1982), we hypothesize:

H1 (formative years): Other things being equal, immigrants who migrated before the formative years will participate at the same level as the native-born population, immigrants who migrated after the formative years will participate less.

The second theory that has been strongly supported by the literature is the persistence theory, or the aging-stability theory, which argues for the high stability of political attitudes and political interests throughout adulthood. With different data, Stoker and Jennings (2008) and Sears and Funk (1999) find

that individuals' partisan affiliations are highly stable throughout lifetime. Minor changes of partisan intensity occur from time to time, but the direction of partisan affiliation is highly unlikely to change. Prior (2010) finds that political interests are “exceptionally stable” in both the short term and the long run during adulthood. He points out that since political attitudes are highly stable once they are formed, and if we want to truly understand the variance of political attitudes across individuals, the best way is to go back to the formative years and focus on the factors influencing the formation of attitudes.

The same logic applies to studies of political behavior. Plutzer (2002) finds that voter turnout can in fact be explained with developmental theories, in that the change from habitual nonvoters to voters is a very gradual process marked by the inertia of habit-forming. Experience in young adulthood is the most influential factor, or the starting point, for future voting behavior. Gerber, Green, and Shachar (2003) similarly view voting as a habit, and the decision to turnout is likely to continue from one election to the next. Therefore, changes from regular turnout to regular abstention or vice versa is a gradual process.

In spite of the strong evidence suggesting that adults rarely change their political attitudes and behavior, there have been studies arguing for at least the theoretical possibility of openness towards change beyond the formative years. Jennings and Niemi (1978) note that the stability of partisan affiliation varies across generations, depending on the consistency of behavior reinforcements. With a specific focus on political tolerance, Miller and Sears (1986) find that the stability of political tolerance is conditional on environmental cues. The level of political tolerance is stable if the environment remains constant; the level of political tolerance changes substantively, however, when the political environment changes in regard to level of political tolerance. The authors conclude that the high level

of political consistency we observed is partially a result of early socialization's lasting influence, and partially a result of environmental continuity.

If the persistence of political orientations is conditional upon the consistency of the external environment, then one would expect that such persistence would be much weaker when it comes to immigrants' political (re)socialization, since the (re)socialization implies a fundamental change of one's political environment. Indeed, White et al. (2008) find that the persistence theory is less applicable to immigration politics, in that a long history in the source country does not turn out to be an obstacle of engaging in politics in the new host country. Immigrants seem to be willing to modify their behavior according to their new political environment.

Then the question becomes, is immigrants' political (re)socialization an exception to the persistence thesis or not? Given that age at immigration is directly related to the length of residency in the home country, if White et al. (2008) are correct, we would expect that age at immigration does not have a consistently negative effect on individuals' political participation. If immigration is not an exception, that it is harder for immigrants who moved older in life to update their behavior, then we would expect age at immigration to have a negative impact on participation. We therefore hypothesize that:

H2 (lifelong persistence): Controlling for other factors, age at immigration continues to have negative effect on individuals' political behavior even when the age at immigration goes beyond the formative years.

Data

We use the 2008 Civic Engagement Supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) as our data. The CPS is a large-scale (about 60,000 households), nationally-representative survey conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is primarily concerned with

constructing a time-series for unemployment estimates and other economic indicators. Since the 1970s, the CPS has included a voting and registration supplement, and in 2008, 2009, and 2010, the survey included several additional items on civic engagement. Among its many advantages and critically for our purposes, the CPS sample is large and thus allows for relatively precise estimates of detailed subpopulations. Of the more than 55,000 adults in our data, more than 6,000 are immigrants, who are from six different continents, over a hundred countries, and a variety of different personal backgrounds. The survey directly asked immigrants to indicate what year they migrated.¹ Descriptive statistics of our data is presented in the appendix.

The key independent variable is the age at immigration. As figure 1 shows, most of the immigrants arrived fairly early in life, 80% of them arrived between the age of 9 and 43. Figure 2 breaks down the distribution of the age at immigration based on regions of origin, and the figure suggests that there are not large differences when it comes to the distribution of age at immigration for immigrants from different regions.

