

Government of, by and for *the* People:
Foreigners and Democracy in Plato's *Protagoras*

Rebecca LeMoine
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Presented February 25, 2011
Political Theory Workshop
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Abstract: Americans have long struggled with the presence of foreigners in America, but the struggle has escalated in recent years. The controversies over President Obama's birth country, the Arizona immigration law, and the War on Terror demonstrate how divided Americans are over the presence of foreigners in America. These events ask us to consider more thoroughly whether Americans, and other democratic peoples, have more to fear or to hope from allowing foreigners into their midst. In this paper, I argue that Plato's Protagoras can help us elucidate the relationship between foreigners and democracy. In the Protagoras, Plato theorizes about the consequences of inviting foreigners into a democratic polity by examining the foreign sophist Protagoras' influence on democracy in Athens. Contrary to the standard claim that Plato viewed foreigners as a source of corruption that must be kept out, in this dialogue Plato warns readers of the dangers of excluding foreigners. He also shows, however, why caution is warranted when admitting foreigners into a democratic society. Ultimately, the Protagoras suggests that, with the right kind of education, democratic people can maximize the benefits of engaging with foreigners and minimize the risks.

This is a work in progress. Please do not cite without author's permission.
Comments welcome at rlemoine@wisc.edu.

I. Introduction

As two relatively recent events in America's history illustrate, even the most liberal Americans often wish to keep foreigners from influencing American politics. In some cases, this desire is made explicit, as evidenced by reactions to the Supreme Court's ruling in January of last year that corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited under the First Amendment. Days after the ruling, President Obama voiced the concerns of many Americans in his State of the Union Address:

With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests -- including foreign corporations -- to spend without limit in our elections. (Applause.) I don't think American elections should be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. (Applause.) They should be decided by the American people (Office of the Press Secretary 2010).

The fact that, with the exception of the members of the Supreme Court, countless members of the Democratic Party responded to this remark with vast applause and a standing ovation suggests that even those who consider themselves socially liberal and progressive believe that elections should be decided not by foreigners but by Americans. Another event that attests, though more subtly, to this belief was the raging controversy over the birth of President Barack Obama. Accused of forging his birth certificate, Obama was asked to provide documentary evidence to prove he meets one of the qualifications for the office of President—natural born citizenship. Interestingly, those who defended Obama tended to do so not by questioning the legitimacy of this requirement, but rather by defending the authenticity of the birth certificate released by the Obama campaign, suggesting that for many Americans a foreign-born President is both unimaginable and undesirable.

Together, these two events suggest that even Americans who pride themselves on America's multicultural roots and openness to alternative ways of life draw the line at giving

foreigners substantial political power. Americans neither want a foreign-born President nor foreigners influencing the outcome of American elections; they want an America governed by an American-born citizen with elections decided by American people. Moreover, most Americans favor restrictions on immigration, an additional means by which they may limit the ability of foreigners to influence American politics.¹ We might ask, however, why Americans seem to fear the possibility of foreigners leading the nation or influencing political elections. Why, in other words, is American government of, by, and for *the* people rather than any person who wishes to be a part of the nation?

Two central reasons are often cited in the literature to explain why citizens of countries such as America favor limits on the political influence of foreigners. The first explanation has to do with national security. At the time it was put in place, “The requirement that the President be a natural born citizen seems to have been uncontroversial and inspired principally by the reluctance of the framers to entrust the powers of commander in chief to a foreign born citizen” (Erlor 2007, 32-33). Even today, it is sometimes argued that foreigners might have stronger ties to their native countries than to America and may therefore place American interests—military or otherwise—beneath the interests of their birth countries. A second explanation for why Americans favor limiting foreign political influence is that many fear that foreigners will threaten the survival of their national culture. As Will Kymlicka, explaining the reason why many favor limits on immigration, says, “open borders would [...] make it more likely that people’s own national community would be overrun by settlers from other cultures, and that they would be unable to ensure their survival as a distinct national culture” (1995, 93). Michael Walzer, arguing from a communitarian perspective, offers a similar argument in support of

¹ For data supporting this assertion, see the question on immigration policy in the 2006 World Values Survey of America (Inglehart et al. 2006) and a 2009 report released by the Pew Research Center.

limitations on immigration. According to Walzer, the sense of belonging to a cohesive community is so valuable that governments should protect it by limiting immigration, for “the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life” (1983, 39). Walzer goes on to argue that though offering refuge to foreigners is generous and noble, “if we offered a refuge to everyone in the world who could plausibly say that he needed it, we might be overwhelmed” (51). In short, from Walzer’s viewpoint, restrictions on immigration are integral to communal self-determination.² It is telling, moreover, that a sizeable proportion of Americans seem to agree with these scholars, as evidenced by a 2009 Pew Research Center survey in which over a majority surveyed agreed that “the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values” (, 65).

While these arguments contribute much to our understanding of the tendency to favor limitations on foreign political influence, what these arguments do not explain that I think Plato’s *Protagoras* does is what makes *democratic* citizens in particular prone to fear the political influence of foreigners.³ In making this claim, I am not suggesting that the fear of foreign political influence is greater among democratic citizens than non-democratic peoples. Rather, I am suggesting that this fear may stem from different motivations or exhibit itself differently, and that recognizing the unique contours of the relationship between democratic societies and

² There are, of course, a few scholars who favor opening the borders. For a good overview of this literature see (Carens 1996).

³ I am not forgetting Bonnie Honig’s *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Though Honig makes many interesting and useful observations about the relationship between democratic societies and foreigners, she gives little consideration to how the democratic political system might shape reactions against foreigners. Like Kymlicka, Walzer, and others, what she says about American xenophobia could be true of the xenophobia of any state, democratic or not. For example, we find this passage in her discussion of the myth of an immigrant America: “. . .the dream of a national home, helped along by the symbolic foreigner, in turn animates a suspicion of immigrant foreignness at the same time. ‘Their’ admirable hard work and boundless acquisition puts ‘us’ out of jobs. ‘Their’ good, reinvigorative communities also look like fragmentary ethnic enclaves. ‘Their’ traditional family values threaten to overturn our still new and fragile gains in gender equality. ‘Their’ voluntarist embrace of America, effective only to the extent that they come from elsewhere, works to reaffirm but also endangers ‘our’ way of life” (2001, 76).

foreigners may help us better understand the American situation. The *Protagoras*, with its focus on the interactions between Athenian citizens and the foreigner Protagoras—one of many travelling teachers of rhetoric in ancient Greece who charged fees for his teachings—explores the unique aspects of the relationship between democracies and foreigners. Ultimately, the dialogue reveals that democratic citizens fear the political influence of foreigners because the nature of the democratic political system, in which political power depends upon persuasion rather than force, encourages natives striving for political clout to seek advice about politics from foreigners without questioning whether that advice may endanger their national culture or national security. While the *Protagoras* warns broadly against accepting any advice, from a foreigner or not, without investigating its validity, it suggests that the advice of foreigners in particular can be dangerous. Unlike the politically ambitious citizen, the foreigner must only persuade a small number that his advice is worth taking; his reputation thus depends not on whether he gives advice that leads to the betterment of the community, but whether it serves the interests of the politically ambitious.

