Spring, 2011
Political Science 826
The Legislative Process
Thursday 1:20-3:15 p.m.
North Hall 422

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

This seminar is designed to introduce you to the major topics of research on and the major theoretical approaches to studying the United States Congress. The central questions are: what motivates the behavior of members of Congress, how do they structure institutions to meet their goals, how do structures affect outcomes, how do members of Congress interact with the President, the courts, and the public . . . ultimately, how important is Congress for the making of public policy and why? We will only be able to cover a small fraction of the work on Congress, but I will attempt to introduce you to some of the classics in the area as well as give you a taste of the best work that is currently being done. We will begin the semester with several weeks on the major approaches to studying Congress: new institutionalism, rational choice (distributive, informational, and partisan), behavioral, and historical. Next we will examine Congress on several different levels: individual level (representation and elections), the institutional level (committees, parties, rules, and the floor), and extra-institutional (Congress and the executive and judiciary). The semester ends with a focus on normative work on Congress. How should the institution be structured and how can its performance be improved?

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1) The quality of this seminar will largely depend on the level of participation from all students. Everyone is expected to read the required readings by the day of the seminar and be willing and able to participate meaningfully in discussions. It is essential to have a good understanding of each article, not only individually but also how they fit together.

2) You will write a 15 page (or so) paper that addresses one of the research questions raised in the seminar. This is not to be a synthetic work, but rather a paper that defines a problem, briefly reviews the state of knowledge on the issue, and then presents a proposal for future research.

3) You also will write six short papers (2-3 pages) that summarize and critique the readings for a given week. No outside reading is required for these papers.

4) There will be a final examination. The exam will probably have three questions. We will discuss the format of the exam (how long you will have to work on it, take-home or in-class) later in the semester.

COURSE EVALUATION

The seminar paper and the final exam will each comprise 25% of your grade, the six short papers are 5% each, and seminar participation is the remaining 20%.

COURSE READINGS The following books are required reading for the course:

David T. Canon, *Race, Redistricting and Representation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

The rest of the course readings will be available on-line through your "student center" on MyUW.

COURSE OUTLINE

Suggested Readings are indicated with a * (these are not included in the online readings).

Part One--Theories and Methods

January 20th – Approaches to Studying Congress and American Politics

John S. Lapinski and E. Scott Adler, "Defining the Macropolitics of Congress," in *The Macropolitics of Congress,* ed. E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, 1-18.

David Brady, "Rational Choice, History, and the Dynamics of Congress," in *The Macropolitics of Congress,* ed. E. Scott Adler and John S. Lapinski, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, 251-58.

Richard Fenno, "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics," APSR 80:1 (March, 1986): 3-15.

Theodore J. Lowi, "The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study." APSR 86:1 (March, 1992): 1-7.

General reviews of the Congress literature:

*Gerald Gamm and John Huber, "Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the Contemporary Congress," in Political Science: State of the Discipline (Centennial Edition), New York: W.W. Norton, 2002, 313-41.

*Nelson W. Polsby and Eric Schickler. "Landmarks in the Study of Congress since 1945: Sketches for an Informal History." Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.

*Davidson, Roger. "Legislative Research: Mirror of a Discipline." In Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol.4, Northwestern University Press, 1991, 17-36.

*Mezey, Michael L. "Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance." In Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Ada Finifter editor. Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1993, 335-64.

January 27th – The Rational Choice Approach

Cameron, Charles, Chapter 3 in Veto Bargaining, 69-82.

Shepsle and Weingast, "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions," Chap. 1 in edited book by the same name (hereafter, PTCI), pp. 5-35.

Arnold, Douglas R. The Logic of Congressional Action, Chapters 1, 4 and 6, pp. 3-16, 60-87, 119-146.

Krehbiel, Keith, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking Chapters 1+2, pp. 3-48.

Green, David and Ian Shapiro, "Legislative Behavior and the Paradox of Voting" and selection from their conclusion, pp. 98-120,142-46,196-204, from Pathologies of Rational Choice.

*Weingast, Barry. "Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives." In A New Handbook of Political Science. Edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Oxford University Press, 1996, 167-90.

*Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Part One, pp. 1-77.

*Shepsle, Kenneth A. "Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures." Legislative Studies Quarterly 10:1 (February, 1985): 5-19.

*Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. "Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior." American Economic Review 65:2 (May, 1975): 407-414.

*Moe, Terry M. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story" and comment from Morris Fiorina, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Special Issue, 1990): 213-61.

*Hall, Richard L. "Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative Institutions," and response by Morris Fiorina ("Afterword (But Undoubtedly Not the Last Word)"), pp.273-312 in PTCI.

February 3rd – – Historical Research

Swift, Elaine and David W. Brady. "Out of the Past: Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of Congressional History," PS: Political Science and Politics 24:1, 61-64.

Gamm, Gerald. "Buried Treasure: Theory and Historical Data." The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Katznelson, Ira. "Reflections on History, Method, and Political Science."The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Aldrich, John. "Does Historical Political Research Pose Any Special Methodological Concerns?"The Political Methodologist, Newsletter of the Political Methodology Section, American Political Science Association, 8:1 (Fall, 1997).

Eric Schickler, *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*, Princeton University Press, 2001, Chapter 1, pp. 3-26.

Katz, Jonathan, N., and Brian R. Sala, "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection," *American Political Science Review*, v. 90, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 21-33.

Crook, Sara Brandes, and John R. Hibbing, "A Not-so-distant Mirror: the 17th Amendment and Congressional Change," *American Political Science Review*, v. 91, no. 4, December 1997, pp. 845-53.

Gailmard, Dean and Jeffrey A. Jenkins, "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," *APSR*, 53:2 (April, 2009): 343-59.

Clinton, Joshua D. and John Lapinski, "Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891-1994." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33:4 (November, 2008): 510-41.

*David R. Mayhew, *America's Congress* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

*Polsby, Nelson, *How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

*Kernell, Samuel, and Michael P. McDonald. "Congress and America's Political Development: The Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Service." AJPS, 43:3 (July, 1999): 792-811.

*Bianco, William T., David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkerson, "The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816," *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 40 no. 1, February 1996, pp. 145-171.

*Gamm, Gerald, and Shepsle, Kenneth. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825." LSQ 14:1 (February, 1989): 39-66.

*Swift, Elaine K. "Electoral Connection Meets the Past: Lessons from Congressional History, 1789-1899." Political Science Quarterly 102:4.

*Hansen, John Mark. "Choosing Sides: The Creations of the Agricultural Policy Network in Congress, 1919-1932." Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 183-229.

*Binder, Sarah A. and Steven S. Smith. Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate. Brookings, 1997.

*Canon, David T., and David J. Sousa. 1992. "Party System Change and Political Career Structures in the U.S. Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17: 347-63.
*Hansen, John Mark. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. University of Chicago Press, 1991.
*Polsby, Nelson. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62:2 (1968): 144-68.
*Stewart, Charles H. Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865-1921. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
*Swift, Elaine. The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change in Congress, 1787-1841. University of Michigan Press, 1996.

February 10th – Elaborations and Extensions of the Rational Choice Approach: Informational Theory and Partisan Theory

Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization, Chapter 3, pp. 61-103.
Steven S. Smith, *Party Influence in Congress*. Introduction and Chapters 1-3, pp. 1-81.
Cox and McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda,* Chapters 1-3, pp. 1-49.
Lebo, Matthew J. Adam McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. "Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000." *American Journal of Political Science* 51:3 (July, 2007): 464-81.

*Cox, Gary W. and Mathew McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (University of California Press, 1993), pp. 85-135.
*Smith, Steven S. "Positive Theories of Congressional Parties." Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:2 (May, 2000): 193-215.
*Aldrich, John, "Political Parties and Governance," *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*, pp. 194-240.
*Aldrich, John and David Rohde, "The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Governmet." In *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era*, edited by Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, Washington, D.C., 2000.

(Note we also will have one week on normative approaches to studying Congress. Logically that week should come here on the syllabus, but in practical terms, we will have a better discussion of what Congress *should* be doing after you have a better understanding of how it works and what it *is* doing.)