[Figure 1 here]

[Figure 2 here]

To test our hypotheses, we examine two dependent variables as measures of political participation and engagement. One is participating in political discussion, and the other is participating in political actions. The political discussion question asks about the frequency of people talking about politics

¹ Unfortunately, this variable has been recoded into different “classes.” For example, all immigrants who migrated to the States between 1975 and 1979 are grouped together. For most of the immigrants in our sample (over 70 percent) the group spans only two years, but for a few it is as large as 15 to 20. Many of our hypotheses relate the the particular age the immigrant was at immigration. To determine their age at immigration, we first calculated the bounds (e.g. someone who was born in 1982 and immigrated between 1996 and 1997 was at least 16 and at most 17 at the time of immigration). We then replicated each record that we were uncertain of their age at immigration and weighted them equally. For the case described above, we would duplicate the record, assigning one an age at immigration of 16 and the other 17 and giving them both a weight of 0.5.

with others, and we categorize the answers into three categories of almost never, sometimes, and frequently. The political action variable is a dichotomous variable. It takes the value of one for individuals who indicated participating in at least one of five political activities (contacting an elected official, boycotting a product, joining a rally, attending a political meeting, and supporting a candidate) between 2007 and 2008.

Figure 3 shows the unadjusted average level of political discussion and political action against the age at immigration. Generally speaking, age at immigration has a negative and nonlinear relationship with political discussion and political action. The red line indicates average level of political discussion and action for the native-born population. Not surprisingly, for immigrants who arrived as infants, their level of political participation is very close to that of the native-born population.

[Figure 3 here]

To further examine the relationship between the age at immigration and political participation, we control for demographic and socioeconomic variables including age, sex, education, income, employment status, home ownership, community engagement variables including doing favors with neighbors and participating in religious organizations, and the variable indicating whether it was self-report or not.² The descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented in the appendix.

Results and Discussion

Hypothesis 1

To test our first hypothesis about the differences between the political participation of immigrants who migrated before the formative years and those who migrated after the formative years, we

² The CPS collects data on members of the household who were not present from the interview from others. Following the practice of others, we include a variable in our multivariate analysis indicating whether the data was collected from the respondent him or herself or from another member of his or her household (see Highton [2005] for further discussion of the importance of controlling for the source of the data when using the CPS).

conducted a relatively straightforward test with multiple regression. Our theory suggests that those who migrated before the formative years should act no differently than those who were born and raised in the United States. After we control for factors known to affect political participation (education, income, race, gender, etc.), we can examine the effects of dummy variables that indicate whether or not a particular immigrant migrated before the age of twelve, between twelve and eighteen, or after eighteen. The reference category refers to native born citizens. The full results of the regressions can be found in the appendix.³ Table 1 shows the predicted probabilities, holding everything else constant, for a hypothetical individual who is a citizen, with income in the second quartile of income, with a college degree, and typical values for the other control variables.

[Table 1 here]

The first column of Table 1 shows the predicted probabilities for native-born citizens. The hypothetical native-born citizen is predicted to have a 0.46 probability of reporting frequently discussing politics (operationalized here as discussing politics at least several times a week). The second column shows the predicted probability for an immigrant who migrated before age 12. The average prediction is slightly lower, but after controlling for other factors affecting political participation, the confidence intervals for pre-formative years immigrants overlaps the interval for native-born citizens. When we look at the probabilities for immigrants who came to the United States after the formative years, the predicted probability is significantly smaller than for native-born citizens. With respect to political discussion, we have tentative support for our hypothesis.

The remaining columns of the table show the predicted probabilities of discussing politics for immigrants from different regions of the world. Interestingly, unlike the others, Asian immigrants,

³ The dependent variable for the political participation models is dichotomous (participate in one or more of the five different activities or not), and we fit the model by logistic regression. For the political discussion variable, the dependent variable was ordinal and we use an ordered logistic regression.

even when they migrated before the age of 12, discuss politics at a significantly lower rate than native-born citizens, although the gap is not large. It is not entirely clear as for why it is the case for Asian immigrants. In general, the statistical power of these tests broken out by region drops off dramatically. The patterns that we expect hold up, but we are unable to make statistical distinctions at conventional levels of significance when we restrict our view to subsets of the immigrant population.