My interpretation of Plato's *Protagoras* proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I show that the beginning of the *Protagoras* serves to illustrate the uncritical attraction that those with political ambition have towards the teachings of foreigners. The second part of the analysis, dealing with the initial exchanges between Socrates and the foreign sophist Protagoras, reveals the causes and dangers of this uncritical acceptance of the advice of foreigners. Finally, in the third part of the analysis, I show that Plato not only considered the problematic relationship between democracies and foreigners but also suggested a means of mitigating the fears democratic citizens have of foreigners without having to resort to the exclusion of foreigners. I conclude by reflecting on how Plato's *Protagoras* may help us better understand American fears

of foreign political influence, and in what ways the solution proposed in the dialogue would work in a context so different from that of ancient Athens and in what ways it might leave unsolved problems.

II. The Foreigner's Charm to Politically Ambitious Democrats

The *Protagoras* opens with a conversation between Socrates and an unnamed friend.⁴ After asking Socrates where he has been, the friend jokes somewhat disapprovingly that Socrates must have been chasing after the handsome Alcibiades.⁵ Socrates confirms that he was just with Alcibiades, but shares the strange news that he did not pay him any attention and, in fact, almost completely forgot him. To this, his friend responds, “You surely haven’t met someone else more beautiful, at least not in this city” (309c).⁶ Socrates confirms that he has indeed met someone more beautiful. Upon hearing this, Socrates’ friend asks, “What are you saying? A citizen or a foreigner?” (309c).⁷ A foreigner, says Socrates, a foreigner from Abdera. “And this foreigner seems to you more beautiful than the son of Cleinias?” his friend asks, to which Socrates responds that the wisest is always finer (309c). When his friend asks if this means he has been in

⁴ Socrates (470-399 B.C.) was an Athenian known for going around the city and testing the wisdom of people reputed to be wise. Plato, a student of Socrates, was greatly influenced by him and used Socrates as a speaker in nearly all of his dialogues. Socrates was put to death on charges of impiety and corrupting the young by making the weaker argument the stronger.

⁵ Alcibiades (c. 450-404 B.C.) was an Athenian noted in his youth for his great beauty and intellectual promise. He became notorious for being one of the leaders of the ambitious imperial policy that led to the disastrous Sicilian expedition, of which he was chosen as a commander. Shortly before the expedition sailed, he was accused of acts of religious sacrilege. Fleeing to Sparta to escape trial, he was denounced for betraying his city when he helped Sparta fight Athens. Though he was later reinstated in Athens, he again attracted suspicion, returned to exile, and was eventually murdered with the collusion of the Athenian government. It is a running theme in Plato’s dialogues that Socrates is in love with him. Plato depicts their relationship in detail in the *Symposium* and is at pains to deny that it was a sexual relationship, or that Alcibiades’ behavior, which contributed to Athens’ downfall, was the result of corruption by Socrates.

⁶ All quotations from the *Protagoras* are taken from Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell’s translation (1992). I have also consulted the translations of W.K.C. Guthrie (1956), C.C.W Taylor (1976), and Beresford (2005). Where necessary, I have noted significant differences in translation.

⁷ Beresford’s (2005) more modern translation renders “What are you saying?” as, “I don’t believe it!” For the modern reader, this perhaps better captures the incredulity in Socrates’ friend’s voice.

the company of a wise man, Socrates says, “The wisest man alive, if you think the wisest man is—Protagoras” (309d). His friend, expressing surprise upon learning that the famed sophist Protagoras has been in town for two days, asks Socrates to take his slave’s seat and relate his encounter with the famed sophist.⁸

Commentators on this scene usually focus on Socrates’ notorious relationship with Alcibiades and his remark about Protagoras perhaps being the wisest man alive. They generally ignore, however, all the lines in between. Firstly, notice how Socrates’ friend assumes, not that there is no one more attractive than Alcibiades, but that there is no one more attractive *in Athens*. If there is a more beautiful man than Alcibiades, he must be a foreigner. Now, presumably, if the friend really believed this he would proceed directly to ask Socrates from which city the foreigner comes. Instead, he asks Socrates if this person is a citizen or a foreigner. Through this question, he reveals that he would rather find that he had overlooked a fellow citizen than assume a foreigner is finer than Alcibiades. When Socrates confirms that the person is a foreigner, his friend reiterates this stance by essentially asking Socrates if he *really* found this foreigner more attractive than (note the change of language) the son of an Athenian. Through this short exchange, Plato reveals that the person to whom Socrates will be relating his story has, at least when it comes to physical appearance, a “preference for the homegrown over the foreign” (Bartlett 2003, 613).

Though Socrates’ friend twice reveals his skepticism over finding someone more physically attractive than the most attractive Athenian, when Socrates tells his friend that the foreigner is more attractive because he is (supposedly) the wisest man alive, the friend does not question whether Protagoras is really the wisest man alive. Instead, he confirms, through his

⁸ Here I have deferred to other translations. Lombardo and Bell (1992) and Beresford (2005) do not translate the word as “slave,” but rather as “boy.” Beresford notes, however, that by “boy” what is really meant is slave.

excitement at learning that Protagoras is in town, that he does think Protagoras the wisest man alive. In effect, whereas he questioned whether anybody could be more beautiful than the most handsome Athenian, he does not question that Protagoras is wiser than any person alive, including any person in Athens. Socrates, on the other hand, is upfront about his skepticism regarding Protagoras' wisdom. As many scholars point out, he does not say that Protagoras *is* the wisest man alive, but rather that he has been with the wisest man alive *if* his friend would describe Protagoras this way. Moreover, as Patrick Coby argues, "It is hard to believe [...] that Socrates would prize Protagoras's wisdom (a 'wisdom' that he has already tested and found wanting) more highly than Alcibiades' untried potential. The turn from Alcibiades to Protagoras is not an ascent, as represented, but is in fact a descent" (1987, 24). Thus, from the opening of the dialogue, readers are both alerted to the fact that Socrates' friend assumes Protagoras to be wise and to the fact that Socrates questions this assumption.