Part Two--Congressional Elections and Representation

February 17th – Representation: The Senate, Districting, and Race

Richard Rosenfeld, "What Democracy?: The Case for Abolishing the United States Senate." *Harper's Magazine*, May, 2004, 35-44
Lee, Frances E. "Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds.: JOP 60: (February, 1998): 34-62.
Griffin, John D. "Senate Apportionment as a Source of Political Inequality." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31:3 (August, 2006): 405-32.
Canon, David, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Preface, Introduction, and Chapter 1, xi-59.
Brunell, Thomas L. *Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections are Bad for America*. New York: Routledge, 2008, chapters 1 and 3, 1-15, 29-49.

Rehfeld, Andrew, *The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 9 and Epilogue, pp. 209-44.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?", *AJPS*, 53:3 (July 2009): 666–80.

*McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization," AJPS, 53:3 (July, 2010): 681-94.

*Theriault, Sean M. *The Power of the People: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005).

*Bailey, Michael. "Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983-94." LSQ 26:1 (February, 2001): 45-80.

*Lee, Frances, "Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics." APSR 94:1 (March, 2000): 59-72.

*Lee, Frances, and Bruce Oppenheimer, *Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

*Bianco, William T. Trust: Representatives and Constituents. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

*Fiorina, Morris, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2nd ed., Yale University Press, 1989.

*West, Darrell M. "Activists and Economic Policymaking in Congress." AJPS 32:3 (August, 1988): 662-80.

*Sundquist, James L. "Representation and the Will to Govern." Chapter 15, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981, pp. 440-59.

*Achen, Christopher. "Measuring Representation." AJPS 22:3 (August, 1978): 475-510.

*Fenno, Richard F. "U.S. Members in their Constituencies: An Exploration." APSR 71 (1977): 883-917.

*Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. "Constituency Influence in Congress." APSR (March, 1963): 45-57.

February 24th – Race and Representation in Congress

Guinier, Lani, "The Representation of Minority Interests in Congress," In Classifying by Race, Paul Peterson, ed. Princeton University Press, 1995, 21-49.

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," *American Political Science Review*, v. 90, No. 4, December 1996, pp. 794-812.

Lublin, David. "Racial Redistricting and African American Representation." APSR 93:1 (March, 1999): 183-86. Response to Lublin from Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran. "A Social Science Approach to Race, Redistricting, and Representation," same issue, 187-91.

Kenneth Shotts, "Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes?" JOP 65:1 (February, 2003): 216-226. Reply from David Lublin and Stephen Voss, "The Missing Middle," same issue of JOP, 227-237. Rejoinder from Shotts, pp. 238-43.

Canon, David. Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Chapters 3, 4, and 6, 93-200, 243-64.

*John Griffin and Brian Newman, Minority Report: Evaluating Political Equality in America (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008).

*Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S.

Congress, Princeton University Press, 2003.

*Overby, L. Marvin and Kenneth M. Cosgrove, "Unintended Consequences?: Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests," *The Journal of Politics*, v. 58, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 540-550.

*Richard Fenno, Going Home: Black Representatives and their Constituents, University of Chicago Press, 2003.

*Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson, Chapter 3 in Race and the Transformation of American Politics, Princeton University Press, 1989, 59-88.

*Brace, Kimball; Bernard Grofman, and Lisa Handley. 1987. "Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?" Journal of Politics 49: 169-85.

*Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994. Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Lublin, David Ian. 1997. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymander and Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

*Swain, Carol. 1993. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

March 3rd – Congressional Elections and Links to Constituents

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Philip Edward Jones, "Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll Call Voting," *AJPS* 54:3 (July, 2010): 583-97.

Bafumi, Joseph, and Michael C. Herron, "Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress," *APSR* 104:3 (August, 2010): 519-42.

Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan, "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Member's Voting," APSR, 96:2 (March, 2002): 127-40.

Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts, "Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and the Politics of Nineteenth Century U.S. House Elections, AJPS 50:2 (April, 2006): 283-93.

Canon, David, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, Chapter 5, 201-42.