Table 2 shows the predicted probability of participating in at least one form of political actions. A native-born citizen has on average a 0.32 probability of taking a political action, and an immigrant (with the same values of the other control variables) who arrived before the age of 12 has a 0.28 predicted probability. Again, this difference is not statistically significant. For immigrants who arrived after the age of 18, however, they participate at a statistically significant lower rate, almost half of the probability of a native-born citizen. This finding is again consistent with our formative years hypothesis. When immigrants arrive before their formative years, they seem to assimilate into the American society fairly well, and participate in politics at the same rate as the native-born population.

[Table 2 here]

To better interpret the region-specific results, we highlight the cases in which immigrants' predicted probabilities of participation are significantly lower than that of the native-born population. Except for Oceanian and Canadian immigrants, all immigrants who arrived after their formative years are less likely to participate. For European and African immigrants, as long as they arrived sometime before 18, they participate at a similar rate as the native-born citizens. For Asian immigrants, they need to arrive early in life, before the age of 12, to fully assimilate politically. Latino immigrants, however, never seem to fully assimilate regardless of the age at immigration.

Based on the findings on political discussion and action, we observe two outliers. First, unlike the

others, Latino immigrants who come before the age of 12 have a statistically lower probability of taking any political actions. But it was not the case when it comes to political discussion. So Latino immigrants are willing to discuss politics but unwilling to take actions. Second, recall that Asian immigrants stand out as less likely to discuss politics, but they do not stand out as less likely to take political actions here. So for Asian immigrants, they are less willing to discuss politics but are willing to take political actions. We are not exactly certain as to why. To fully account for these anomalous findings, further investigation will be needed.

Hypothesis 2

The persistence or aging-stability hypothesis argues that individuals' political orientations stabilize over time. To test the hypothesis in the context of immigrants' political assimilation, we examine the relationship between age at immigration and the level of political participation. Recall that if the persistence thesis is correct (which posits that individuals have more stable behavior patterns as they age), we would expect to see a constant negative relationship between age at immigration and participation. If the persistence thesis is not correct, that immigrants are capable of lifelong learning, we would expect to see no relationship between age at immigration and participation.

Our theory predicts a negative relationship between age at immigration and levels of immigrant participation. Given the non-linear pattern we observed from the simple correlation, we use a semi-parametric estimation procedure to model this non-linearity directly (Beck and Jackman 1998; Keele 2008). This estimation allows for some parameters to be locally fit rather than assuming the same global relationship holds across the data. Without imposing a strict linear form on the relationship between the variable of interest and the dependent variable, we can estimate some function, $f(x)$, non-parametrically. For my purposes, I will use a cubic regression spline. Cubic splines have the

advantage of generating a continually differentiable function across the range of the spline. The resulting estimation yields estimates for the global parameters (as in standard regression), and estimates of the value of the unknown function of the non-linear parameter at each observed value of the variable.

[Figure 4 here]

Figure 4 displays our results. In the left-hand panel, we show the effect of age at immigration across its range on political discussion. For the purposes of this and the following figures, the other control variables in the model were held constant at their means. For political discussion, the resulting curve is steepest between birth and 20 years old. After about age 20, the effect of age at immigration levels off before falling again around age 40, although the effect is not strong. The story is different when it comes to actually engaging in political behavior. When we average the effect over all of the different immigrant subpopulations, we see a relatively constant and strong negative effect until about age 40 where age at immigration seems to lose its importance.

This general pattern provides partial support for the lifelong persistence thesis when it comes to political discussion, and strong support to the lifelong persistence thesis when it comes to political action. As age at immigration increases, levels of political discussion are affected to a certain extent, meaning that age at immigration somewhat works against immigrants to become attentive to politics and to express their political ideas. However, as age at immigration increases, levels of political action sharply decline, meaning that age at immigration greatly works against immigrants when it comes to taking actions.

[Figure 5 to 10 here]

Figures 5 through 10 show the results broken out for the other regions. Setting aside the rather

strange patterns in Figure 9, which are probably more an artifact of the relatively small number of immigrants from Australia and New Zealand in our sample, the general trend among the immigrant subpopulations seems to be consistent with the patterns found of the overall immigrant population, and more so when it comes to political action. The effect of age at immigration does not stop at the end of the formative years; it in fact becomes most pronounced when it occurs in middle age.