The opening of Socrates' story about his encounter with Protagoras immediately confirms the picture just given of Protagoras' reputation among rich Athenians. Socrates begins by explaining how Hippocrates barged into his room before daybreak, announcing the good news that Protagoras is in town.⁹ When Socrates tells Hippocrates that Protagoras arrived the day before yesterday, Hippocrates confesses he just found out the night before because he spent the day in Oenoë chasing after his runaway slave. Socrates, "[r]ecognizing his fighting spirit and his excitement," asks if Protagoras has wronged Hippocrates (310d). Hippocrates responds that he has, by withholding his wisdom. Socrates then tells Hippocrates that Protagoras would make him wise too if he met his price, to which Hippocrates responds, "If only it were as simple as that [...] I'd bankrupt myself and my friends too. But that's why I'm coming to you, so you will talk to him for me. [...] He's such a celebrity, Socrates, and everyone says he's a terribly clever

⁹ Perhaps a historical person, Hippocrates is known only from this dialogue. His name means "horse-power."

speaker. Why don't we walk over now, to be sure to catch him in? I've heard he's staying with Callias, son of Hipponicus. Come on, let's go" (310e-311a). Like Socrates' friend, Hippocrates does not question Protagoras' wisdom; he believes it because "everyone" says it.

It is useful here to point out the contrast that has been drawn between Hippocrates and Socrates' unnamed friend. While neither question Protagoras' wisdom, the representation of Hippocrates nonetheless differs noticeably from that of Socrates' friend. Socrates depicts Hippocrates as a young man lacking control of himself and others. Hippocrates cannot restrain himself from rushing to Socrates before the sun has come up, nor could he restrain his slave from running away. Socrates' friend, by contrast, despite his desire to gossip about Alcibiades, patiently waits for Socrates to arrive and demonstrates control over his slave. Furthermore, whereas Hippocrates relies on forceful words to cajole Socrates into taking him to Protagoras, Socrates' friend politely invites him to sit down, if he is not busy, to share his story. Socrates' friend is satisfied to learn about Protagoras through Socrates, rather than immediately meet him himself. Compared to Hippocrates, Socrates' friend is mature, traditional, and withdrawn from the intellectual happenings of Athens—"if Hippocrates knew of the arrival of Protagoras a day later than did Socrates, the comrade remains unaware of it on the third day after the fact" (Bartlett 2003, 613).

Returning for now, however, to Hippocrates, we discover that the dialogue soon reveals the origins of his attraction to the foreign sophist. Instead of proceeding directly to Callias' house to visit Protagoras, Socrates suggests he and Hippocrates pass the time until daybreak strolling around so as not to arrive too early. He then explains to his friend how he used this time to "see what Hippocrates was made of" (311b). Socrates begins by asking Hippocrates what he hopes to learn from Protagoras. After a series of questions, Hippocrates concludes that, in going to

Protagoras, he hopes to become a sophist. At this point, Socrates makes Hippocrates blush by asking, “Wouldn’t you be ashamed to present yourself to the Greek world as a sophist?” (312a). Socrates, in effect, “is asking Hippocrates to judge himself not by himself [...] He is putting Hippocrates right into the social context of all of Greece” (Saxonhouse 2008, 184). This is the first sign that, contrary to Hippocrates’ and Socrates’ friends’ excitement over the arrival of Protagoras, the rest of Greece does not think so highly of sophists like Protagoras. Hence, when Hippocrates said that “everyone” thinks well of Protagoras, he really meant everyone with whom he associates.

As the story continues, we (and Socrates’ friend) learn more about why Hippocrates and the Athenians with whom he associates are drawn to Protagoras. According to Hippocrates, a sophist teaches men to make clever speeches. This, then, is the knowledge Hippocrates believes Protagoras is withholding from him, the knowledge he is so desperate to obtain. Why, however, is Hippocrates so desperate to learn the art of speech making? Here an understanding of the ancient Athenian political system becomes useful. While Athens was a direct democracy in that all citizens were able to participate in voting on legislative and executive bills, we know from the works of ancient Greek historians such as Thucydides that political leaders still emerged in the form of powerful orators. Since political decision-making depended on how citizens cast their votes, the most powerful citizens were to a substantial degree those who could deliver the most persuasive speeches, speeches that could persuade citizens to vote in a particular way. Hippocrates’ longing for the foreign sophist’s knowledge of speech making, then, is in essence a longing to discover how to persuade his fellow citizens to do what he wants them to do.

Though this does not yet tell us why politically ambitious democrats might turn to foreigners in particular for political knowledge or why the masses seem to distrust foreign

sophists, it does explain what kind of people are drawn to foreign sophists—politically ambitious democrats. As aforementioned, Socrates’ relatively politically withdrawn, unnamed friend is satisfied to hear second-hand and on Socrates’ own time about Protagoras. Hippocrates, the politically ambitious democrat, is neither willing to receive Socrates’ account nor to accommodate his schedule. It is the politically ambitious democrat then who finds the foreigner most enticing. The beginning of the dialogue, in short, shows that though foreigners can appeal to any, politically ambitious democrats in particular seek their company. Moreover, by subtly hinting that Socrates may possess doubts about the foreigner’s wisdom as well as the judgments both Hippocrates and his unnamed friend make with regard to this foreigner, the beginning of the dialogue raises certain questions in the reader’s mind about the potential dangers an uncritical attraction to foreigners may pose to democracies.

II. The Dangers Foreigners Pose to Democracies

As the dialogue progresses, we soon learn both why politically ambitious democrats flock to foreigners in particular and why the masses might distrust them. According to Hippocrates, the sophist teaches one how to make clever speeches. Yet, as Socrates points out, there must be more to the sophist’s profession since a lyre-player would presumably make Hippocrates a clever speaker on the lyre. Thus, to understand what a sophist does, one must know on what subject a sophist makes one a clever speaker. Hippocrates is embarrassed for an answer. This leads Socrates to his next point:

“Do you see what kind of danger you are about to put your soul in? If you had to entrust your body to someone and risk its becoming healthy or ill, you would consider carefully whether you should entrust it or not, and you would confer with your family and friends for days on end. But when it comes to something you value more than your body, namely your soul, and when everything concerning whether you do well or ill in your life depends on whether it becomes worthy or worthless, I don’t see you getting together with

your father or brother or a single one of your friends to consider whether or not to entrust your soul to this recently arrived stranger. No, you hear about him in the evening—right?—and the next morning, here you are, not to talk about whether it's a good idea to entrust yourself to him or not, but ready to spend your own money and your friends' as well, as if you had thought it all through already and, no matter what, you had to be with Protagoras, a man whom you admit you don't know and have never conversed with, and whom you call a sophist although you obviously have no idea what this sophist is to whom you are about to entrust yourself" (313a-c).