Sulkin, Tracy, *Issue Politics in Congress*. Cambridge University Press, 2005, chapters 2 and 4, 19-42, 71-88.

*Lapinski, Daniel. "The Effect of Messages Communicated by Members of Congress: The Impact of Publicizing Votes." LSQ 26:1 (February, 2001): 81-100.

*Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," AJPS 45:1 (January, 2001): 136-59.

*Theilmann, John and Allen Wilhite. "Campaign Tactics and the Decision to Attack." JOP 60:4 (November, 1998): 1050-62.

*Engstrom, Erik J. "Stacking the States, Stacking the House: Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century," APSR 100:3 (August, 2006): 419-28.

*Jacobson, Gary C.. The Politics of Congressional Elections.

*Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

*Herrera, Richard, and Michael Yawn. "The Emergence of the Personal Vote." JOP 61:1 (February, 1999): 136-50.

*Erikson, Robert S. "Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: a Review of the Macrolevel Evidence." AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 373-399.

*Jacobson, Gary C. "Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections?" AJPS 34:2 (May, 1990): 400-407.
*Born, Richard. "Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and the Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Choice Analysis." AJPS 34:3 (August, 1990): 615-45.
*Mayhew, David R. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." Polity 6:3 (1974): 295-317.
*Fiorina, Morris P. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy did it." APSR 71 (March, 1977): 177-81.
*King, Gary, and Gelman, Andrew. "Systematic Consequences of Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections." AJPS 35:1 (February, 1991): 110-38.
*Wright, Gerald C. and Berkman, Michael B. "Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections." APSR 80:2 (June, 1986): 567-88.

Part Three--Testing Distributive, Informational, and Partisan Theories: Institutional Structures and Congressional Behavior

March 10th – Parties in Congress

Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 8-10, 165-236.
Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapters 9-10, pp. 171-229.
Smith, Steve, *Party Influence in Congress*, chapter 6-8, pp. 148-216.

*Snyder, James and Tim Groseclose, "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." AJPS, 44:2 (April, 2000): 193-211.
*Krehbiel, Keith. "Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship." AJPS, 44:2 (April, 2000): 212-227.
*Krehbiel, Keith, and Alan Wiseman, "Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois." LSQ 26:3 (August, 2001): 357-90.
*Forgette, Richard and Brian R. Sala. "Conditional Party Government and Member Turnout on Senate Recorded Votes." JOP 61:2 (May, 1999): 467-84.
*Bianco, William T. And Itai Sened, "Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures," APSR 99:3 (August, 2005): 361-72.
*Krehbiel, Keith. "Paradoxes of Parties in Congress." LSQ 24:1 (February, 1999): 31-64.
*Rohde, David, "Parties and Committees in the House," pp. 119-38 in PTCI.
*Canon, David, and Kevin S. Price. "Partisan Policymaking in the United States House of Representatives, 1929-1998." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1999, Atlanta, Georgia.
*Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. "Where's the Party? *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (2): 235-66.
*McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1999.
*Lawrence, Eric D., Forrest Maltzman, and Steven S. Smith. "Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1999.
*Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
*Rohde, David W. *Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

*** March 17th – Spring Break ***

March 24th – Parties, Rules, and Parliamentary Rights

Jason Roberts and Steven S. Smith, "Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, AJPS, 47:2 (April, 2003): 305-17.
Bryan W. Marhsall, "Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House," LSQ, 27:1 (February, 2002): 61-85.
Schickler, Eric. "Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1988: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models." APSR 94:2 (June, 2000): 269-80.
Binder, Sarah, A., "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990," *American Political Science Review*, v. 90, n. 1, March 1996, pp. 8-20.
Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics, Chapters 4-5, 51-117.
Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapter 4, 50-86.