Our finding here is contradictory to White et al. (2008), who find that immigrants' previous experience does not seem to pose an obstacle for their later political assimilation. Intuitively, it makes sense to think that political assimilation does not come easy for just anyone; for those who immigrated at an older age, they would have a harder time to be open and to fully adapt to a new political environment. Given the evidence, we might need to think twice before we conclude that the lifelong persistence thesis does not apply to immigrants.

Conclusion

In this paper we apply socialization theories to the study of immigrants' political participation. We find that immigrants' political (re)socialization indeed follows a similar pattern. Formative years are highly influential in establishing the political behavior patterns later in life, and behavioral habits tend to be more stable and harder to change as people age. By examining the participation patterns of immigrants from different regions of the world, we notice nuanced differences when it comes to the interaction between the age at immigration effect and regions of origin, and that it is harder for Asian immigrants to fully assimilate when it comes to political discussion, and harder for Latino immigrants to fully assimilate when it comes to political action. Given the inequality of levels of political participation, it is important normatively to further investigate the reasons behind such differences.

What we intend to include in the next iteration of the paper is how age at immigration mediates the

way other variables influence immigrants' political participation. Li and Jones (2011) find that country of origin has a larger impact on political participation for immigrants who migrated after eighteen. In the economics literature, Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) find that the age at immigration has a direct negative effect on the level of earnings. Moreover, there are lower returns of education attainment and labor market experience when immigrants arrive later in life. Visible minority immigrants who arrived before their teen years do not have an earnings deficit, yet visible minority immigrants who landed at an older age experience an earnings deficit, and this deficit grows with age at migration. English as mother tongue has lower returns for immigrants who arrived before their teens, and higher returns for immigrants who arrived at an older age.

Based on previous literature on political participation and immigration politics, education has a positive effect on participation (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Cho 1999), so does English as a native language (e.g. Bass and Casper 2001, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2003). “Visible” immigrants from Asia and Latino America tend to participate less than the “invisible” ones from Europe and Africa (e.g. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Then the question becomes, do these variables have different effect on immigrants' political participation based on the age at immigration? Possibly, secondary education could have larger positive impact for immigrants who migrated before 12, and lower returns for those who migrated after 18. College education could have larger positive impact for immigrants who migrated before 18, and lower returns for those who migrated after 24. Additionally, English as a native language could have a smaller positive impact for immigrants who migrated younger, and larger positive impact for those who migrated older. And being a visible minority could have smaller negative impact for immigrants who migrated younger, and larger positive impact for those who migrated older. These are all plausible hypotheses that we intend to explore more in the future.

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Appendix

Table A1 Descriptive Statistics: November 2008 CES-CPS
(in percentages)

	Native-born citizen	Naturalized citizen	Non citizen	Total
# of observations	118,617	6,072	8,123	132,812
Sex				
Male	48.75	45.14	49.54	48.64
Female	51.25	54.86	50.46	51.36
Age groups				
18-21	6.80	2.31	6.65	6.53
22-31	16.41	10.55	27.88	16.89
32-41	16.34	17.83	28.56	17.31
42-51	19.63	23.23	17.43	19.68
52-61	18.67	19.35	11.63	18.20
62-71	11.21	12.67	4.29	10.80
71+	10.95	14.05	3.56	10.60
Marital Status				
Married	52.52	66.88	59.93	53.85
Widowed or Divorced	18.61	17.75	10.60	18.00
Never married	28.86	15.38	29.47	28.15
Education				
0 ~ 9 th Grade	5.98	14.41	27.80	7.98
High school	39.82	31.09	35.22	39.01
Associate	28.36	21.89	14.21	27.01
Bachelor's	17.19	20.87	14.09	17.17
Master's	6.34	7.09	6.18	6.37
Professional and PhD	2.32	4.66	2.51	2.46
Family Income				
0 ~ 29,999	25.45	24.16	42.26	26.40
30,000 ~ 49,999	20.53	21.05	24.03	20.76
50,000 ~ 99,999	33.67	31.65	22.93	32.94
100,000+	20.35	23.14	10.79	19.90
Home ownership				
Own home	73.86	72.79	41.30	71.82
Not own home	26.14	27.21	58.70	28.18
Employment Status				
Employed	60.92	61.29	62.81	61.07
Unemployed	3.89	3.10	4.98	3.92
Retired	16.61	20.16	5.48	16.02
Disabled	4.98	3.51	2.46	4.72
Not in workforce	13.60	11.94	24.28	14.26