Socrates goes on to tell Hippocrates that he can safely buy teachings from Protagoras if he is a "knowledgeable customer," but if he is not he should not risk "what is most dear" to him "on a roll of the dice, for there is a far greater risk in buying teachings than in buying food" (313e-314a). Politically ambitious democrats, then, make the mistake of blindly accepting Protagoras' reputation rather than realizing that he is "a pedagogical booby trap to be approached with caution and retained only after careful consideration" (Coby 1987, 22). Hippocrates' political ambition is so great, in other words, that he fails to consider the potential dangers of hearing the foreigner's teachings. Instead, he is so eager to learn how to persuade others and thereby gain political clout that he is even willing to sacrifice both his and his friends' money. Socrates, by pointing this out, is not only trying to temper Hippocrates' enthusiasm for the foreign sophist, but also his unnamed friends' and the reader's. As W.K.C. Guthrie writes, "This introductory scene ensures that we go to meet the Sophists in a mood very different from that of uncritical admiration with which they are surrounded at the house of their patron. Socrates has put certain questions, and certain suspicions, in our minds" (1956, 30).

As we move into the scene where Socrates and Hippocrates first enter Callias' house, Plato emphasizes what has already been revealed, that members of the Athenian elite worship Protagoras whereas the Athenian masses denounce him. The latter fact is confirmed by the kind of greeting Socrates and Hippocrates receive from Callias' doorman:

[The doorman] must have been annoyed with all the traffic of sophists in and out of the house, because when we knocked he opened the door, took one look at us and said, “Ha! More sophists! He’s busy.” Then he slammed the door in our faces with both hands as hard as he could. We knocked again, and he answered through the locked door, “Didn’t you hear me say he’s busy?” “My good man,” I said, “we haven’t come to see Callias, and we are not sophists. Calm down. We want to see Protagoras. That’s why we’ve come. So please announce us.” Eventually he opened the door for us (314d-314e).

Not only does this scene reveal the common Athenian’s attitude towards sophists, but it also indicates that, “the people found it quite difficult to distinguish between Socrates and the sophists” (Frede 1992, xiv). Entering into Callias’ house, however, we discover a humorous reinstatement of the adoration for sophists presented earlier by Socrates’ friend and Hippocrates:

When we went in we found Protagoras walking in the portico flanked by two groups. On one side were Hipponicus and his brother on his mother’s side, Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son of Glaucon. On the other side were Pericles’ other son, Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mendes, Protagoras’ star pupil who is studying professionally to become a sophist. Following behind and trying to listen to what was being said were a group of what seemed to be mostly foreigners, men whom Protagoras collects from the various cities he travels through. He enchants them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow the sound of his voice in a trance. There were some locals also in this chorus, whose dance simply delighted me when I saw how beautifully they took care never to get in Protagoras’ way. When he turned around with his flanking groups, the audience to the rear would split into two in a very orderly way and then circle around to either side and form up again behind him. It was quite lovely (314e-315b).

The language Socrates uses is revealing not only of the treatment Protagoras receives from well-known Athenians, but also of Socrates’ own opinion of Protagoras. Protagoras “enchants” people with his voice, putting them in a trance.¹⁰ The locals in turn “dance” around him in military-like fashion, “flanking” him and following “to the rear” in an “orderly way.” In short, as Harry Berger puts it, “The figure of the sophist as an omnicompetent outsider is a phantasm created and ventriloquized by those who welcome him in their midst, and are careful to keep behind him in the dance they let him lead” (1984, 76).

¹⁰ Note that it is his voice, not what he says, that seems to enchant people. The implicit suggestion here may be that people sometimes find foreigners fascinating not because they have especially wise things to share but simply because they speak with an accent.

What is even more revealing about this scene, however, is the observation that Protagoras collects foreigners from the various cities through which he travels. It seems that when Hippocrates exclaimed earlier that he would bankrupt himself and his friends to receive Protagoras' wisdom, this was not the most extreme way in which he could harm his friends. In fact, it is altogether possible that Protagoras could whisk Hippocrates away from his city, just as he has so many others. What is the democratic city to do when its politically ambitious sons—its future leaders—leave the city to become the devotees of a foreigner who promises knowledge? However self-interested these aspiring democrats may be, a democratic city needs leaders to step forth and spur on debate. What will happen when the best and brightest minds stop performing this essential service to their communities and instead turn to supposedly bettering themselves by following a foreigner around? In short, one of the first dangers to a democracy that the meeting with Protagoras reveals is the danger of losing one's best, most politically active citizens.

Interestingly, in the scene that follows we learn that Protagoras himself recognizes this danger. Explaining that Hippocrates thinks by associating with Protagoras he can become a man of respect in the city, Socrates asks if Protagoras would rather discuss this in private or in the presence of others. In response, Protagoras indicates the precarious nature of his relationship with Athens: "Your discretion on my behalf is appropriate, Socrates. Caution is in order for a foreigner who goes into the great cities and tries to persuade the best of the young men in them to abandon their associations with others, relatives and acquaintances, young and old alike, and to associate with him instead on the grounds that they will be improved by this association. Jealousy, hostility, and intrigue on a large scale are aroused by such activity" (316c-d). He then goes on to explain how the sophists of old would disguise their activities (much like modern-day Straussians), and how this fooled the masses but not the powerful men. Protagoras claims he has

taken the opposite route by openly declaring he is a sophist. As we have seen, the result has been that the powerful men are attracted to Protagoras while the masses shun him. The masses, it seems, are all too keenly aware that the foreign sophist threatens to take their best citizens from them and this consequently inspires feelings of hostility. Yet, Protagoras also says his activities create jealousy. Thus, arousing the hostility of those upset over the politically promising friends and family members they and the community have effectively lost is not the only danger foreign sophists pose to democracies. They also fan the flames of envy in those who are themselves politically ambitious yet are unable to afford the foreigner's services, thereby encouraging them to initiate and participate in political plots that could lead to the overthrow of the current democratic system.