*Finocchiaro, Charles J. And David W. Rohde, "War on the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House," *LSQ* 33:1 (May, 2008): 35-62.
*Guillaume R. Frechette, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer, "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," APSR 97:2 (May, 2003): 221-32.
*Wawro, Gregory J. And Eric Schickler, *Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
*Schickler, Eric. "Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1988: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models." APSR 94:2 (June, 2000): 269-80.
*Krehbiel, Keith, "Restrictive Rules Reconsidered," *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 41, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 919-964 (with a response from Dion and Huber).
*Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich, "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House," *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 41, no. 4, October 1997, pp. 1340-1394 (with a response from Gary Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins).
*Sinclair, Barbara, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy," in PTCI, 235-52.
*C. Lawrence Evans, "Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions," Legislative Studies Quarterly 24:4 (November, 1999): 605-42.
*Sinclair, Barbara, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking, John Hopkins University Press, 1995.
*Brady, David; Cooper, Joseph; and Hurley, Patricia. "The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representatives: 1887-1968." LSQ 4 (August, 1979): 381-408.
*Cooper, Joseph, and Brady, David W. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." APSR 75 (June, 1981): 411-25.
*Kiewiet, Roderick D. And Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, University of Chicago Press, 1991.
*Binder, Sarah A. Minority rights, majority rule: Partisanship and the development of Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

March 31st – Floor Behavior

Kingdon, John L., *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, University of Michigan Press, 3rd ed. 1989, Chapters 1, 10-12, pp. 3-25, 242-95.
Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapters 5-6, 87-123.

Hall, Richard. Participation in Congress, Chapter 7, pp. 175-214.

April 7th– Floor Behavior 2: Random topics

Jenkins, Jeffrey A. "Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting: Evidence From the Confederate House of Representatives." AJPS 44:4 (October, 2000): 811-22.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. W. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," *American Political Science Review*, v. 91, no. 2, June 1997, pp. 324-338.

David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser, "Congressional Vote Options," LSQ, 28:3 (August, 2003): 387-411.

Lapinski, John S. "Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877-1994," *AJPS* 52:2 (April, 2008): 235-51.

Schickler, Eric, and Kathryn Pearson, "Agenda Control, Majority Power, and the House Committee on Rules," *LSQ* 34:4 (November 2009): 455-92.

Wawro, Gregory J. and Eric Schickler, "Legislative Obstructionism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: (June 2010): 297-319.

*Frances Lee, "Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Control and Senate Partisanship, 1981-2004." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33:2 (May, 2008): 199-222.

*Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data," APSR, 98:2 (May, 2004): 355-70.

*Mucciaroni, Gary, and Paul Quirk. *Deliberative Choices: Debating Public Policy in Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

*Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel, "Dynamics of Cosponsorship," *American Political Science Review*, v. 90, no. 3, September 1996, pp. 555-566.

*Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech, "The Multiple Ambiguities of 'Counteractive Lobbying'", *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 40, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 520-69 (with a response by David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright and a rejoinder from Baumgartner and Leech).

*Evans, Diana, "Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives," *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 38, no. 4, November 1994, pp. 894-917.

*Sullivan, John L., et al. "The Dimensions of Cue-taking in the House of Representatives: Variations by Issue Area." JOP 55 (November, 1993): 975-97.

*VanDoren, Peter M. "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll-Call Data?" LSQ 15:3 (August, 1990): 311-340.

*Hill, Jeffrey S. and Kenneth C. Williams. "The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate." AJPS 37 (November, 1993): 1008-31.

*Hall, Richard L. "Measuring Legislative Influence." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (May, 1992): 205-31.

*Smith, Steven S. Call to Order. Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1989.

*Poole, Keith T. "Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the U.S. Congress." LSQ 13:1 (February, 1988): 117-33.

*Poole, Keith T. And Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting, Oxford University Press, 1997.

April 14th – Congressional Committees

Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Chapter7-8, 124-70.
Hall, Richard L., *Participation in Congress*, Chapters 1-2, pp. 1-48.
Adler, E. Scott and John S. Lapinski, "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituenc y Characteristics Approach," *American Journal of Political Science*, v. 41, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 895-918.
King, David C., "The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, *American Political Science Review*, v. 88, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 48-62.
Stewart, Charles III and Tim Groseclose. "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-1991." AJPS 42:2 (April, 1998): 453-74.
Lawrence, Eric, Forrest Maltzman, and Paul Wahlbeck. "The Politics of Speaker Cannon's Committee Assignments," AJPS 45:3 (July, 2001): 551-62.

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