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables

	# of Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimal	Maximum
Dependent Variables					
Political discussion	7662	1.951	0.844	1	3
Political action	7629	0.222	0.649	0	1
Independent variables					
Age	12998	3.776	1.622	1	7
Sex	14195	1.523	0.499	1	2
Education	14195	1.634	0.735	1	3
Family Income	11307	2.242	1.093	1	4
Homeowner	14195	0.548	0.498	0	1
Participate in religious group	7670	0.149	0.356	0	1
Do favors with neighbors	7543	1.636	0.724	1	3

Table A3: Regression Results Hypothesis 1

	Action	Discussion
Citizen	0.474 [.078]	0.177 [.03]
Migrated before 12	-0.173 [.087]	-0.144 [.04]
Migrated between 12 and 18	-0.493 [.096]	-0.189 [.039]
Migrated After 18	-0.853 [.061]	-0.239 [.025]
Reported doing favors for neighbors	0.372 [.014]	0.201 [.007]
Involvement in religious organizations	0.812 [.023]	0.214 [.013]
Income	0.191 [.011]	0.116 [.005]
Education	0.732 [.017]	0.283 [.008]
Age	0.006 [.001]	-0.002 [0]
Female	-0.099 [.02]	-0.07 [.01]
Homeowner	0.057 [.026]	0.021 [.012]
Employment	0.125 [.024]	0.105 [.012]
Self-report	0.459 [.023]	0.089 [.011]
Constant	-4.398 [.098]	
Cut point 1		0.438 [.040]
Cut point 2		1.426 [.040]
n	55,809	55,728
log-likelihood	-30502.6	-56142.8

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3





Table 1: Predicted Probabilities – Political Discussion

		Native-born	All Immigrants	European	Asian	Latin American	African	Oceania	Canada
Age at Immigration									
Before 12			0.413 [.37, .457]	0.45 [.297, .612]	0.299 [.192, .427]	0.361 [.263, .47]	0.41 [.13, .748]	0.501 [.036, .964]	0.506 [.184, .824]
Between 12 and 18		0.462 [.434, .491]	0.397 [.353, .442]	0.363 [.206, .548]	0.288 [.181, .419]	0.366 [.267, .474]	0.352 [.085, .73]	0.096 [0, .936]	0.666 [.242, .941]
After 18			0.387 [.349, .428]	0.391 [.251, .547]	0.159 [.098, .242]	0.404 [.307, .507]	0.501 [.235, .768]	0.058 [0, .71]	0.437 [.129, .792]

Table 2: Predicted Probabilities – Political Action

		Native-born	All Immigrants	European	Asian	Latin American	African	Oceania	Canada
Age at Immigration									
Before 12			0.283 [.247, .318]	0.343 [.263, .422]	0.324 [.251, .397]	0.205 [.158, .252]	0.441 [.21, .672]	0.277 [-.055, .608]	0.45 [.276, .624]
Between 12 and 18		0.319 [.309, .329]	0.222 [.189, .256]	0.25 [.166, .335]	0.232 [.166, .299]	0.196 [.152, .24]	0.329 [.085, .572]	0.518 [-.11, 1.146]	0.395 [.156, .635]
After 18			0.166 [.149, .184]	0.232 [.188, .276]	0.113 [.091, .136]	0.165 [.136, .194]	0.234 [.152, .315]	0.214 [-.007, .434]	0.333 [.194, .473]

Figure 4: Overall




Figure 5: European Immigrants




Figure 6: Asian Immigrants





Figure 7: Latin American Immigrants




Figure 8: African Immigrants




Figure 9: Oceanian Immigrants




Figure 10: Canadian Immigrants