Yet, we soon discover a third way in which the foreigner endangers a democratic community. Having opened up a conversation with Protagoras, Socrates proceeds to ask him the same line of questions he asked Hippocrates about what it is exactly that a sophist teaches, to which Protagoras replies, "What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage one's household, and in public affairs—how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action" (318e-319a). When asked if he is talking about "the art of citizenship" and promising "to make men good citizens," Protagoras confirms that this is exactly what he means (319a). At this point, Socrates admits that he had not thought this could be taught, for two reasons. Firstly, he has observed that all Athenians are wise and that, when it comes to technical matters such as the construction of ships, "if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to advise them, no matter how handsome and rich and well-born he might be, they just don't accept him," but "when it is a matter of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant,

ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-born—it doesn't matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without any prior training under a teacher" (391c-d). The reason for this, he says, is because they do not think this can be taught. Secondly, even the wisest and best Athenians are unable to transmit to others the virtues they possess. "Look at Pericles," he says, "the father of these young men here. He gave them a superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but as for what he himself is really wise in, he neither teaches them that himself nor has anyone else teach them either, and his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up virtue on their own wherever they might find it" (319e-320a).

By mentioning the wisdom of the Athenians, Socrates has created a dilemma for Protagoras. As J. Peter Euben notes, "Protagoras can hardly deny the wisdom of the Athenians in whose city he is and in which he seeks students. Yet he cannot simply agree they are wise since that would make him superfluous [...] He must be sufficiently democratic not to offend, and sufficiently elitist to attract the sons of the wealthy who can afford his fees and gain advantage over those who cannot" (1997, 244). Arlene W. Saxonhouse confirms that, "The gathering behind closed doors at this mock Hades is precisely for those who are not content with the egalitarianism of Athenian democracy. These men are driven by a desire for the individual glory that is in conflict with the ideology of equality governing the city in which they live. No wonder the doors to Callias' house are shut" (2008, 186). Thus, Socrates has indeed put Protagoras in the position of arguing for his superiority without portraying the Athenians gathered in Callias' home as too desperately in need of his teachings. Moreover, by mentioning the great hero Pericles—whose sons are present in the audience—Socrates has turned the conversation into "a test of whether Protagoras can do what Pericles can't" (Euben 1997, 244).

In response to Socrates' skepticism regarding the teachability of good citizenship, Protagoras delivers his answer in the form of a myth. The myth goes something like this. A long time ago, when the gods existed but mortal races did not, the gods put Prometheus ("fore-thinker") and Epimetheus ("after-thinker") in charge of assigning to each race its appropriate powers and abilities. Epimetheus, begging Prometheus to let him do the distribution himself, ensured the survival of all the species by giving them equivalent, though different abilities. By the time he reached man, however, he discovered he had distributed all the powers and abilities on the "nonreasoning" animals (321c). Upon learning this, Prometheus, desperate to save the human race from extinction, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the practical arts together with fire.

While this wisdom enabled men to stay alive, Prometheus was unable to steal from Zeus "the wisdom for living together in society, political wisdom" (321d). As a result, humans did not naturally gather together to defend themselves from the wild animals, and when they did, they would merely wrong each other and end up scattered once again. Eventually, Zeus, afraid that the whole race might be wiped out, sent Hermes to "bring justice and a sense of shame to humans, so that there would be order within cities and bonds of friendship to unite them" (322c). He instructed Hermes to distribute these abilities to *all* humans and decree to them, "Death to him who cannot partake of shame and justice, for he is a pestilence to the city" (322d). For this reason, Protagoras believes, "It is reasonable to admit everyone as an advisor on this virtue [justice], on the grounds that everyone has some share of it" (323c).

Having established this, Protagoras goes on to argue that, though this virtue is what makes someone human, it can only be acquired through the proper teachings. From childhood,

the community must play an active role in teaching a child virtue, punishing if necessary.¹¹ Since the whole community is involved in the teaching of virtue, it is impossible to say exactly who is responsible for one's virtuous behavior, as difficult as, for instance, pinpointing who taught one one's native language. Nevertheless, despite the involvement of the entire community in educating the children in virtue, it will happen that some people will be more virtuous than others. Protagoras claims he is such a person and therefore is "uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good" (328b). As Martha Nussbaum explains, "Even if all adults are competent native speakers and teach the language to their children, there is still room for an expert who can take people 'a little further along the road'—presumably by making the speaker more explicitly and reflectively aware of the structures of his practice and the interconnections of its different elements" (2001, 104). Thus, it would be a mistake to read Protagoras' myth as an argument that political virtue is natural. Rather, as G.B. Kerferd argues, "Nothing could be more emphatic—political virtue is both shared in by all men and is not by nature" (1953, 43). Zeus has given humans the ability to learn the political art, but it must be learned.

According to many interpreters, Protagoras' myth is essentially a justification of democracy. Emblematic of this interpretation is Cynthia Farrar's argument, in *The Origins of Democratic Thinking*, that the myth illustrates the value of including the many in the life of the political regime. While not all will attain political excellence, according to Farrar Protagoras' myth suggests that all humans are politically competent. As Farrar explains, "Protagoras suggests, in defiance of aristocratic tradition, that political excellence is a social achievement, not a natural legacy, and that the political realm, unlike the technical or social, is a realm of universal

¹¹ According to J. Peter Euben, "Protagoras' myth speaks of Zeus's gifts, which purportedly stilled the violence that had left men vulnerable to each other. But the discursive coda on punishment is more of a contradiction than an elaboration of the myth" (1997, 233).

competence and equal opportunity to achieve excellence” (1998, 84). M.I. Finley interprets the myth along similar lines:

The essence of [Protagoras’ democratic political theory], insofar as we can judge from Plato, is that all men possess *politike technē*, the art of political judgment, without which there can be no civilized society. All men, at least all free men, are peers in this respect, though not necessarily equal in their skill in *politike technē*—a conception reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence—and the conclusion follows that the Athenians were right to extend *isegoria* [the universal right to speak in the Assembly] to every citizen (1996, 28).

Finley rightly connects Protagoras’ myth to the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson, who composed the first draft of the Declaration, seems indeed to have shared Protagoras’ belief that humans can be taught to be politically competent. For instance, in a letter to James Madison, Jefferson remarks, “Educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this” (1787, 247). Some of the Founding Fathers, it seems, agreed with Protagoras that all men, with a little training, could be politically competent.

Yet, there are good reasons why we should hesitate in casting this myth as a justification for democracy, for at the same time that the myth justifies the political involvement of all it also justifies Protagoras’ role as a professional teacher of the political art to those wealthy enough to afford his fees. In effect, as Michael Frede argues, Protagoras’ myth justifies the creation of an elite political class, for better or worse:

[Protagoras] is easily seen, not as providing an increase in civic virtue welcome to everybody, but as giving the well-to-do the edge, an increase in competence which, in the best case, will justify their claim to power and, in the worst, allow them to succeed in the pursuit of their self-interest by their incredible ability to handle arguments and to persuade, just as on this occasion Protagoras manages, by his long speech, to charm and cast a spell on his audience and so to persuade them that virtue can be taught (1992, xx).

What is more, Protagoras’ myth seems to actually support the worst-case scenario, in which what he teaches is not the art of truly being a good citizen, but rather the art of manipulative rhetoric

for personal gain. If we recall, Protagoras' story recounts how Hermes distributed Zeus' gift of the political art to all humans. Had the story ended here, Protagoras would not have proven the teachability of political virtue, but rather the opposite—that political virtue is natural and therefore not teachable. To maintain the argument that virtue is teachable, Protagoras had to supplement his story with an account of how Athenians teach virtue by punishing those who do not learn. Yet, by making this move, Protagoras has reduced justice to convention and the social constraints of each city and, in doing so, has revealed something of his own procedure. As Alfredo Ferrarin puts it, "He teaches how to appear just and conform to the customs of the city while pursuing one's ends without seeming subversive" (2000, 318). That Protagoras essentially aspires to teach his students to *appear* just is confirmed by Protagoras' additional offer of proof of the universal belief that all humans have a share of justice—the fact that people "will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human" (323b-c).

Hence, while on the surface Protagoras' myth is democratic, when we pay attention to the function that the myth plays in Protagoras' speech we discover that it actually "legitimizes his teaching of the wealthy few while endorsing equality, presents him as modest yet uniquely qualified to promote civilization, principled yet self-promoting, one of 'us' yet a god-gifted foreigner, thoroughly traditional yet fashionably radical" (Euben 1997, 248). According to Bonnie Honig, the foreigner who comes from outside to re-found the political regime has a special appeal precisely because of his status as an outsider: "Someone who comes from somewhere else is familiar with human nature, intrigue, and ambition but is not himself captivated by the particular intrigues at work here, in this new place, in which he has no investment or history" (2001, 21). Yet, this very detachment can also be a source of trouble. As

Euben argues, “sophists do not have to give an account of or take responsibility for what they say, because as foreigners, they do not have to live with the results of whatever decision an Assembly influenced by their students take. But what sort of political educators are men so situated likely to be? What conception of virtue are they likely to exemplify and propose?” (1997, 253). By highlighting Protagoras’ reputation vis-à-vis Athenian elites and the Athenian masses prior to introducing us to Protagoras’ myth, Socrates warns us (and his friend) that we should not take Protagoras at face value. The myth may appear democratic and flattering, but it cannot be forgotten that Protagoras, as a foreigner, may ultimately not have the good of the Athenian people in mind.

Moreover, as we have seen, the fact that the masses detest Protagoras seems to have no effect whatsoever on his ability to earn a living and a good reputation among the most powerful citizens. Protagoras simply does not need to appease the masses. Rather, he only needs to appease the elite few who pay his fees. That is, Protagoras does not need to worry about teaching what most members of the community can agree is in the community’s best interest; he needs only teach the elite few the rhetorical techniques necessary to advance their own positions. It matters little whether there is ultimately backlash in response to a policy voted upon by the mass of citizens, for the mere allure of being able to persuade others blinds one to the possible side effects of this power of persuasion. It is also possible that the politically ambitious democrat could believe that his powers of persuasion might allow him to escape such consequences. Protagoras, therefore, only has to teach how to gain political clout, not how to be a just citizen who puts the community’s interest above one’s own.

It is, then, the foreigner’s ability to teach what is unjust yet earn the praise of the most prestigious citizens that attracts the politically ambitious democrat to the foreigner rather than the

citizen. Not only might the foreigner know new rhetorical strategies simply because he comes from another place, but he is also less restricted in what he can teach. The citizen who suggests how one might manipulate the populace may come across as dangerous because, in making such a suggestion, he is implying that he himself might be a manipulator of his fellow citizens—perhaps even those listening to him now. The foreigner who offers helpful tips on manipulating one's fellow citizens, on the other hand, may actually appear less dangerous because he is not part of the community and therefore could seem to have little or no stake in the decisions the community makes. Of course, it is often not true that the political decisions of one community have no effect on other communities. Yet, the foreigner, by speaking in a charming way and promising new, forbidden knowledge that will increase one's political standing, is more capable than a fellow citizen of disguising his true intentions or, at the least, making people worry less about them. After all, unlike a fellow citizen, the foreigner is not in direct competition for political standing within that particular community.

III. Plato's Solution: The Art of Measurement

What the *Protagoras* has revealed thus far, then, is that politically ambitious democrats in particular are attracted to foreigners who promise advice that will increase their political standing, and that they are attracted to such foreigners more so than such citizens because they need not fear that the foreigner will try to compete with them for political power. Moreover, the *Protagoras* has revealed the dangers foreigners pose to democracies. Not only do they threaten to take away the best citizens either literally by enfolded them into their traveling entourage or metaphorically by teaching them to be corrupt without seeming so, but they also encourage less

wealthy citizens to engage in large-scale political intrigues, the kind which might lead to the collapse of democracy altogether.

Clearly then Plato seems to have found foreigners dangerous to democracy. Yet, the *Protagoras* goes beyond identifying the problem and its causes; it also proposes a possible solution. Curiously, though Plato conveys that the Athenian masses have legitimate reasons to distrust foreign sophists, he does not advocate what seems to be their solution. As suggested by the scene in which Callias' doorman slammed the door in the face of those he supposed to be more foreign sophists, the Athenian masses are so distrusting of foreign sophists that their natural inclination is simply to exclude them from the polity. There are several reasons to believe that Plato did not agree with this solution. First of all, it is well acknowledged by scholars of Plato that Socrates, or at least the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, is Plato's example of an exemplary citizen. Thus, it could be argued that by mistaking Socrates for a sophist—just as Callias' doorman did—because of their unwillingness even to investigate the opinions of outsiders, the Athenian masses have actually deprived themselves of the only truly wise teacher in their midst. Secondly, as the rest of the dialogue shows us, with the right education citizens can actually learn much from foreigners.

To illustrate this, we need to return to the dialogue. We have just reached the point when Protagoras finishes telling his story about the origins of mankind. Following this performance, Socrates asks for clarification. He is confused about whether justice, temperance, and piety are all different things or simply different words for the same entity—virtue. Protagoras tells him that virtue is a single entity, and justice, temperance, and piety are its parts. To this list, they also add wisdom and courage. As the conversation proceeds, Socrates manages to convince him that

wisdom, temperance, justice, and piety are all the same thing.¹² Protagoras maintains, however, that courage is something completely different, for an ignorant man can be courageous. Hence, courage cannot be taught because it comes “from nature and the proper nurture of the soul” (351a).¹³ At this point, Socrates, seeking to prove that courage is no different from wisdom, begins to advance what some scholars interpret as an argument in favor of hedonism by asking Protagoras if what is pleasant is always good while what is unpleasant is always bad. Protagoras agrees, so long as one takes pleasure in honorable things. In response to this remark, Socrates identifies Protagoras with the masses by asking, “Surely you don’t, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things good?” (351c). Protagoras, attempting in turn to cast Socrates as a simpleton, answers that, based on his life experience, there are pleasurable things that are bad and painful things that are good.

Since Protagoras will not admit the connection between pleasure and the good, he suggests that Socrates present his case. Socrates proceeds by asking Protagoras whether he agrees with the many that knowledge is subordinate to other feelings—“sometimes desire, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear”—or if knowledge is capable of ruling a person so that he or she will always be able to do what is best (352b). Protagoras, who makes his living by charging money for his teachings, has no choice but to go against the opinion of the many: “Not only does it seem just as you say, Socrates, but further, it would be shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity” (352c-d). Socrates is satisfied with this answer, but says that

¹² I have skipped, of course, the steps Socrates took to change Protagoras’ mind, as well as the conversation’s “digression” into an argument over a Simonides’ poem, in which Socrates distinguishes between *being* good and *becoming* good, and advances the unconventional argument that, “To be a Spartan is to be a philosopher much more than to be an athlete” (342e). According to Socrates, the Spartans are some of the greatest sophists because they disguise themselves as un-philosophical warriors, but then shut foreigners out of the polis and secretly discuss philosophy among themselves.

¹³ Roger Duncan (1978) argues that Protagoras’ positive appraisal of courage is actually in tension with his “man-measure” maxim, for if all values are right then there is nothing worth dying for.

the trouble is that the many will not believe them; instead, they will argue that, “most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it” (352d). Socrates goes on to argue that even though people claim to indulge in food, drink, or sex, thinking they are pleasurable, in fact they are not pleasurable because they later bring about diseases, poverty, and other kinds of pain. Likewise, things like athletics, surgery, medicine, and dieting cannot really be said to be painful because in the end they bring pleasure. Protagoras agrees with Socrates on all these points, and through these arguments is brought into agreement with the statement that one should “call the very enjoying of something bad whenever it deprives us of greater pleasures than it itself provides, or brings about greater pains than the very pleasures inherent in it” (354c-d). In other words, he comes to agree that the good is nothing other than pleasure while the bad is nothing other than pain.

Having established that the good is always pleasant while the bad is always painful, Socrates moves on to explain why people sometimes move towards the bad even when they know it is bad. This is because, he says, “the power of appearance often makes us wander all over the place confused and regretting our actions and choices” (356d). By this he means that the smaller pleasures, when placed right in front of us, seem larger than the more distant pleasures that could be gained by abstaining from the immediate pleasure. To better understand this, Socrates presents us with a metaphor. When two objects are placed in our line of vision, the one that is farther away will appear smaller than the one that is closer, even if the one farther from us is in fact the larger object. Similarly, the pleasure of, say, overeating appears greater than the pleasure of living a healthier, longer life only because it is a pleasure that can be gained immediately rather than later down the road (though, as it turns out, this “pleasure” is actually a pain because of its consequences for our long-term health). Socrates claims that the deceptive

power of appearances can be overcome, however, with the “art of measurement,” which “would make the appearances lose their power by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and would save our life” (356d-e). Socrates, in short, argues that, “all our irrational desires are [...] responsive to teaching” (Nussbaum 2001, 121).

Tying up his argument, Socrates shows that when people say they do bad things even though they “know” they are bad, they are actually mistaken because a knowledgeable person would not choose the bad; thus, people who choose the bad are in fact ignorant. Eliciting Protagoras’ agreement, Socrates then shifts gears ever so slightly by establishing that fear or dread is an expectation of something bad and that a knowledgeable person will not go towards things to be feared because these are bad. Taking up Protagoras’ suggestion that war is noble and good, and that courageous people go to war, Socrates argues that the courageous go to war because they know that war is not to be feared because it leads to pleasure in the long run. Cowards, on the other hand, avoid war out of ignorance. The ultimate conclusion is that “the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and [...] the opposite of this ignorance” (360d). As Socrates reaches this conclusion, Protagoras becomes aware of the trap he is falling into and nods only reluctantly; when Socrates bluntly reveals that courage is actually no different from wisdom, Protagoras falls silent and only begrudgingly admits he was wrong to suggest that people can be ignorant yet courageous.

Yet, despite this admission—that wisdom, justice, temperance, piety, and courage are all the same—Protagoras maintains at the end that he and Socrates have switched positions. Socrates began by arguing that virtue was not teachable, but now believes that virtue is nothing other than knowledge and, thus, the logical conclusion of this is that virtue is teachable. Protagoras, on the other hand, began by arguing that virtue was teachable, but now believes it is

not. Protagoras seems to overlook the fact that, moments ago, he admitted the validity of Socrates' argument that virtue is knowledge, and that by now maintaining that virtue is not teachable he has essentially discredited his profession. In some sense, the smarter thing would have been for Protagoras to accept that Socrates has won the argument, and to take up Socrates' argument that virtue is teachable. Yet, doing this would concede that Socrates is the better teacher—something Protagoras' pride and position simply will not allow him to do. We see this at the end of the dialogue when Protagoras compliments Socrates, but refuses to admit his superior wisdom. Instead, he says he would not be surprised if Socrates gained among men high repute for wisdom, suggesting that the conversation that just took place has not proven Socrates' superior wisdom. The observant reader cannot help but notice, however, that Socrates, in successfully arguing that virtue is teachable, has proven Protagoras an inferior teacher.

Moreover, Socrates has shown that it is possible to engage with and even learn from foreigners without risking the quality or very existence of one's democratic community. By learning the art of measurement, citizens will be able to distinguish the good from the bad and to choose the good rather than the bad. Recall what Socrates said earlier about how often people are attracted by immediate pleasures that bring them pain in the long run, such as the pleasure of overeating which in the long run causes health problems. Another example Socrates could very well have evoked is the attraction politically ambitious democrats have towards the foreigner who promises to teach them how to become clever speakers. While taking the easy route of learning how to appear just rather than actually being just may bring temporary pleasure, citizens who practice the art of measurement will know that in the long run appearing rather than being just often has devastating consequences not only for one's community but also for oneself. Moreover, it is the citizens who are truly just that receive the greatest reward—eternal praise.

Thus, by learning the art of measurement, citizens can become knowledgeable customers of the advice of others. Armed with this education, they can converse with others—foreign or not—with less risk of damage to their souls. What is more, the art of measurement will allow them to “buy” good advice, whether from a fellow citizen or a foreigner. In this way, citizens will be able to maximize the benefits of engaging with foreigners while also minimizing the risks.

IV. Conclusion

Writing in 1948, Alexander Meiklejohn prefaced a book with reference to the Attorney General who has “restricted the speech of temporary visitors to our shores” and who is “afraid that we, whose agent he is, will be led astray by opinions which are alien and subversive” (1948, xiii-iv). Plato’s *Protagoras* suggests that there are indeed legitimate reasons to fear the political influence of foreigners, chief among them the possible corruption of one’s best citizens. Yet, he does not seem to think it necessary or desirable to restrict the speech of foreigners. Rather, his answer is to teach citizens the art of measurement, which will allow them to distinguish the good from the bad and to choose the former over the latter. To be clear, Plato does not seem to be saying that the foreigner is always a threat to democracies; in fact, in other dialogues such as the *Laws* Plato is quite clear that foreigners can bring wisdom to the community and thus it would be foolish to exclude them entirely. Rather, the suggestion here is that foreigners are simply less constrained than citizens in what they can teach and therefore are more likely to promote the unjust. With the art of measurement, however, citizens can learn to obtain the wisdom that some foreigners bring and reject advice that leads to injustice.

How applicable, however, is Plato’s solution today? Could it *ever* work? On the one hand, if we take seriously Plato’s suggestion in many other dialogues that the education one

receives during one's youth plays a primary role in shaping the adult one becomes, then it seems plausible that with our extensive public education system we could teach young people, at least to some degree, the value of placing long term gain over short term gain and of choosing the just over the unjust. One might object, however, that this cannot work because we do not all agree on what is just. I would argue though that such agreement is actually unnecessary to a large degree. The art of measurement provides a beginning point, a method by which we may begin to examine whether or not the principles on which most Americans, or even a small segment of Americans, agree are actually just. Thus, it is not even necessary for us to agree on what is just in every instance, as long as we can agree on one basic principle—that the best life is that which brings the most happiness. We need not even here agree on what happiness is, for the goal of the art of measurement is to help us identify what true happiness is.

The *Protagoras* therefore supplies us with a fairly promising solution to the problem of maximizing the benefits of allowing foreigners into our country while minimizing the risks they sometimes can pose. It does not, however, do all the hard work for us. Though there are hints about what is just and what makes people truly happy and some of these arguments could conceivably hold today, in some cases the reflections on justice and happiness that we find might be more suited to the context in which Plato wrote or his characters conversed, or might not capture at all the circumstances within which people today live. Moreover, Plato's solution does not explicitly address one of the major ways in which foreigners today exercise political influence—by becoming citizens, an achievement that is still difficult but certainly not as difficult as during Plato's time. Nonetheless, the art of measurement could perhaps help solve problems such as these. Either way, Plato leaves us with many problems to solve, and a method worthy at least of our consideration.

Works Cited

- Bartlett, Robert C. "Political Philosophy and Sophistry: An Introduction to Plato's Protagoras." *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (October 2003): 612-624.
- Berger, Harry J. "Facing Sophists: Socrates' Charismatic Bondage in Protagoras." *Representations* 5 (Winter 1984): 66-91.
- Carens, Joseph H. 1996. "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders." In *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. W. Kymlicka. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coby, Patrick. *Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras*. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1987.
- Duncan, Roger. "Courage in Plato's 'Protagoras'." *Phronesis* 23, no. 3 (1978): 216-228.
- Erler, Edward J. "American Citizenship and Postmodern Challenges." In *The Founders on Citizenship and Immigration: Principles and Challenges in America*, edited by Edward J. Erler, Thomas G. West and John Marini, 25-74. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007.
- Euben, J. Peter. *Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Farrar, Cynthia. *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

- Ferrarin, Alfredo. "Homo Faber, Homo Sapiens, or Homo Politicus? Protagoras and the Myth of Prometheus." *The Review of Metaphysics* 54, no. 2 (Dec. 2000): 289-319.
- Finley, M.I. *Democracy Ancient and Modern*. Revised Edition. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996.
- Frede, Michael. "Introduction." In *Plato: Protagoras*, translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, vii-xxxiv. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. "The Protagoras: Summary." In *Plato: Protagoras and Meno*, by Plato, edited by E.V. Rieu, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, 30-37. London: Wyman & Sons, 1956.
- Honig, Bonnie. 2001. *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald, Max D. Larsen, and Jon Miller. 2006. "United States [2006]." In *World Values Survey*.
- Jefferson, Thomas. "Letters on the Constitution (1787, 1789)." In *American Political Thought: A Norton Anthology*, edited by Isaac Kramnick and Theodore J. Lowi, 244-248. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
- Kerferd, G.B. "Protagoras' Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the 'Protagoras' of Plato." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 73 (1953): 42-45.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Revised Edition. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Office of the Press Secretary. "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address." *The White House*. 27 January 2010. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address> (accessed 2010 1-April).

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2009. "Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2009." Washington, D.C.

Plato. *Protagoras*. Translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.

—. *Protagoras*. Translated by C.C.W. Taylor. London: Oxford University Press, 1976.

—. *Protagoras and Meno*. Translated by Adam Beresford. London: Penguin Group, 2005.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. *Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens*. 1st Paperback Edition. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Walzer, Michael. 1983. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.